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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Essays
Immigration is at the center of public attention in many developed countries. The large
refugee inﬂow to Europe with more than 1.4 million applications for asylum in 2015
alone, has dominated public and political debates in European countries over the last
years. However, immigration has been a key issue for many countries long before the
recent refugee migration to Europe. Large-scale immigration to classic immigration
countries such as the United States, Canada or Australia has a long tradition; and
increasing immigration to European countries since the second half of the 20th century
transformed many European countries into immigration countries. Over the last three
decades, the number of ﬁrst-generation immigrants living in OECD countries has more
than doubled, reaching a number of 135 million in 2017 (United Nations Population
Division, 2018; OECD/European Union, 2015).
Figure 1.1 displays the population shares of ﬁrst-generation immigrants in diﬀer-
ent OECD countries between 1990 and 2017. It illustrates that the relative number
of immigrants grew substantially during this period in all displayed countries. More-
over, the immigrant populations in many European countries are today comparable in
relative size to those in classic immigration countries. For example, the foreign-born
population shares in 2017 in France (12.2%), the U.K. (13.4%), Germany (14.8%), and
Sweden (17.6%), are similar to the share of immigrants in the United States (15.3%).
In Switzerland, Australia, and Canada, these numbers lie between 20 and 30 percent.
At the same time, we observe increasing skepticism and anti-immigration sentiments
in the public and political debates in several of these countries over the last years. For
example, the emergence of populist right-wing parties in many European countries (e.g.,
in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and France) is closely related to these sentiments,
mostly against Muslim immigrants from non-EU countries (e.g., The Economist, 2010).
Furthermore, the Brexit referendum in the U.K. was dominated by discussions about
immigration from EU-countries (e.g., The Economist, 2016); and also the election of
Donald Trump partly built on anti-immigration rhetoric.
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Figure 1.1: Immigrant Populations in diﬀerent OECD countries
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Note: The ﬁgure displays the population shares of foreign-borns in Canada, the U.S., Australia, the U.K., Germany,
France, Sweden, and Switzerland over the period from 1990 to 2017. Source: United Nations Population Division (2018).
A typical explanation for such anti-immigration sentiments are economic concerns
of the receiving population with respect to an increased competition for jobs and the
associated ﬁscal costs of immigration. However, a perceived lack of integration plays
another important role. While the economic integration of immigrants is mostly a con-
cern in the public debate, a number of studies suggest that especially the integration
along social and cultural lines and its eﬀects on the host society are important deter-
minants of attitudes towards immigration. Accordingly, the integration of immigrants
is repeatedly mentioned as one of the main issues of concern in public opinion surveys
in many countries (e.g., Card et al., 2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller
et al., 2015; OECD/European Union, 2015).
It appears that the economic and social integration of immigrant populations is
a major challenge for many host countries. It is crucial for both the well-being of
individual immigrants and the social cohesion of destination countries. Hence, to avoid
high economic and social costs for immigrants and destination countries alike, it is
important to understand the integration process, and to identify determinants and
policy instruments that can be useful to support successful integration.
Given the labor market implications and the intense debates over the merits of im-
migration, a sizable literature has evolved in economics that is concerned with migra-
tion. One major strand of this literature studies the migration decision of immigrants,
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and treats migration as an investment including costs and beneﬁts (Sjaastad, 1962; see
Bodvarsson et al., 2015 for a survey of the literature). A second important strand of
the migration literature is concerned with the eﬀects of immigration and emigration
on the labor markets in the destination and origin countries, respectively (e.g., Dust-
mann et al., 2016, on measuring eﬀects of immigration on the destination country's
labor market; Beine et al., 2008, on brain drain in origin countries). A third large
strand of the migration literature is concerned with the integration and assimilation
of immigrants.1 More speciﬁcally, this literature analyzes how immigrants perform
and develop in the new country. Starting with the seminal work of Chiswick (1978),
immigrant-native gaps in labor market outcomes and the progress of immigrants with
time spent in the destination country have been studied extensively (e.g., Borjas, 1985,
1995; LaLonde and Topel, 1992; Duleep and Regets, 1999; Lubotsky, 2007). While the
main focus of this literature lies on labor market assimilation, there is an increasing
interest also in the assimilation with respect to social, cultural, and political outcomes.
Examples for outcomes studied in this literature are marriage and fertility decisions,
residential location, or name-choices (e.g., Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Abramitzky et al.,
2016).
The assimilation literature draws a mixed picture on immigrants' assimilation in
diﬀerent countries. Especially in European countries, immigrants and their children
are often found to perform worse in the labor market than natives. In addition,
both economic and social assimilation are observed to happen at a rather slow pace
(OECD/European Union, 2015; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011; Algan et al., 2012). On
the contrary, classic immigration countries, such as the United States or Canada, have
a lot of experience in absorbing huge immigrant populations. Therefore, immigrants
and their descendants are typically found to assimilate much faster in these countries
than in Europe. However, the topic of integration has become increasingly prominent
also in the United States, where the changing composition of immigrants since 1965
is also reﬂected in a larger heterogeneity in assimilation patterns among more recent
immigrant cohorts (e.g., Card, 2005).
The literature proposes several reasons for initial diﬀerences between immigrants
and natives with respect to economic performance and other dimensions, as well as
for the observed assimilation patterns of immigrants. Most importantly, education
and skill acquisition play a key role (Dustmann and Glitz, 2011). For example, the
immigrant-native gaps in labor market performance in many European countries are
in large part caused by less favorable socio-demographic characteristics, i.e., by a lower
formal education of immigrants (e.g., OECD/European Union, 2015). However, also
1In the economics literature, the term `assimilation' refers to the process of closing immigrant-native
gaps in labor market or social outcomes. It is often used interchangeably with the term `integration'
in this literature, even though `integration' describes the inclusion of immigrants in the society more
generally. This thesis follows the literature and uses `assimilation' and `integration' interchangeably.
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immigrants with a higher stock of human capital may have problems to utilize their
skills after immigration. A diﬀerent valuation and non-recognition of diplomas in the
destination country can cause occupational downgrading (e.g., Eckstein and Weiss,
2004; Dumont and Monso, 2007). Furthermore, an initial lack in complementary des-
tination country-speciﬁc human capital, such as language skills, hinders immigrants to
reach their potential, leading to disadvantages in the labor market and a slow social
integration of immigrants (Chiswick and Miller, 2015, survey the literature on language
acquisition and its eﬀects).
An immigrant's willingness to invest in destination country-speciﬁc human capital
and also in additional general human capital, depends crucially on the expected returns
to skills. Many factors are likely to determine these returns. One of the most promi-
nent factors inﬂuencing the investment decisions of immigrants is the time span that
they plan to stay in the country (Dustmann and Görlach, 2015, survey the literature
on temporary migration). Other factors that may inﬂuence (country-speciﬁc) human
capital investments are the motive of immigration and the legal status of immigrants
(e.g., Chin and Cortes, 2015; Gathmann and Keller, 2017).
Apart from these classic human capital arguments, other aspects like ethnic net-
works or ethnic capital, immigration policies, and discrimination are likely to aﬀect
the performance of immigrants and their integration process (e.g., Battisti et al., 2016;
Gathmann and Keller, 2017; Kaas and Manger, 2012). Another factor, which is among
the most controversial topics in the integration debates in many European countries,
is the (national) identity of immigrants. A growing literature in economics studies the
question, whether it matters for the social and economic integration of immigrants if
they feel more connected to their origin country, or if they have a feeling of belong-
ing to the destination country (e.g., Casey and Dustmann, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011b;
Nekby and Rödin, 2010). The channels through which the identity of immigrants may
aﬀect their integration are then related to the aforementioned mechanisms, e.g., the
formation of social networks and investments in country-speciﬁc human capital.
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the integration of immigrants
in diﬀerent contexts. The essays cover a broad variety of dimensions of integration,
including outcomes of economic and social integration, and identify particular mecha-
nisms that foster or impede assimilation. Thus, the thesis primarily contributes to the
literature on social and economic assimilation and their determinants. The three essays
have in common that they consider the relationship of immigrants to their destination
and origin countries as an important factor in the assimilation process. The general
idea is that an immigrant's subjective feeling or objective legal status of belonging
somewhere, aﬀects her long-term integration by providing or reducing incentives to
invest in country-speciﬁc human capital, social networks, and other opportunities.
In Chapter 2, I investigate how the national identity of ﬁrst-generation immigrants,
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measured as attachment to their origin country, inﬂuences the long-term integration of
the second generation. In particular, this chapter addresses the research question how
the origin attachment of immigrant parents in the U.S. aﬀects the integration of their
children in the dimensions of identity, social networks, language use and skills, and
school performance. Hence, the focus in Chapter 2 lies on the emotional relationship
of immigrants to their origin country and its long-term eﬀects on social and economic
integration.
Chapter 3, which is joint work with Christina Gathmann and Nicolas Keller, ana-
lyzes the eﬀect of a liberal citizenship policy on the social integration of immigrants in
Germany. More speciﬁcally, we analyze whether the option to naturalize faster, speeds
up the social assimilation of immigrants with respect to fertility, family formation, and
partner choice. Since acquiring citizenship gives immigrants the same rights as the
native population in the destination country, citizenship changes the legal status with
which an immigrant belongs to the destination society. Thus, the focus in this chapter
lies on the legal relationship of immigrants to their destination country.
Chapter 4 of this thesis is joint work with Christina Gathmann, and aims to as-
sess the labor market assimilation of immigrants in Germany. Most previous studies on
economic assimilation in Germany have focused explicitly or implicitly on guest worker
immigrants (e.g., Pischke, 1992; Schmidt, 1997). While these earlier studies ﬁnd little
or no evidence for economic assimilation despite large earnings diﬀerentials upon ar-
rival, these results might not be relatable to more recent immigrants in Germany, since
the composition of more recent immigrant cohorts with respect to education, origin
countries, etc. is very diﬀerent from earlier cohorts. Moreover, Germany's relationship
to immigration has changed over the last decades because it has become an immigra-
tion country. Therefore, more recent immigrants may have more incentives to invest
in country-speciﬁc human capital than guest workers. Thus, the motivation of this
chapter partly builds on the idea that the relationship between the receiving society
and immigrants aﬀects integration.
In the following, each of the chapters is summarized in more detail.
National Attachment and the Integration of Second-Generation
Immigrants in the U.S.
In Chapter 2, I analyze the eﬀects of immigrants' national identity on their children's
integration in the dimensions of identity, social networks, language use and skills,
and school performance. Due to the potential endogeneity of immigrants' identity
formation, most previous studies are limited in their scope and report correlations
between some proxy of identity and diﬀerent integration outcomes (e.g., Casey and
Dustmann, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011b; Nekby and Rödin, 2010).
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In this essay, I use a sample of immigrant parents and their children in the United
States from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey (CILS), and rely on an
IV-strategy to identify the eﬀect of a parent's national identity on her children's inte-
gration outcomes. Parents' national identity is approximated with a composite measure
of attachment to their origin country. In order to overcome endogeneity, I instrument
parents' national attachment with a measure of average national pride of the popula-
tion in their country of origin. The idea of the instrument is that immigrants from
diﬀerent backgrounds might be diﬀerently attached to their origin countries, since the
importance of national identity varies across countries due to historical and cultural
reasons. A theoretical model on the transmission of identity across two generations is
introduced in order to motivate this empirical strategy.
The empirical results conﬁrm that immigrants from countries with high average
national pride are more attached to their origin countries, and that parents transmit
their origin attachment to their children. Moreover, my main results show that a
pronounced origin identity of parents has negative eﬀects on their children's integration.
Children whose parents are strongly attached to the origin country are less likely to have
contact with natives, speak English less frequently and more poorly, and perform worse
in school than peers whose parents are less attached to their origin country. Suggestive
evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) further indicates that a stronger
origin identity leads to disadvantages in the labor market for male second-generation
immigrants.
The main contribution of this essay is that it addresses the endogeneity issue when
analyzing the link between national identity and integration, and establishes a negative
eﬀect of a strong origin attachment of immigrants on the integration of the second
generation. The results indicate that the relationship of immigrants to their origin
country aﬀects long-term integration. Thus, these results support inclusive policies
that promote an immigrant's feeling of belonging to the destination society, since they
have the potential to weaken origin ties and encourage the formation of a destination
country identity. Examples of such policies could be a liberal access to citizenship,
which is studied in the subsequent chapter.
Citizenship and Social Integration
Chapter 3 analyzes the causal link between citizenship and social integration. In par-
ticular, my co-authors and I analyze whether a more liberal access to citizenship aﬀects
the social assimilation of immigrants with respect to fertility, family formation, and
partner choice. Further, we investigate the role of immigrants' expectations about their
assumed residency requirement for citizenship for their long-term decisions. Finally,
we study cultural heterogeneity of the eﬀects.
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A liberal citizenship policy may aﬀect the marriage and fertility decisions of eligible
immigrants through three channels: income, human capital and social norms. The
option to naturalize faster in the host country improves the earnings of immigrants in
the labor market, since citizenship removes entry barriers and restrictions on mobility
(Bratsberg et al., 2002; Gathmann and Keller, 2017). It further encourages additional
investments in (destination country-speciﬁc) human capital. Finally, citizenship is a
policy instrument that could foster a destination country identity, since the option to
naturalize allows immigrants to become equal members of the host society with all
rights and responsibilities. As a result, the option to naturalize could inﬂuence the
social norms or values that immigrants want or feel obliged to follow (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000). Higher wages, more human capital, and an assimilation in norms
are likely to have consequences for the demand and timing of fertility, as well as the
position in the marriage market.
To identify the causal eﬀect of citizenship empirically, we cannot simply compare
naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants, because naturalized migrants are not se-
lected randomly from the immigrant population. A second diﬃculty is that eligibility to
citizenship is often closely tied to the number of years an immigrant has resided in the
host country. To overcome these empirical challenges, we exploit exogenous variation
in the eligibility rules for citizenship that was caused by two reforms in Germany. More
precisely, we exploit age-dependent residency requirements for naturalization that were
introduced in 1991. Immigrants who arrived at the age of 15 or older could naturalize
after 15 years of residency, while immigrants who arrived between the ages of 8 and 14
could naturalize after only 8 years. At the same time, foreign-borns who arrived before
the age of 8 could naturalize when they turn 16. The second reform in 2000 reduced the
residency requirement to 8 years for all immigrants arriving at age 8 or older; younger
immigrants still get eligible when they turn 16. The timing of the reforms provides
additional variation across immigrants depending on their year of arrival.
Based on data from the German Microcensus (2005-2010), we ﬁnd that the option
to naturalize faster has signiﬁcant eﬀects on fertility, family formation and partner
choice. Speciﬁcally, faster eligibility delays marriage but has no eﬀect on divorce or
cohabitation rates. Female immigrants reduce their demand for children and postpone
childbirth. Our estimates indicate that immigrants who were surprised by the reforms
converge much less in their fertility behavior and marriage choices than immigrants who
anticipated their waiting period. The average eﬀects mask substantial heterogeneity
across immigrant groups. Immigrants from more traditional cultures have not only
higher fertility and marriage rates, but also adapt more slowly to a liberal citizenship
policy than the average immigrant.
This essay provides causal evidence of the eﬀects of immigration policy on the social
assimilation of immigrants. A more liberal access to citizenship is found to speed up
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social assimilation. The results therefore indicate that policies that change the (legal)
relationship of immigrants to their destination country can support social assimilation.
The Labor Market Assimilation of Immigrants in Germany
In Chapter 4, we study the labor market assimilation of immigrants in Germany. De-
spite the huge interest in immigration in Germany, it is not quite clear from the existing
literature how immigrants perform and progress in the labor market. This is partly
caused by a lack of appropriate data sources: most papers in the existing literature
on assimilation in Germany use the GSOEP survey, where the number of foreigners
is very limited and the composition of the immigrant population is to some extent
problematic (Dustmann, 1993; Pischke, 1992; Licht and Steiner, 1993; Schmidt, 1997;
Bauer et al., 2005); others use the IAB employment register data (IEB), which suﬀer
from a selective identiﬁcation of immigrants (by citizenship) and the lack of a variable
indicating the year of migration (e.g., Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2015).
In this essay, we use a rich, new data source to analyze the assimilation of immi-
grants in employment, unemployment and wages. More speciﬁcally, our analysis relies
on the PASS-ADIAB dataset, which combines longitudinal earnings histories from so-
cial security records between 1975 and 2010 (IEB) with household survey data (PASS).
Whereas the administrative data contains no information on whether individuals are
immigrants and their year of arrival, such information can be added from the survey
data to produce an informative data source on migrant behavior.
The empirical results indicate that immigrants in Germany assimilate with respect
to their employment and unemployment probabilities. Within the ﬁrst ten years in Ger-
many, male and female immigrants close between 70% and 80% of the initial immigrant-
native gaps in employment, which are about 11 and 23 percentage points for men and
women, respectively. The assimilation in the probability of being unemployed is of
similar magnitude.
Due to the sizable relative employment growth of immigrants, the composition of the
immigrant population in the workforce is likely to change with years since migration. In
order to estimate wage assimilation, we therefore take into account potential selection
along the employment margin by applying diﬀerent methods to impute the missing
wages of non-employed individuals (a similar approach is used for gender wage gaps
by Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). Independent of the imputation method applied, we
ﬁnd robust evidence for wage assimilation among both male and female immigrants.
Over the ﬁrst 10 years, their wages increase by 10-11% relative to natives. When
investigating the heterogeneity of the eﬀects, we ﬁnd that especially immigrants from
former Soviet republics (most likely ethnic Germans) assimilate in the labor market,
while Turkish immigrants are less likely to catch up with natives. Further results
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indicate that immigrants in Germany tend to ﬁnd better job matches and are less
likely to change occupations or industries the longer they live in Germany.
This chapter revisits the labor market assimilation in Germany, and illustrates that
immigrants in Germany perform better than the previous literature suggests. Further-
more, it illustrates that selection along the employment margin can bias estimates of
wage assimilation substantially.
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Chapter 2
National Attachment and the
Integration of Second-Generation
Immigrants in the U.S.
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, the national identity of immigrants has increasingly attracted attention
in public debates on immigrant integration in many destination countries. In particu-
lar, the weak record of integration in many European countries is often attributed to a
strong attachment of immigrants to their origin countries. The observed persistence of
pronounced origin country identities among immigrants, even among the second and
third generation, is often argued to have detrimental eﬀects for their long-term integra-
tion (e.g., The Economist, 2017, on the recent discussions about Turkish immigrants
in Europe).
The economics literature proposes diﬀerent theoretical arguments why the national
identity of immigrants may aﬀect their integration (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000,
argue that identity aﬀects preferences and economic behavior). A pronounced origin
identity is likely to inﬂuence the ethnic composition of immigrants' social networks,
leading to lower incentives to invest in country-speciﬁc human capital, and access to
diﬀerent information on the labor market (e.g., Battu et al., 2007). Furthermore,
it may foster the formation of oppositional identities (e.g., Austen-Smith and Fryer,
2005). These factors may ultimately have negative eﬀects on the school and labor
market performance of immigrants and their descendants.
I thank Marianne Bitler, Christina Gathmann, Martin Lange, Andreas Lichter and participants
at CReAM/RWI Workshop on the Economics of Migration, internal seminar at the University of
Heidelberg, 11th RGS Doctoral Conference in Economics, Workshop on Microeconomics in Lüneburg,
the 21st IZA Summer School in Labor Economics, and the 32nd Annual ESPE Conference for valuable
comments and suggestions.
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Despite the increasing public attention, little is known about the eﬀects of immi-
grants' national identities. Only a few papers in economics have analyzed the link
between national or ethnic identity, and the integration of ﬁrst and second-generation
immigrants. These studies have mostly reported correlations, and produced ambigu-
ous results for European destination countries (e.g., Casey and Dustmann, 2010; Bisin
et al., 2011b).1 For the United States, previous research on ethnic identity has exclu-
sively focused on racial achievement gaps, and has paid little attention to its potential
eﬀects on the performance of immigrants (e.g., Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Fryer and
Torelli, 2010). However, questions regarding the factors that favor or impede long-term
integration have become more prominent also in the United States, as the changing
composition of immigrants since the 1960s is also reﬂected in a larger heterogeneity in
assimilation patterns among more recent immigrant cohorts.2
In this paper, I investigate how the national identity of ﬁrst-generation immigrants,
measured as attachment to their origin country, inﬂuences the long-term integration of
the second generation. In particular, this paper addresses the research question how the
origin attachment of immigrant parents aﬀects the integration of their children in the
dimensions of identity, social networks, language use and skills, and school performance.
To answer this question, I use a sample of immigrant parents and their children
from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey (CILS). The CILS data include
several variables reﬂecting a parent's attachment to her origin country, which are used
as a composite measure to proxy national identity. The major challenge for identifying
causal eﬀects of immigrants' national attachment on their children's integration out-
comes lies in its potential endogeneity. First, there might exist reverse causality such
that a low performance of immigrants in the destination country may increase attach-
ment to their origin country. Furthermore, immigrants with a strong origin attachment
may have other traits that favor or impede integration.
Therefore, the empirical approach of this paper relies on an IV-strategy to overcome
potential endogeneity. More speciﬁcally, the instrument for immigrants' national at-
tachment is the average national pride of the population in their origin country, which
is taken from the Integrated Values Survey (IVS). The instrument is based on the
idea that immigrants from diﬀerent backgrounds might be diﬀerently attached to their
origin countries, since historical and cultural reasons aﬀect the importance of national
identity across countries. I motivate this empirical strategy with a theoretical model on
1The national identity of immigrants is generally treated as a concept of ethnic identity in this
literature, and therefore, this paper also treats national identity as ethnic identity.
2Figure 2.A.1 illustrates this heterogeneity in terms of real wages for male second-generation immi-
grants. It reports origin country coeﬃcients of second-generation immigrants in a log-wage regression
for men in the CPS (1994-2015). While second-generation immigrants in the U.S. earn, conditional on
education, on average 3% less than natives, there exists substantial heterogeneity across origin coun-
tries, even among immigrants from countries that are located within more homogeneous geographical
areas.
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the transmission of identity across two generations. The model illustrates that immi-
grants from countries with a higher weight on national identity will choose an identity
for themselves and their children that deviates less from the origin country's norms.
The empirical results indicate that immigrants from countries with high national
pride are indeed more attached to their origin countries. Moreover, I ﬁnd strong sup-
port for the theoretical prediction that a more pronounced origin attachment of parents
is transmitted to their children, and that it impedes children's assimilation. Children
whose parents are strongly attached to the origin country have less contact with natives,
speak English less frequently and more poorly, and perform worse in school than peers
whose parents are less attached to their origin country. Furthermore, reduced-form es-
timates in the Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest that a stronger origin identity
leads to disadvantages in the labor market for male second-generation immigrants. All
results are very robust to various robustness checks.
The results of this study illustrate that the national identity of immigrants inﬂu-
ences long-term integration. It aﬀects their and their children's social networks and
(country-speciﬁc) human capital investments, and leads to disadvantages in the labor
market. Thus, whether immigrants are emotionally oriented towards their origin coun-
try or open to the new society, plays an important role for the integration process.
The results therefore support inclusive policies that promote an immigrant's feeling
of belonging to the destination society, since they have the potential to weaken origin
ties and encourage the formation of a destination country identity. One example of
such policies could be a liberal access to citizenship. Furthermore, the recent eﬀorts
made by many countries to target the identity of immigrants more directly through
immigration policies, might help to reduce negative eﬀects of national attachment.3
The analysis in this paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it is
closely related to the rapidly growing literature on identity in economics, and in par-
ticular to the literature on ethnic identity, its intergenerational transmission, and its
eﬀects on school or labor market performance. A couple of theoretical studies analyze
the link between ethnic identity and education or labor market outcomes. Their main
focus lies on the formation of oppositional identities among ethnic minorities, and on
potential trade-oﬀs between a pronounced ethnic identity and school or labor market
opportunities (e.g., Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Battu et al., 2007; Patacchini and
Zenou, 2016). Empirically, a few papers study correlations between ethnic identity
and labor market outcomes of immigrants. Most of these papers use variables such as
ethnic self-identiﬁcation, language use, number of same-origin friends, or attachment
3One type of these policies are compulsory language and integration courses that exist for example
in France (Service-Public, 2018) and Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). A
second type are requirements for naturalization that demand immigrants to commit to the destination
country's culture and value system, and have been introduced in many countries in recent years (e.g.,
civics test in the U.S.).
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to religion as proxies for ethnic identity, and produce ambiguous results on its link with
labor market outcomes (e.g., Casey and Dustmann, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011b; Nekby
and Rödin, 2010; Battu and Zenou, 2010). While some ﬁnd penalties for having a
strong ethnic identity (e.g., Bisin et al., 2011b), others do not ﬁnd negative eﬀects
(e.g., Casey and Dustmann, 2010). Again other papers focus on the formation of the
destination country identity rather than the origin country identity (e.g., Manning and
Roy, 2010). The main contribution of this paper to this literature is that it exploits
exogenous variation in the importance of the origin country identity of immigrants, in
order to estimate its causal eﬀects on integration outcomes.4 Furthermore, it uses a
novel concept of ethnic identity, namely the attachment of immigrants to their origin
country. This measure of ethnic identity has the advantage that it is not an integration
outcome itself unlike some imposed measures of ethnic identity in the literature (e.g.,
the language use of immigrants). Another advantage of this measure is that it repre-
sents eﬀectively the idea of identity that is present in public debates on immigrants'
identity. A third contribution of this paper to this literature is that it investigates
the eﬀects of national identity on the integration of immigrants in the U.S., whereas
most previous research on ethnic identity in the U.S. has focused on explaining racial
achievement gaps.5
Second, this paper contributes to the sizable literature on immigrant assimila-
tion, since it analyzes identity as a factor that inﬂuences long-term assimilation (e.g.,
Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985, 1995; Duleep and Regets, 1999; Lubotsky, 2007; Card,
2005). It also contributes to the literature on the assimilation of second-generation
immigrants by focusing on outcomes of this population (Dustmann and Glitz, 2011;
Borjas, 1992, 1993; Card, 2005; Sweetman and Van Ours, 2014). Furthermore, this
study is related to the literature on ethnic capital and ethnic networks, since the social
networks of parents are found to depend on their national attachment (Battisti et al.,
2016; Bisin et al., 2011b; Borjas, 1992; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Dustmann et al.,
2016).
Finally, the empirical approach in this paper is related to a growing literature that
tries to identify the economic eﬀects of culture through the use of the epidemiological
approach (e.g., Blau, 1992; Blau et al., 2011; Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009;
Fernández, 2011).6 My approach exploits a similar type of variation to the epidemio-
4As opposed to other papers, such as Nekby and Rödin (2010), who diﬀerentiate four dimensions
of the national identity of immigrants by considering combinations of the origin and the destination
country identities, this paper does not consider the eﬀects of changes in immigrants' destination
country identity. The focus lies exclusively on the origin identity, since the exogenous variation only
aﬀects the origin country identity in this setting.
5For instance, the studies of Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Fryer and Torelli (2010) are
concerned with the achievement gaps between Black and White students in the U.S.
6The epidemiological approach is the attempt to identify the eﬀect of culture through the variation
in economic outcomes of individuals who share the same economic and institutional environment, but
whose social beliefs are potentially diﬀerent (Fernández, 2011, p. 489). In this empirical literature,
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logical approach, namely variation in an aggregate measure across origin countries of
second-generation immigrants. However, compared to studies that apply the epidemi-
ological approach, the IV-approach allows to narrow down the channel through which
this cultural eﬀect works. Moreover, the data provides rich information on the parents
such that I can control for many important characteristics that might be omitted when
applying the epidemiological approach (e.g., parents' education, labor market position,
and years since migration).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical mech-
anisms through which parents' national identity could aﬀect the integration of their
children. Furthermore, a theoretical model on the transmission of identity is intro-
duced in order to motivate the empirical strategy of this paper. Section 2.3 introduces
the data sources as well as the empirical strategy to identify the eﬀects of national
attachment. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical results. Section 2.5 presents additional
results and a range of sensitivity checks in order to demonstrate the robustness of the
results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Considerations
In this section, I discuss mechanisms through which immigrants' attachment to their
origin country could aﬀect the integration of their children. Building on this discussion,
I then introduce a simple model on the intergenerational transmission of identity that
is used to motivate my empirical strategy.
2.2.1 Origin Attachment and Long-Term Integration
From an economics point of view, there exist several potential reasons why the identity
of immigrants and their descendants is of vital interest. A growing literature in eco-
nomics has focused on identity, and points out that the concept of identity may aﬀect
important life choices. Identity inﬂuences preferences, creates externalities, and aﬀects
economic behavior. All of these factors have eﬀects on economic performance (e.g.,
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). In the given context, there are two particularly relevant
channels through which a stronger origin attachment of immigrant parents might aﬀect
the long-term integration of their children.
The attachment of immigrants to their origin country is likely to have an inﬂuence
on their preferences with respect to social networks. After immigrating to the desti-
nation country, immigrants with a strong national attachment to the origin country
will therefore choose social networks with a higher emphasis on the origin country, i.e.,
cultural variation across origin countries is used to investigate how culture aﬀects outcomes like female
labor supply, fertility (Fernández and Fogli, 2009) or living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007) in the host
country among second- or third-generation immigrants (see Fernández, 2011, for a survey).
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they are likely to have more friends and acquaintances who are immigrants from the
same origin country.7 Thus, the children of parents with a strong ethnic identity grow
up in a diﬀerent social surrounding, which is induced by their parents' choices. Bisin
and Verdier (2011) describe, for example, that self-segregation of parents is a decision
where the cultural composition of the surrounding is at least partly under control of
the parents. They can choose schools, neighborhoods, peers, and so on, and thereby
inﬂuence their children, who then pick traits by matching in society.
These more pronounced ethnic networks are likely to have negative eﬀects on the long-
term integration of children for diﬀerent reasons. Growing up in a surrounding with
more persons of the same national background will decrease incentives and oppor-
tunities to invest in country-speciﬁc human capital, such as the destination country
language. Hence, children of immigrants with strong origin-country networks might
end up having a lower language proﬁciency  with negative consequences for their
school and labor market performance (e.g., Chiswick and Miller, 2002; Bleakley and
Chin, 2004). Another reason is that ethnic rather than native networks are likely to
provide diﬀerent information regarding labor market opportunities. Battu et al. (2007)
model such a trade-oﬀ between labor market opportunities and ethnic preferences. In
both cases, parents' preferences with respect to social networks will negatively aﬀect
their children's education and labor market success through a diﬀerent horizontal so-
cialization.
Apart from inducing a diﬀerent social network, parents also aﬀect their children
through vertical socialization. Immigrant parents with a strong origin attachment are
likely to transmit their origin attachment to the children. For example, they might
raise their children more according to their origin culture, talk more positively about
the origin country, or visit the country more often. This vertical transmission of the
ethnic identity could aﬀect the child because the stronger origin attachment of a child
will lead to social network preferences that are similar to those of their parents. Hence,
the same mechanisms will apply to a child's network with the consequences described
above. Additionally, immigrant children with a strong origin identity might be more
likely to form oppositional identities. For example, Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005)
formalize a particular peer eﬀect, acting White, as a two-audience signaling problem:
In their model, ethnic minorities face a tension between signaling their type to the
outside labor market and their peers, since signals that induce high wages can be
signals that induce peer rejection. A similar mechanism could also apply for children
of immigrants.
The discussion of theoretical mechanisms gives reasons to expect that a stronger
origin attachment of immigrant parents could have negative eﬀects on the integration
7For example, Fryer and Torelli (2010) use a measure that is based on the share of same-race friends
as a proxy for ethnic identity.
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of second-generation immigrants. In particular, one can form the expectation for the
empirical analysis that children of parents with a strong origin attachment have a
more ethnic social network, speak the destination country's language less frequently
and more poorly, and perform worse in school and in the labor market. Furthermore,
immigrant children of parents who are more attached to the origin country are more
likely to develop a more pronounced origin identity, and consequently, this may result
in an oppositional identity.
2.2.2 The Transmission of Ethnic Identity
After discussing theoretical arguments for the expectation that a stronger origin at-
tachment of immigrants negatively aﬀects the long-term integration, I introduce in
this subsection a simple model on the transmission of ethnic identity from parents to
children.8 The model allows to formalize ideas regarding the mechanisms that form
the ethnic identity of immigrants and their children, and will furthermore be useful to
motivate the choice of the instrument in the empirical setting.
In this model, parents who migrate to a country face the decision to what extent
they acculturate and how to raise their children. Very simpliﬁed, the identity choices
that parents have to take are therefore the decisions on how much they and their chil-
dren should assimilate and deviate from the origin identity.
Parents are assumed to have an interest in preserving their origin identity, since they
grew up in the origin country and were raised according to its norms and values. How-
ever, as argued in the previous section, a strong origin identity might negatively aﬀect
an immigrant's labor market position. Hence, the decision for the parents' identity
depends on the eﬀect of acculturation on their labor market position, and on the disu-
tility from deviating from the origin culture.
Parents further have to decide how to educate and raise their children, and which values
and norms to transmit to them, thereby implicitly deciding on their identity. Marks
et al. (2007) illustrate that the level of immigrant parents' acculturation inﬂuences the
development of their children's ethnic identity. This may be the case because they
prefer that their children become similar to themselves, but they may also simply not
be able to educate their children in a way that promotes the destination country's
views and norms. At the same time, altruistic parents have incentives to maximize
the future prospects of their descendants. Hence, if a strong ethnic identity of children
decreases their future chances in the labor market, or if it creates disutility through
other channels, for example due to a higher risk of social marginalization, then this
will also inﬂuence the identity decision of parents.
Parents therefore face a trade-oﬀ. They want to maximize their utility by maintaining
8National attachment to the origin country is conceptually treated as ethnic identity in this model.
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origin norms and by raising their children similarly to themselves and ultimately sim-
ilar to those origin norms. Conversely, they want to minimize possible disadvantages
from an identity that deviates too much from the native norms.
The following utility function of parents formalizes these ideas:
Up = yp + πuc − θ(Ic − Ip)2 − µ(Ip − xo)2. (2.1)
In this formulation, the utility Up of a parent p depends on her income yp and the
future utility of her child c, uc. Ip and Ic represent the identity of the parent and the
child respectively, and xo are the norms and values of the origin country. The latter
two parts of the utility function are loss functions, decreasing the utility of a parent
if children deviate from parents, as well as if parents deviate from the origin country
norms. The weights θ and µ determine how important each part is for the utility of a
parent.
The child's future utility uc depends on future earnings and the social status of a child,
uc = yc − S(Ic), with S ′Ic(·) > 0, (2.2)
where yc represents future earnings of a child, and the function S(Ic) describes potential
eﬀects of a strong ethnic identity on the child's social position in society. As previously
discussed, a stronger ethnic identity may aﬀect the utility that a child gains from its
social status, for example, if it causes the child to feel marginalized throughout her life.
The future earnings of a parent and her child are given by
yp = tp − ζ(Ip), with ζ ′Ip(·) > 0 (2.3)
yc = tc − σζ(Ip)− η(Ic), with η′Ic(·) > 0 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. (2.4)
Earnings depend on the individual earnings potentials tp and tc, as well as functions
ζ(Ip) and η(Ic) through which the ethnic identity of the child and the parent, may have
an eﬀect on the labor market position. The assumption that the ﬁrst derivatives of
those functions are positive, meaning that the earnings of parents and children depend
negatively on identity, are reasoned in the previous section.
Therefore, a parent who has to decide on her own and her child's ethnic identity
in this model faces the trade-oﬀ outlined above: A strong ethnic identity of a parent
minimizes losses from the latter loss function, since the parent does not deviate so
much from the origin country's norms. At the same time, it decreases utility due to its
eﬀects on the earnings of the parent and future earnings of the child. A decision for a
strong ethnic identity of a child might decrease the distance between the parent's and
the child's identity, and therefore increase utility. However, the decision for a strong
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ethnic identity of a child generates disutility for the parent through its negative eﬀects
on the child's social position, and the future earnings of the child.
The parent maximizes Up with respect to Ic and Ip. Maximizing equation (2.1)
with respect to the child's identity Ic and solving the ﬁrst order condition gives
Ic = Ip − π
2θ
(
η′(Ic) + S ′(Ic)
)
. (2.5)
Maximizing equation (2.1) with respect to the parent's identity Ip gives the parent's
optimal choice of identity:
Ip =
1
θ + µ
[
µxo + θIc −
(1 + πσ
2
)
ζ ′(Ip)
]
. (2.6)
Substituting the parent's optimal identity from equation (2.6) into equation (2.5) and
solving by Ic gives:
Ic = xo −
(1 + πσ
2µ
)
ζ ′(Ip)− π(θ + µ)
2θµ
(
η′(Ic) + S ′(Ic)
)
. (2.7)
Equations (2.5) and (2.7) illustrate that in the absence of negative eﬀects of a pro-
nounced ethnic identity of the parent and the child (with respect to the earnings of
the parent or the future utility of the child), a parent would choose an identity for
her child that is equal to her own identity, and ultimately resembles the norms of her
origin country, xo. However, due to the negative eﬀects of a strong ethnic identity, the
identity of the parent will deviate from her origin country's norms, and the identity
of the child will deviate from the parent's identity. In equation (2.7) one can see that
the diﬀerence between a child's optimal identity Ic and the origin norms xo is larger,
the larger the negative eﬀects of a strong identity of parents and children are, i.e.,
the larger ζ ′(Ip), η′(Ic) and S ′(Ic). Furthermore, the size of the deviation depends
positively on the weight π, which reﬂects the altruism of the parent, and negatively
on the weights on the loss functions, θ and µ. It is an intuitive result that altruistic
parents deviate more from the preferred level of ethnic identity when facing negative
consequences of a strong ethnic identity for their children's future utility. Additionally,
it is also plausible that parents who are more interested in raising their children similar
to themselves (high θ), as well as immigrants who care more about being similar to the
norms of their origin country (high µ), will deviate less from the origin norms when
facing negative eﬀects of a strong ethnic identity.
The basic results of the model illustrate that immigrants are likely to transmit their
ethnic identity to their children. More interestingly, they also allow to think of sources
of exogenous variation that cause diﬀerences in ethnic identity among immigrants and
their children, in order to empirically identify the eﬀects of ethnic identity. For example,
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the national identity might play a diﬀerent role across countries, since the national
feelings might be shaped over a long time and be based on historical events and culture.
In Germany, for instance, national identity plays a less important role than in countries
such as the United States or France. Immigrants from origin countries with a high
importance of national feelings might also be more aﬀected by deviations from the
origin country's norms after immigration. In the model, such a heterogeneity will
translate into an origin country-dependent weight on the second loss function: µo. In
equation (2.6) and (2.7), one can see that immigrants from countries with a higher
importance of the national identity (which translates into a higher value of µo) will
choose an identity for themselves and their children that deviates less from the origin
norms. The discussion on the assumptions η′Ic(Ic) > 0 and ζ
′
Ii
(Ii) > 0 support the idea
that ceteris paribus, an increase in µo and thus in Ii and Ic, will lead to negative eﬀects
on the labor market position of both parents and children.
As will be discussed in the next section, I use a proxy for µo in the empirical part of
the analysis to identify the causal eﬀect of immigrants' origin identity on the integration
of their children. This proxy will be the average national pride in the origin country
of immigrant parents, since it reﬂects diﬀerences in the importance of national feelings
across countries.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Based on the theoretical discussion in Section 2.2.1, the empirical analysis is concerned
with the eﬀects of national attachment of immigrant parents on their children's inte-
gration in the dimensions of ethnic identity, oppositional identities, social networks,
language use and skills, and education. For this purpose, I use data from the Chil-
dren of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), which contains information on both
the origin attachment of immigrant parents and integration outcomes of their children
at diﬀerent ages. Since origin attachment of ﬁrst generation immigrants might be en-
dogenous, I apply an IV-strategy where I instrument national attachment of parents
with a measure of national pride in the country of origin. The idea is that immigrants
from diﬀerent backgrounds assign a diﬀerent importance to their national identity, as
captured by the weight µo in the theoretical model in the previous section.
2.3.1 Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS)
The main analysis builds on data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study
(CILS), which was designed to study the assimilation process of immigrant children
in the United States. It includes a broad range of information including variables on
demographics, language knowledge and preference, ethnic identity, self-esteem, school
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and academic attainment, and social networks of both parents (ﬁrst-generation im-
migrants) and their children (second-generation immigrants). The ﬁrst survey was
conducted in 1992 with 5,262 children in junior high school, at average age 14, in Mi-
ami and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and in San Diego, California. The survey observes
the children two more times in 1995 and between 2001 and 2003 at age 17 and 24,
respectively. Each of the two follow-up surveys retrieve about 85% of the previous
sample. In addition, a parental survey was conducted together with the ﬁrst follow-up
survey. For reasons of cost, this survey targeted half of the total universe of parents,
selecting them on a random basis. Hence, only 46% of the original student sample's
parents were interviewed.
In my sample, second-generation immigrants are deﬁned as children who were born
in the United States but have at least one foreign-born parent, or migrated at very
young age (younger than nine years old).9 I deﬁne the origin country of second-
generation immigrants as the place of birth of their respective parent from the parent
survey.10 Only children who are observed in all three waves and whose parents attended
the survey are considered in the main analysis. The resulting main sample includes
799 children and their parents who immigrated from 24 diﬀerent origin countries. The
distribution of origin countries can be seen in Table 2.B.1.11 It is diﬀerent than the
representative distribution in the Current Populations Survey, since it reﬂects the com-
position of immigrants in the cities where the interviews took place. The majority of
parents in this sample immigrated from Asian countries (i.e., the Philippines and Viet-
nam) or North-American countries (i.e., Mexico). Summary statistics are reported in
Table 2.B.2. About 53% of the children are female, 13% are born to an intermarried
couple, and about 43% of the children are born outside the U.S. Parents are on average
47 years old and immigrated to the United States on average 20 years ago.12
The key independent variable in my analysis is the composite measure `Origin Ties,'
9Literature in psychology and economics suggests that childhood immigrants who arrived at age
nine or younger from non-English-speaking countries are able to learn English better than those who
arrived at an older age (e.g., Bleakley and Chin, 2010). However, also restricting the sample to children
that immigrated at an age younger than 4 years old does not change the results.
10About 80% of the responding parents have partners who originate from the same origin country,
and about 13% have native partners. For children, whose parents were born in diﬀerent origin coun-
tries, I use the birth country of the parent who responded in the survey for two reasons: First, I am
interested in the eﬀect of the origin attachment of parents on the child's integration, and hence I need
the information from the survey on the parent's origin attachment; second, since the parent answers
the survey, the parent seems to be responsible to interact with the school and to play an important
role in the education of the child.
11The sample is further restricted to immigrants and their children whose origin countries take part
in the Integrated Values Survey, since it is the source of the instrumental variable. For that reason,
immigrant children with parents from Cuba, which is among the most important source countries of
immigrants in Miami, had to be dropped.
12When I do not restrict the sample to those children who participated in all three waves, the sample
comprises 1218 children from 28 origin countries. As one can see in Table 2.B.2 (right columns), the
summary statistics do not diﬀer systematically. Also the results are fairly similar as will be discussed
in Section 2.5. Hence, selective attrition seems not to inﬂuence my results.
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which measures parents' national attachment to their origin country. This variable is
obtained with a principal component analysis of the following ﬁve dummy variables
that reﬂect whether the country of origin plays an important role for the identity of
a parent: 1) whether a parent is very proud of the origin country; 2) whether she
talks a lot about the origin country with her child; 3) whether she celebrates origin
country holidays a lot; 4) whether she agrees a lot that contact to compatriots is very
important; and 5) whether a parent buys from shops owned by compatriots. The
composite index explains roughly 40% of the total variance. Factor loadings show that
it is almost equally driven by the ﬁrst four variables, whereas the ﬁfth contributes to
a lesser extent. In fact, summary statistics of the diﬀerent components illustrate that
parents have a rather strong orientation to their origin countries. About 80% of the
parents state that they are very proud of their country of origin, and about half of them
talks a lot with their children about the country or consider contact with compatriots
as very important. One third of the parents celebrates origin country holidays a lot,
and about 20% buy from shops owned by compatriots.
My main dependent variables comprise outcomes of parents and children in all three
waves and cover the diﬀerent dimensions of integration discussed in Section 2.2: ethnic
identity and the formation of oppositional identities, social network choices, language
use and skills, and school performance.13 The ethnic identity of second-generation
immigrants is conceptualized empirically by the respondents' ethnic self-identiﬁcation,
which is observed in the all three waves. I use a dummy variable indicating whether the
observed children self-identify by national origin as opposed to American, hyphenated,
racial or mixed identities. Oppositional identities are approximated by variables that
indicate some sort of negative feelings towards the native population. In order to study
whether a higher national attachment of parents inﬂuences the social network of their
children, I exploit parents' information on the racial composition of their neighborhood
and children's information on their social network. To study diﬀerences in language
use, I analyze outcomes that indicate whether English is the preferred language with
friends, parents, and own potential children in the future. Language skills are measured
in each wave comparably as self-assessed skills on a scale from 1 to 4 in the areas of
speaking, reading, understanding, and writing. The mean value of those four categories
gives a composite measure on English skills that is used as a dependent variable in my
analysis. Finally, I analyze the eﬀect of national attachment of immigrant parents on
the integration of their children with respect to educational outcomes. The ﬁrst CILS
wave includes Stanford mathematics and reading achievement tests. I use the percentile
rank with regard to the national percentiles of those tests as dependent variables, in
13Whenever possible, the same questions are used in diﬀerent waves in order to compare the results
at diﬀerent ages. However, the questionnaires change a lot throughout the three waves, such that it
is not always possible to compare results.
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order to analyze objective measures of skills. Furthermore, grade point averages from
school are available in the ﬁrst and second wave when children are 14 and 17 years old.
At age 24, diﬀerent and less precise measures of education are available, and therefore
I only analyze the eﬀects of parents' national attachment on the years of education and
whether a respondent graduated from college within the last ﬁve years as education
outcomes.
Summary statistics of all dependent and independent variables are shown in Table
2.B.2. One can see that the national origin identity of second-generation immigrants
in my sample is relatively pronounced in all three waves, while only a minority of im-
migrant children identify themselves as American. About 60% of the children have
mostly foreign friends. They have a strong tendency to avoid speaking English with
friends (63% at age 14), family (84% at age 14), and even future children (70% at
age 24), despite having good (subjective) English skills on average. Children in the
CILS sample have better math skills on average (56.93) than the national mean; how-
ever, the mean in reading percentile rank is substantially lower (48.41), reﬂecting the
immigration background of the sample. The mean grade point average in my sample
is about 2.8 for children aged 14 and 17. Among the 24 years-old second-generation
immigrants, 54% are still in school. On average, the second-generation immigrants in
my sample have spent 14.5 years in education, and about 37% have graduated from
college in the last ﬁve years at age 24.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
This study aims to examine the causal eﬀect of national attachment of immigrant par-
ents on their children's integration outcomes. However, there are reasons to believe that
the national attachment of parents is not exogenous to the parents' situation or back-
ground. There might be reverse causality, such that an immigrant who is less successful
in a new society forms a stronger origin identity. Furthermore, immigrants' origin at-
tachment could be endogenous to other traits that aﬀect integration. For example,
immigrants who migrate for diﬀerent reasons, such as political or economic reasons,
could diﬀer both in terms of their integration success and their origin attachment.
In order to overcome this potential endogeneity, I apply an instrumental variable
strategy. More speciﬁcally, the national attachment of immigrant parents is instru-
mented with a measure of national pride in a parent's origin country. The instrument
exploits variation in the importance of the national identity over origin countries, in
the theoretical model captured by the weight µo. I estimate two-stage-least-squares
regressions with the ﬁrst stage
origin_tiespod = α0 + α1national_prideo + α2Xcpod + νd + λr + ucpod, (2.8)
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and the following second stage:
Ycpod = β0 + β1 ˆorigin_tiespod + β2Xcpod + νd + λr + εcpod. (2.9)
Ycpod represents an integration outcome of child c, who lives in destination city d and
whose parent p originates from country o. The predicted origin ties of the child's
parent from the ﬁrst stage are ˆorigin_tiespod. Xcpod consists of control variables on the
level of the parents (polynomials of years since migration and age, gender, education,
employment status, having a native partner), the children (gender, foreign-born), and
the origin country (share of origin-immigrants in the city, real GDP per capita, English
language).14 Furthermore, equations (2.8) and (2.11) control for city ﬁxed eﬀects and
region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (νd and λr).15 The error terms are clustered at the origin
country level.
The parameter of interest is β1, which identiﬁes the eﬀect of parents' national at-
tachment if the average national pride in the origin country is correlated with national
attachment (relevance), and if the exclusion restriction holds. The identifying assump-
tion as well as threats to identiﬁcation are discussed in detail in Subsection 2.3.2.2,
after introducing and discussing the instrument in the following subsection.
2.3.2.1 The Instrument  National Pride in the Country of Origin
The measure of national pride that is used as an instrument for the national attachment
of immigrant parents is obtained from a question in the Integrated Values Survey
1981-2014 (IVS), which asks the respondents how proud they are of their nationality.16
The variable can take values from 0 to 3, with 0 being not proud at all, 1 not
very proud, 2 quite proud, and 3 very proud. When aggregating this variable on
country-level, simple country averages might reﬂect to some extent the composition of
the EVS sample. Hence, I apply a procedure similar to that conducted by Giavazzi
et al. (2013): I estimate a regression model for national pride, controlling for individual
characteristics and wave ﬁxed eﬀects, and include country ﬁxed eﬀects which capture
the country-speciﬁc feature of national pride.17
Table 2.B.3 shows the countries covered and the corresponding values of national
14The share of compatriots in each city is calculated from census data in 1990. Data on real GDP
per capita in 2000 (in U.S. dollars) is taken from Gleditsch (2002). Using information on real GDP per
capita in 1990 or 1980 does not aﬀect results, but reduces the number of observations (not reported).
15Using school ﬁxed eﬀects instead of city ﬁxed eﬀects does not change results. I deﬁne broad
regions of origin: Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, South America, North America, and Oceania.
16The IVS combines the European Values Longitudinal data File 1981-2008 (EVS) and the World
Values Surveys Longitudinal data File 1981-2014 (WVS). The aggregated data set that is used in
order to obtain country-averages for national pride includes more than 470.000 interviews, covering
in total 110 countries.
17Using the mean values of wave-speciﬁc country ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as using simple country-
averages as measure of national pride, does not change the results.
24
pride and other aggregated variables on national feelings that I use in the analysis.
Column (1) shows the measure of national pride that I utilize in most of my analysis
(country ﬁxed eﬀects). In column (2), the simple country-averages of national pride
from the IVS are displayed. The values of the two national pride measures diﬀer
for some countries more than for others. However, they are strongly correlated and
therefore produce similar results.
The mean value of national pride (country ﬁxed eﬀects) among the diﬀerent coun-
tries in the IVS is 2.39, indicating that national pride is on average important around
the world. However, national pride varies considerably across countries, with the low-
est value of 1.54 in Hong Kong and the highest value of 2.89 in Ghana. The values
resonate quite well with other research on national pride and national attachment.
Leading countries in a ranking of general national pride among 21 countries by Smith
and Kim (2006), such as the United States, the Philippines or Australia, also have con-
siderably high average values of national pride in the Integrated Values Survey (United
States 2.62, Philippines 2.69, Australia 2.59), whereas low ranked countries like Latvia
and Germany also have low average values of national pride (Latvia 2.06, Germany
1.77).
In order to argue that the measure of national pride in the IVS actually reﬂects
national pride or national feelings, I additionally use data from the International Social
Survey Programm (ISSP), which conducted studies on National Identity in 1995 and
2003.18 Comparing the values of the IVS national pride variable with an identically
phrased question about national pride in column (3) in Table 2.B.3 shows a high
correlation (0.873). This supports the claim that the pattern of the national pride
variable is not unique to the World Values Survey or the European Values Survey.
The ISSP data is further useful in order to gain a deeper understanding of the
variable `National Pride' and its relationship to other concepts of national feelings.
Generally, the sociological literature distinguishes between two distinct sub-dimensions
of national feelings: nationalism and constructive patriotism. While nationalism can
be characterized as a blind idealization of the nation, patriotism rather rejects an
idealization of the nation and reﬂects a constructive and critical view of it (Schatz
et al., 1999; Sidanius et al., 1997). National pride could in general represent both
of these two categories, since it could reﬂect blind nationalistic pride, and conversely
well diﬀerentiated pride on certain achievements of a nation like human rights. Davi-
dov (2011) proposes composite measures of nationalism and constructive patriotism
that are constructed in the ISSP data and presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table
2.B.3.19 All three indicators, national pride, nationalism, and constructive patriotism,
18Most literature in political sciences and sociology on national identity/feelings uses this data
source. It covers much less countries than the IVS  at most 34 in 2003.
19Nationalism is measured as a principal component of the two statements: 1. The world would be a
better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country Nationality of the Respondent];
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are positively correlated. However, the question regarding national pride in the IVS
reﬂects rather nationalism than constructive patriotism, since the correlation between
the IVS-country eﬀects and the nationalism variable from the ISSP is about 0.6, while
it is just about 0.4 for constructive patriotism. A similar gap exists between the same
question regarding national pride in the ISSP and the two variables.20
2.3.2.2 Identifying Assumption and Discussion
The exclusion restriction demands that the instrument aﬀects the integration outcomes
of second-generation immigrants only through the national attachment of their parents.
In other words, the identifying assumption of my IV-approach is that the average
national pride of the population in the origin country of immigrants is exogenous to the
integration outcomes of immigrants' children, conditional on the large set of controls.
There exist two major threats to the exclusion restriction. First, my measure of
national pride could not only pick up diﬀerences in the importance of national feelings
across countries, but proxy diﬀerences in, for example, education or economic devel-
opment across origin countries that aﬀect unobserved human capital. In this case,
my estimates would be biased. This problem is common in all studies that use ag-
gregate culture proxies from origin countries of immigrants, since they could always
reﬂect other macro-diﬀerences than those intended. One advantage of this approach
compared to the epidemiological approach is that I observe parents and therefore can
control for parent characteristics such as age, years since migration, education, and
the labor market position. These controls should decrease the problem of unobserved
human capital to some extent. Looking at raw correlations between national pride and
other macro-variables, one can see in Figure 2.1a that there exists in fact a negative
correlation between real GDP per capita and national pride across countries. Thus,
poorer countries exhibit more national pride on average. Furthermore, respondents in
English-speaking countries are more proud of their nationality than those in others.
However, simply conditioning on regions (Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, South
America, North America, and Oceania) does eliminate the correlation of those vari-
ables as demonstrated in Figure 2.1b. In all regressions, I include region of origin ﬁxed
eﬀects, and further control for GDP per capita and whether the origin country shares
the same oﬃcial language. Hence, I use variation in national pride within geograph-
ical regions that are more homogeneous. In sensitivity checks, I additionally control
and 2 Generally speaking, [Respondent's Country] is a better country than most other countries.
Both could be answered on a 5-point scale. Civic pride is measured by three questions about civic
and political pride: 1. How proud are you of [Respondent's Country] in the way democracy works?;
2. How proud are you of [Respondent's Country] social security system?; and 3. How proud are
you of [Respondent's Country] fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?. All three questions
could be answered on a 4-point scale.
20In a robustness check, I show that all measures of national feelings, also from the ISSP, gain fairly
similar results.
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Figure 2.1: National Pride and Real GDP per Capita
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Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the correlation between the average national pride and real GDP per capita across countries.
The upper graph plots the average national pride of countries in the IVS (1981-2014) on the y-axis, and real GDP per
capita (in the year 2000) on the x-axis; in the bottom graph, residuals from regressions of real GDP per capita on
region ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, South America, North America, and Oceania), are plotted on
the x-axis.
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for diﬀerent measures of school quality in the origin country, in order to address this
concern further. Including these controls does not change my results.
The second threat to the exclusion restriction is that the level of national pride in
the origin country may aﬀect children's integration outcomes through other channels
than parent's national attachment. For example, a high national pride in the origin
country could aﬀect the integration of immigrant children through other family ties or
through media consumption. However, there are reasons to believe that these other
channels play a minor role. Parents can in general be expected to have an inﬂuence on
how family ties or media consumption aﬀect their children  especially because internet
access was not common at the time that the survey was conducted (i.e., the 1990s).
Furthermore, parents are likely to be aﬀected by family ties and media themselves,
such that these other channels will shape parents' origin attachment. Therefore, the
main eﬀect would still go through the instrumented variable. However, in case that
immigrant children are directly aﬀected by the average national pride in the origin
country, the eﬀect of parents' origin attachment on their children's education could be
overestimated. In order to address these remaining concerns regarding the exclusion
restriction, I provide further sensitivity checks of the IV results by performing the
Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) analysis of plausible exogeneity. It suggests that to
render the IV results insigniﬁcant, more than 40% of the overall eﬀect of my instrument
would have to come through some omitted channels.
Another issue that is common to all studies on assimilation is the selective in- or
out-migration of immigrants. If return migrants, for instance, are negatively selected
from the pool of immigrants in the host country, return migration will lead to an
overestimation of general assimilation eﬀects. This well-known bias from selective
return migration does not aﬀect my estimates, as long as the selection into return
migration is uncorrelated with the national attachment of immigrants. However, high
national attachment of immigrants might increase the probability of return migration.
If this is the case, selective return migration will downward bias my results, since the
remaining second-generation immigrants in my sample would be positively selected.
The literature suggests that 20-50% of an immigrant cohort leave within 10 years in
the host country (Lubotsky, 2007; Dustmann and Görlach, 2015, for a survey). Parents
in my sample have on average been in the United States for 20 years. Hence, my sample
is likely to include those immigrants and their children that stay permanently in the
U.S., since major return migration movements should have already happened before
the survey had been conducted. However, this potentially selected sample should also
reﬂect the policy-relevant population when studying determinants of successful long-
term integration.
Selective attrition is another potential problem given my sample includes only those
respondents who remain in the sample throughout all three waves. It might be the
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case that attrition from the sample, especially at age 24, is correlated with educational
success. Selective attrition could therefore bias my results. As a sensitivity check, I
conduct the same analysis for earlier waves without imposing this sample restriction
and the results remain unchanged.
It should be noted that this empirical approach has a couple of important advan-
tages to methods applied in the previous literature. First, I exploit exogenous variation
across origin countries in order to overcome the potential endogeneity problem that is
present in all studies that analyze correlations between measures of immigrants' eth-
nic identity and assimilation outcomes. Second, compared to studies that apply the
epidemiological approach in order to assess the eﬀects of origin country characteristics
on second-generation immigrants' outcomes, this approach allows to narrow down the
channel through which this cultural eﬀect works, in this case the origin attachment of
parents. At the same time, I can control for many important characteristics that might
bias results when applying the epidemiological approach, such as the education, labor
market position, and years since migration of the parents.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 First Stage
In a ﬁrst step, the ﬁrst-stage relationship between the instrument and the independent
variable of interest is investigated in detail. Table 2.1 presents OLS-estimates of the
eﬀect of national pride in the origin country on `Origin Ties' and each of its components.
One can see that national pride in the country of origin has a strong and highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect on all variables considered. Immigrants from countries with a higher
average national pride are more likely to be very proud of their origin country. Fur-
thermore, they are more likely to converse a lot with their children about the country,
celebrate the origin country's holidays, buy from stores owned by people from their
community, and consider contact with compatriots as very important. The principal
component measuring national attachment is also signiﬁcantly positively associated
with national pride in the country of origin. The coeﬃcients are not only statistically
signiﬁcant, also their magnitude is reasonably large. For example, a standard deviation
increase in national pride in the country of origin (0.157) increases the probability that
immigrant parents are very proud of their origin country by 6.7 percentage points,
which corresponds to the magnitude of the negative eﬀect of having a native partner.
If one relates this eﬀect to speciﬁc origin countries, a more illustrative example can be
constructed: Immigrants from Germany, for instance, have a 14.6 percentage points
lower probability of being very proud of their origin country than immigrants from
France.
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Table 2.1: National Pride in the Origin Country and the Origin Attachment of Immigrants
Origin Ties
(PCA)
Very Proud of
the country of
Origin
Talk a lot with
Child about
Origin
Celebrate a lot
Origin
Holidays
Buy from
Origin-Stores
Contact to
Compatriots
very important
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National Pride in Origin Country 2.395*** 0.426*** 0.465** 0.665*** 0.509*** 0.429***
(0.410) (0.139) (0.216) (0.131) (0.145) (0.126)
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
R-Squared 0.1847 0.0933 0.0737 0.1966 0.1940 0.0938
Notes: The table reports estimates of the relationship between national pride in the origin country and national attachment of the parents in the CILS. The dependent variables are whether a
parent is very proud of the country of origin (column (2)); whether a parent talks a lot about the origin country with her child (column (3)); whether a parent celebrates origin country holidays
a lot (column (4)); whether a parent buys from shops owned by compatriots (column (5)); whether a parent agrees a lot that contact to compatriots is very important (column (6)); and the
principal component of all ﬁve variables (column (1)). The main independent variable is the average national pride in the country of origin, based on a question in the IVS. The sample includes all
foreign-born parents whose children participated in all three CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations include parent and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort Lauderdale, San Diego)
and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South America, North America). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Overall, national pride in the country of origin appears to have strong explanatory
power to predict the origin ties of immigrants, as well as all single variables that are
combined in the composite measure. The results in Table 2.1 therefore support the
empirical strategy to use national pride in the country of origin to instrument the
national attachment of parents. Regarding the relevance of this instrument, one can
also see in all Tables that report IV-estimates (Tables 2.2-2.7) that the instrument is
clearly relevant, since the ﬁrst stage is strong (see column (1) in all Tables), and all
speciﬁcations have F-Statistics varying between 11 and 46.
2.4.2 Identity
Next, I turn to the main results of the IV-regressions. Here, the question is whether a
strong national attachment of immigrant parents has a negative eﬀect on the integra-
tion of second-generation immigrants in diﬀerent dimensions. One of the major results
of the theoretical model was that a stronger ethnic identity of parents is transmitted
to the child. Furthermore, the theoretical discussion in Section 2.2.1 considered the
transmission of a strong origin identity as one of the main channels through which
parents' national attachment may aﬀect the long-term integration of immigrant chil-
dren. Table 2.2 presents the IV-results for the eﬀect of parents' national attachment
on the origin identity of children in all three CILS-waves.21 The estimates show that a
higher national attachment of parents signiﬁcantly increases the probability that their
children self-identify by their origin nationality. This result holds throughout all three
waves, for children at age 14, 17, and 24. Also the magnitude of the eﬀect is rela-
tively sizable, since a standard deviation increase in origin ties of parents (1.371) leads
to a 13.7 percentage points increase in the probability that a 14 years-old child will
self-identify by its origin country.
The IV-results in Table 2.2 suggest that the origin identity is in fact more pro-
nounced for those second-generation immigrants whose parents are more attached to
their country of origin. Recalling the theoretical discussion, a stronger national identity
of immigrant children could aﬀect successful integration in two ways: First, a stronger
origin identity of children could inﬂuence their social networks, language use and skills,
and ultimately school performance and other integration outcomes. Second, it could
aﬀect school and other integration outcomes more directly since it may favor the for-
mation of oppositional identities. In that case, immigrant children with a stronger
21For ease of comparison, I report the corresponding OLS and reduced-form estimates for most
integration outcomes in Table 2.B.5. The OLS estimates are closer to zero than the IV estimates,
and mostly insigniﬁcant. The apparent bias does not support the idea that a failed integration of
immigrants causes a stronger attachment to the origin country. A possible explanation for the positive
bias of the OLS estimates could be an omitted variable bias, since there is some suggestive evidence
in the data that immigrants who immigrated for political reasons are more attached to their origin
country, and simultaneously have better integration outcomes than those who immigrated for other
reasons.
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Table 2.2: National Attachment and Identity
14 years-old 17 years-old 24 years-old
First Stage Ethnic Self-Identity: National
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) 0.100*** 0.113* 0.064*
(0.038) (0.059) (0.038)
National Pride in Origin Country 2.312***
(0.413)
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 710 710 711 695
F-Statistic 31.4152 35.5453 40.3808
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates of the relationship between national attachment of parents and the self-identity of their children
in diﬀerent CILS-waves (child aged 14 in column (2), aged 17 in column (3), and aged 24 in column (4)). The dependent variable in all
columns is whether the child self-identiﬁes by origin nationality as opposed to self-identifying as Amercian, hyphenated, or in terms of
race. The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents, a principal component of diﬀerent variables indicating an
attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country of origin
(variable from the IVS). The sample includes all children of foreign-born parents who participated in all CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations
include parent, child and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort Lauderdale, San Diego) and region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South America, North America). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
origin identity might be more likely to reject or oppose the majority population and
its norms. This latter channel is investigated in Table 2.3, where I analyze the eﬀect
of parents' national attachment on outcomes reﬂecting oppositional identities. The
estimates in Table 2.3 do not indicate that a stronger attachment to the origin country
of parents has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the relationship of an immigrant child to the
majority population. Immigrant children whose parents are more attached to their
origin country are not less likely to self-identify as Americans. Additionally, the results
do not suggest that there exist eﬀects on agreeing or disagreeing to statements whether
the U.S. is the best country, or whether Americans feel superior to foreigners when they
interact with them.
Overall, the results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 support the idea that national identity
is transmitted across generations; however, this stronger national identity is not found
to foster oppositional attitudes with regard to the majority society. In the following
subsections, I will therefore investigate whether parents' identity choices aﬀect the inte-
gration process of their children through the other main channel previously discussed,
namely in terms of social networks, language use and skills, and ultimately school
performance and labor market prospects.
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Table 2.3: National Attachment and Oppositional Identities
14 years-old 17 years-old 24 years-old
First Stage
Ethnic Self-
Identity:
American
USA best
country
Americans
feel superior
Ethnic Self-
Identity:
American
USA best
country
Americans
feel superior
Ethnic Self-
Identity:
American
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) -0.063 -0.077* 0.078 0.001 0.059 0.060 0.035
(0.063) (0.046) (0.053) (0.039) (0.068) (0.045) (0.046)
National Pride in Origin Country 2.312***
(0.413)
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 710 710 711 710 711 710 715 695
F-Statistic 31.4152 33.3851 34.2461 35.5453 34.9089 34.1034 40.3808
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates of the relationship between national attachment of parents and outcomes regarding oppositional identities of their children in diﬀerent CILS-waves (child aged 14 in columns
(2)-(4), aged 17 in columns (5)-(7), and aged 24 in column (8)). The dependent variables are whether a child self-identiﬁes as Amercian (columns (2) and (4)); whether a child agrees that the United States are the
best country (columns (3) and (5)); and whether a child agrees that Americans feel superior when they interact with foreigners (columns (4) and (6)). The main independent variable is the national attachment of
parents, a principal component of diﬀerent variables indicating an attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country of origin (variable
from the IVS). The sample includes all children of foreign-born parents who participated in all CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations include parent, child and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort
Lauderdale, San Diego) and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South America, North America). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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2.4.3 Social Networks
As discussed in the theoretical discussion, the origin attachment of immigrants could
aﬀect their preferences with respect to the ethnic composition of their social networks.
A stronger origin identity should therefore be reﬂected in more pronounced ethnic
networks of parents and children. Results in Table 2.4 support this idea because the
IV-estimates for outcomes regarding the ethnic composition of social networks in dif-
ferent CILS-waves point in this direction. Estimates in columns (2) and (3) show that
parents with a stronger origin attachment live in neighborhoods with more foreign and
less White American neighbors. Both coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at a 10
and 5 percent level, respectively. The magnitude of these eﬀects is fairly large, as
a standard deviation increase in origin ties leads to a 19.3 percentage points higher
probability of living in a neighborhood with mostly foreign neighbors, and decreases
the probability of living in a neighborhood with mostly White American neighbors by
18.9 percentage points. In columns (4) and (5), I further analyze the eﬀect of parents'
national attachment on the probability that their oﬀspring has mostly foreign friends
at age 14 or age 17, respectively. Both coeﬃcients are positive, but it is statistically
signiﬁcant only for immigrant children at age 17. A standard deviation increase in
origin ties of a second-generation immigrant's parent raises the probability of having
mostly foreign friends at age 17 by 28.9 percentage points.
Results in Table 2.4 suggest that the national attachment of parents has an impact
on the ethnic network of their children. They grow up in diﬀerent neighborhoods where
they are exposed to less natives and more foreigners. Furthermore, they have more
foreign friends throughout their adolescence. These diﬀerent and more ethnic social
networks are likely to reduce the incentives that immigrant children would invest in
destination country-speciﬁc and general human capital.
2.4.4 Language Use and Language Skills
Since the origin attachment of parents aﬀects the ethnic composition of the social net-
work of their children, theoretical considerations suggest that the returns to country-
speciﬁc human capital might be lower for children whose parents are strongly attached
to the origin country. For instance, growing up in an environment with fewer natives
and having more foreign friends, immigrant children may not need to use or speak En-
glish often, and would therefore develop lower English skills. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present
the IV-results for outcomes regarding language use and skills, respectively. The esti-
mates in columns (2), (4), and (5) in Table 2.5 illustrate that adolescents whose parents
are more attached to the origin country are signiﬁcantly less likely to speak English
with their friends at all ages. The magnitude of this eﬀect is relatively large through-
out all waves. For example, a standard-deviation increase in origin ties of the parents
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Table 2.4: National Attachment and Social Networks
Parents 14 years-old 17 years-old
First Stage
Most
Neighbors
Foreigners
Most N.
White
Americans
Most Friends
Foreigner
Most Friends
Foreigner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) 0.141* -0.138** 0.057 0.210***
(0.075) (0.070) (0.059) (0.068)
National Pride in Origin Country 2.393***
(0.410)
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls No No No Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 714 714 714 698 690
F-Statistic 34.1189 34.1189 46.9338 32.8045
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates of the relationship between national attachment of parents and outcomes regarding the ethnic composition of the social
networks of parents and their children in diﬀerent CILS-waves (parents in columns (2)-(3), child aged 14 in column (4), aged 17 in column (5)). The dependent
variables are whether most of the parents' neighbors are foreigners or whether most neighbors are White Americans (columns (2)-(3)); and whether most or
all of the child's friends are foreigners (columns (4) and (5)). The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents, a principal component of
diﬀerent variables indicating attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country
of origin (variable from the IVS). The sample includes all foreign-born parents or their children if they have participated in all CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations
include parent and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort Lauderdale, San Diego) and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South
America, North America). Regressions on child-outcomes further include child characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
increases the probability that 14 years-old children will not speak English with their
friends by 27.6 percentage points. Furthermore, the origin attachment of parents sig-
niﬁcantly increases the probability that their oﬀspring will not communicate in English
with their parents (columns (3) and (6) for age 14 and 24). Finally, immigrant children
at age 24, whose parents are very attached to the origin country, are less likely to want
to raise their own children with English as the primary language at home (column (7)).
Hence, potential diﬀerences are likely to be transmitted even to the third generation.
Generally, the results in Table 2.5 support the idea that a stronger origin attach-
ment of parents lowers the incentives and habit of their children to speak English. In
the following, it is further analyzed whether these lower incentives to speak the desti-
nation country's language also translate into disadvantages in terms of language skills.
In fact, one can see in Tables 2.6 that the eﬀect of origin ties on language skills is neg-
ative, but insigniﬁcant for parents and 14 years-old children. However, the coeﬃcient
becomes larger and statistically signiﬁcant throughout adolescence. At 24 years old,
a standard deviation increase in national attachment of parents lowers language skills
by 0.18 points (measured on a scale from 1 to 4). This ﬁnding could be explained by a
divergence throughout adolescence due to the diﬀerent social surrounding and diﬀerent
language habits.
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Table 2.5: National Attachment and Language Use
14 years-old 17 years-old 24 years-old
First Stage
No English
with Friends
Often /
Always no
English with
Parents
No English
with Friends
Only English
with Friends
No English
with Parents
Hope to raise
Children in
English
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) 0.201*** 0.134** 0.176*** -0.199*** 0.109* -0.236***
(0.071) (0.062) (0.052) (0.050) (0.057) (0.081)
National Pride in Origin Country 1.796***
(0.544)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 645 645 686 714 701 703 696
F-Statistic 10.8942 21.7827 34.0931 30.1623 30.0417 28.4388
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates of the relationship between national attachment of parents and variables regarding their children's language use in diﬀerent CILS-waves (child aged 14 in columns (2)-(3),
aged 17 in column (4), aged 24 in columns (5)-(7)). The dependent variables are whether the child speaks no/only English with friends (columns (2), (4), (5)); whether the child speaks (often/always) no English
with its parents (columns (3) and (6)); and whether the child hopes to raise own children in English (column (7)). The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents, a principal component
of diﬀerent variables indicating an attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country of origin (variable from the IVS). The sample
includes all children of foreign-born parents who participated in all CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations include parent, child and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort Lauderdale, San Diego)
and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South America, North America). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Overall, the results in this subsection indicate that there exist negative eﬀects of
the national attachment of parents on the language use and skills of second-generation
immigrants. These ﬁndings are consistent with the results that they have stronger
ethnic networks and a stronger origin country identity. The negative eﬀects on language
skills suggest that there exist in fact lower incentives to invest in country-speciﬁc human
capital. Lower language skills are likely to aﬀect the human capital formation of second-
generation immigrants with consequences for labor market prospects.
Table 2.6: National Attachment and Language Skills
Parents 14 years-old 17 years-old 24 years-old
First Stage English Skills English Skills English Skills English Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) -0.084 -0.059 -0.109* -0.132***
(0.198) (0.050) (0.059) (0.028)
National Pride in Origin Country 2.248***
(0.408)
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 698 698 715 715 652
F-Statistic 30.3671 34.1034 34.1034 33.6967
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates of the relationship between national attachment of parents and language skills of parents and their children in diﬀerent
CILS-waves (parents in column (2), child aged 14 in column (3), aged 17 in column (4), aged 24 in column (5)). The dependent variable English skills is a
combination of diﬀerent self-assessed language skills (speak, read, understand, write). The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents,
a principal component of diﬀerent variables indicating an attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average
national pride in the country of origin (variable from the IVS). The sample includes all foreign-born parents or their children if they have participated in all
CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations include parent and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort Lauderdale, San Diego) and region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South America, North America). Regressions on child-outcomes further include child characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.4.5 School Performance
The previous results illustrate that immigrant children whose parents are more attached
to the origin country have a diﬀerent social network and speak English less frequently
and worse, compared to those whose parents are less attached to their origin country.
Diﬀerent networks, and in particular diﬀerent language skills, should also aﬀect the
integration of immigrant children in other dimensions, which are often considered as
indicators of long-term integration. For example, they could lead to poorer performance
of second-generation immigrants in schools and later in the labor market. I further
investigate whether there exists this negative eﬀect of parents' national attachment on
the human capital formation of children in Table 2.7, where I report the IV-estimates
of the relationship between parents' origin attachment and education outcomes of their
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Table 2.7: National Attachment and Education
14 years-old 17 years-old 24 years-old
First Stage
Math
Achievement
Percentile
Reading
Achievement
Percentile
Grade Point
Average
Grade Point
Average
Years of
Education
College degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) -12.828** -11.960*** -0.383*** -0.433** -0.210 -0.129
(6.313) (4.636) (0.138) (0.187) (0.297) (0.079)
National Pride in Origin Country 2.431***
(0.474)
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 663 663 689 711 711 703 702
F-Statistic 26.3463 29.2449 38.4368 38.4368 33.8465 33.4871
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates of the relationship between national attachment of parents and education outcomes of their children in diﬀerent CILS-waves (child aged 14 in columns (2)-(4), aged 17 in
column (5), aged 24 in columns (6)-(9)). The dependent variables are Standford math and reading achievement percentiles (columns (2) and (3)); the grade point average (columns (4) and (5)); years of education
(column (6)); and whether the child has graduated from college in the last 5 years (column (7)). The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents, a principal component of diﬀerent variables
indicating an attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country of origin (variable from the IVS). The sample includes all children
of foreign-born parents who are if they and their parents have participated in all CILS-waves. All speciﬁcations include parent, child and origin level controls, as well as city ﬁxed eﬀects (Miami, Fort Lauderdale,
San Diego) and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, South America, North America). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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children.
Indeed, the results indicate that parents' origin identity negatively aﬀects their
children's education outcomes. A strong attachment of parents to their origin country
has sizable and highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on their children's math and reading
achievement test percentiles (columns (2) and (3)). For example, a standard deviation
increase in parents' origin attachment leads to a 16 percentage points decrease in the
reading percentile-rank of their children at age 14. In columns (4) and (5), one can
further see that for both 14 and 17 years-old children, a higher national attachment of
parents leads to a signiﬁcantly poorer grade point average for them. The magnitude of
this eﬀect is quite large, since a standard deviation increase of parents' origin ties de-
creases the GPA of 17 years old children by about 20%. Among 24 years-old immigrant
children, estimates point towards the same direction, but they are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Nonetheless, the coeﬃcient in column (7) for the eﬀect of parents' national
attachment on the probability that 24 years-old immigrant children have graduated
from college within the last ﬁve years, is very close to being signiﬁcant at a ten percent
level. The ﬁnding that there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the years of education and
other measures of education at age 24 does not necessarily mean that there is no eﬀect
on the overall education of second-generation immigrants in the long run. It might
instead be caused by the fact that these outcomes are not as precise and objective as
test scores or grade point averages.
In sum, the results conﬁrm that origin attachment of parents has sizable nega-
tive eﬀects on the assimilation of their children. Second generation immigrants whose
parents have a strong ethnic identity also develop a more pronounced ethnic identity.
They grow up in diﬀerent neighborhoods, have stronger ethnic networks, and have less
contacts with natives. Additionally, they are less likely to speak English with their
friends and families, and have lower language skills. Finally, a stronger origin iden-
tity of parents impedes the school performance of their children, especially objective
measures such as test achievement scores and grade point averages.
2.5 Additional Results and Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Labor Market Outcomes in the CPS
The main results have shown that a strong origin attachment of parents leads to a
weaker record of integration of their children in the dimensions of identity, social net-
works, language use and skills, and education. This weaker integration is likely to
aﬀect the labor market position of adult second-generation immigrants as well. Due to
the low number of second-generation immigrants that are active in the labor force in
the CILS data, in this section I use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
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between 1994 and 2015. Since there is no information on parents included in the CPS,
I estimate the reduced-form, analyzing the relationship between the average national
pride in the origin country of second-generation immigrants and their labor market
outcomes.
My sample includes second-generation immigrants who are aged between 25 and
65. I deﬁne second-generation immigrants in the CPS as respondents who were born
in the United States, but have at least one foreign-born parent. The origin country
of second-generation immigrants is deﬁned as their mother's place of birth if she or
both parents are foreign-born, and as the father's place of birth if only the father is
foreign-born. I analyze the eﬀect of national pride in the country of origin on classic
labor market outcomes of second-generation immigrants. My dependent variables are
whether respondents are active in the labor market or not; whether they are unem-
ployed;22 the natural logarithm of their yearly wage income; and the total income of
the respondents.23 The sample restrictions leave a total sample of 966,771 observations
from 87 origin countries (492,368 women and 474,403 men). Since the income vari-
ables are obtained only once a year, the sample size for these outcomes is substantially
smaller (29,356 women and 38,255 men). Summary statistics for second-generation
immigrants can be seen in Table 2.B.4. The respondents in the second-generation im-
migrants sample are on average 44 years old, and they are relatively well educated (37%
have at least a Bachelor's degree). Furthermore, their parents mostly immigrated from
European or other North-American countries.
Using this sample of second-generation immigrants from the CPS, I estimate OLS-
regressions of the following type:
Yiost = β0 + β1national_prideo + β2Xiost + νs + σt + λr + uiost. (2.10)
The left hand side variable Yiost represents the realization of a dependent variable for
individual i in state s at time t, whose parents originate from country o. The variable
of interest in these regressions is national_prideo, which represents the measure of the
national pride in the parents' country of origin o that has been used as an instrument for
national attachment of parents in the main analysis. This OLS-regression can therefore
be interpreted as a reduced-form estimate and is very similar to the epidemiological
approach. Xiost are individual and aggregate origin country control variables.24 I
further control for state ﬁxed eﬀects, year-month ﬁxed eﬀects, and region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (νs , σt, and λr, respectively). The error terms are clustered at the origin
country level.
22Additional sample restriction that respondents are active in the labor market.
23Additional sample restriction that the respondents are full-time employed.
24Individual: Polynomials of age, gender, being non-white; Origin: English language, GDP per
capita.
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Table 2.8: National Pride in the Origin Country and Labor Market Outcomes
Labor Force Participation Unemployed Log Wage Log Total Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Men
National Pride in Origin Country -0.018* -0.007 0.013*** 0.009*** -0.121* -0.071** -0.116* -0.065*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.067) (0.034) (0.068) (0.034)
Observations 474403 474403 410328 410328 38255 38255 38244 38244
R-Squared 0.1072 0.1269 0.0119 0.0178 0.1488 0.2446 0.1747 0.2884
Panel B: Women
National Pride in Origin Country -0.001 0.013 0.006 0.003 -0.101 -0.049 -0.082 -0.029
(0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.068) (0.036) (0.067) (0.033)
Observations 492368 492368 364096 364096 29356 29356 29340 29340
R-Squared 0.0574 0.0847 0.0085 0.0146 0.1456 0.2584 0.1648 0.2936
Education Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual and Origin Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Month Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates of the relationship between national pride in the country of origin and labor market outcomes of second generation immigrants in the CPS (1994-2015). The dependent
variables are whether a second generation immigrant is active in the labor market (column (1) and (2)); whether a respondent is unemployed or not (column (3) and (4)); the natural logarithm of wage
income (column (5) and (6)); and the natural logarithm of the second generation immigrants' total income (column (7) and (8)). The main independent variable is the average national pride in the country
of origin (variable from the IVS). The sample includes all second generation immigrants who are between 25 and 65 years old. In columns (3)-(8), the sample further excludes respondents who are not
active in the labor market. Finally, columns (5)-(8) include only those respondents who are full-time employed. All speciﬁcations include individual and origin level control variables. Even columns include
education controls. Furthermore, year-month ﬁxed eﬀects, state ﬁxed eﬀects, and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Oceania, South America, North America) are included.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The results for second-generation immigrants in the CPS are presented separately
for men and women in Panel A and B of Table 2.8, respectively. The reduced-form
estimates for men suggest that there exist long-term disadvantages of national attach-
ment on the labor market assimilation of second-generation immigrants. There is a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on labor force participation, a positive eﬀect on the prob-
ability of being unemployed, and a negative eﬀect on both wage income as well as
total income of male second-generation immigrants. When including controls for ed-
ucation of the respondents in even columns (one potential channel), the coeﬃcients
of national pride decrease in size, and the eﬀect on labor force participation becomes
insigniﬁcant. However, there exists a robust negative eﬀect of national pride in the ori-
gin country on the other three outcomes in this stricter speciﬁcation. A one standard
deviation increase in national pride in the origin country leads to a 0.26 percentage
points increase in the risk of unemployment (0.009 ∗ 0.298). This corresponds to an
increase of 17.7% (4.6/0.26). Compared to the eﬀects of other relevant controls, such
as originating from an English speaking country, the eﬀect of a one standard deviation
increase in origin national pride is about half the size. The negative signiﬁcant eﬀect
of national pride on wage incomes in column (6) is also quite sizable: A one standard
deviation increase in national pride in the origin country leads to a 2.1% decrease in
wages for second-generation immigrant men. In comparison, the eﬀect of coming from
an English-speaking country is 7.2%.
For female second-generation immigrants, the results do not indicate any negative
eﬀects of national pride in the origin country on the labor market position. However,
when running the main analysis from the previous section separately for male and
female immigrant children, negative eﬀects of parents' origin attachment are found
to be similarly prevalent for both genders. One possible explanation for this gender
diﬀerence could be that women, and in particular women with a migration background,
have diﬀerent employment careers than men. They are on average less attached to the
labor market and are less likely to work full-time. Another possible explanation could
be that they do in fact overcome the human capital diﬀerences over lifetime.
Overall, national pride in the country of origin is negatively associated with the
labor market performance of male second-generation immigrants, while having no ef-
fect on females. However, since it is not possible in the CPS to control for parents'
characteristics or attribute this eﬀect to a speciﬁc channel, the negative eﬀects of na-
tional pride in the origin country have to be interpreted as suggestive evidence for the
long-run eﬀects of national attachment.
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2.5.2 Threats to the Exclusion Restriction
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, there exist two major threats to the exclusion restriction.
First, the exclusion restriction could be violated if the aggregate measure of national
pride proxies low unobserved human capital that is not captured by the control vari-
ables. As argued above, this problem is common in all studies that utilize aggregate
culture proxies from immigrants' origin countries. The fact that I can control for par-
ent characteristics such as age, years since migration, education, and the labor market
position should decrease the problem of unobserved human capital to some extent.
Also the origin-country controls GDP per capita and English-speaking, as well as the
region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects aim to minimize this problem.
In addition, I address this concern in the ﬁrst four rows of Table 2.B.6 by adding
the following control variables that are supposed to proxy human capital quality in
the origin country: The average years of education of women aged 25 and older in
the country of origin (Gakidou et al., 2010);25 an index of knowledge distribution that
was constructed as the arithmetic mean of the percentage of students and the percent-
age of literates in the origin country (Vanhanen, 2003); the share of non-agricultural
population as a percentage of total population (Vanhanen, 2003); and the Human De-
velopment Index (UNDP, 2004). The timing of those variables is as close to the year of
migration of the parents as possible. The results in Table 2.B.6 show that my results
are fairly robust to all additional independent variables that aim to control for the
human capital quality in the origin country of immigrants.
In the ﬁfth row of Table 2.B.6, I further investigate the problem of unobserved
human capital by adding the math achievement percentile rank of children at age 14 as
a control variable. This variable was used as an outcome variable in the main analysis,
since the test is supposed to capture diﬀerences in skill learning among children. How-
ever, one might argue that math test scores could reﬂect to some extent unobserved
human capital or intelligence. Since it is not clear whether this is the case, ﬁnding ro-
bust negative eﬀects of parents' national attachment on children's integration outcomes
with this speciﬁcation should support the argument that the results are not driven by
unobserved human capital. In fact, I ﬁnd that the results do not change a lot when
including math test score percentiles as an explanatory variable.
The speciﬁcation tests in Table 2.B.6 do not suggest that the results are driven by
unobserved human capital that is captured by the measure of national pride in the
origin country.
Another concern with regard to the exclusion restriction could be that national pride
in the origin country of immigrant children may aﬀect them through other channels
than their parents' origin attachment. As discussed in Section 2.3.2.2, the eﬀects of
25Same results for average years of education of men.
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national pride through channels such as family ties or media consumption are likely to
be minor compared to its eﬀect that comes through parents' origin attachment.
In order to address remaining concerns regarding the exclusion restriction, I conduct
a sensitivity analysis of the IV estimates to potential deviations from the exclusion re-
striction following the local-to-zero approximation method proposed in Conley, Hansen,
and Rossi (2012). This approach allows for a direct eﬀect of the instrument on the
outcome variable and allows to infer how sensitive results from the following second
stage equation of the 2SLS are to deviations from the perfect exclusion restriction:
Ycpod = β0 + β1 ˆorigin_tiespod + γ national_prideo + β2Xcpod + νd + λr + εcpod. (2.11)
Following Conley et al. (2012), I then assume that the potential direct eﬀect of the
instrument national_prideo on integration outcomes Ycpod, γ, is uniformly distributed
over an interval [0, δ] with δ > 0 for outcomes with positive IV-estimates, and an
interval [δ, 0] with δ < 0 for outcomes with negative IV-estimates. By varying δ, I can
then identify the threshold at which the second-stage coeﬃcient on national attachment
of parents becomes insigniﬁcant at the ten percent level.26
Figure 2.A.2 presents the results for diﬀerent outcomes using my main speciﬁcation.
To gauge magnitudes and in order to compare the results across diﬀerent outcome
variables, I do not plot the interval size δ on the x-axis, but its share with respect to the
reduced-form estimates of the national pride instrument on the respective outcomes.27
Thus, moving along the x-axis shows how the conﬁdence interval of the IV-estimate
is aﬀected if one allows for a larger direct eﬀect of the instrument  measured as
percentage share of the reduced-form estimate.
The results in Figure 2.A.2 are fairly similar across the diﬀerent outcome variables:
the thresholds for δ for all six integration outcomes is found to be at values that
correspond to about 40% of the reduced-form estimates. For example, the threshold at
which the IV-estimate for the outcome English Skills (Age 24) would turn insigniﬁcant
is δ = −0.155. That is, as long as the direct eﬀect of the instrument on English Skills
(Age 24) is of lower magnitude than −0.155, the second stage is still signiﬁcant at the
ten percent level. Relating this δ-threshold to the reduced-form eﬀect, which is −0.330
(see Table 2.B.5), leads to a threshold of 47% of the size of the reduced-form eﬀect.
Overall, Figure 2.A.2 suggests that to render the IV results insigniﬁcant, about 40%
of the overall eﬀect of the instrument would have to come through some omitted third
variable that is also captured by average national pride in the origin country. Given
26Satyanath et al. (2017) implement the Conley et al. (2012) local-to-zero approach very similarly
in order to identify thresholds at which their IV-estimates turn insigniﬁcant.
27The reduced-form estimate is obtained in the regression Ycpod = β0 + βRFnational_prideo +
β2Xcpod + νd + λo + ucpod, and the results are presented in Panel B of Table 2.B.5. The values on the
x-axis in Figure 2.A.2 are therefore calculated as follows: δβRF .
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the discussion in Section 2.3.2.2, it seems implausible that national pride in the origin
country would aﬀect children's integration through channels like family ties or media
consumption with a magnitude as large as 40% of the total eﬀect. Furthermore, it
seems unlikely that unobserved human capital would cause so much endogeneity given
the detailed control variables included in the main speciﬁcation, and the previous
robustness checks. Hence, the local-to-zero approach of Conley et al. (2012) supports
the robustness of my main results.
2.5.3 Alternative Samples
Another concern about the main results may be that the particular composition of
immigrant populations in the cities where the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal
Survey took place or the sample composition may drive the results. In order to test for
this, Table 2.B.7 presents IV-results of the main speciﬁcation for diﬀerent subsamples.
More speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst three rows I drop the main immigrant groups, since
one might be concerned that the large number of second-generation immigrants with
parents from Mexico or the Philippines could cause the results. As one can see, results
are very robust to these changes of the sample.
The sample restriction to only keep the respondents who are observed throughout
all three CILS-waves could bias my results, if selective attrition exists. The robustness
check in row 4 of Table 2.B.7 addresses this concern, where this restriction is dropped.
The results remain unchanged. Hence, selective attrition seems not to drive the main
results.
Furthermore, one could question the validity of the main results because the sample
includes a large number of immigrant children who were born abroad and migrated at
an age younger than nine. This sample choice is based on the critical period hypothesis.
Literature in psychology and economics suggests that immigrants who arrived at age
nine or younger from non-English-speaking countries are able to learn English better
than those who arrived at an older age. They are ultimately able to speak English just
as well as immigrant children who migrated from English-speaking countries. On the
contrary, immigrant children who immigrated at an age above nine from non-English-
speaking countries have signiﬁcantly poorer English-skills, and perform worse with
respect to socioeconomic outcomes in the long term (e.g., Bleakley and Chin, 2010).
In addition to this argument, results in row 5 of Table 2.B.7 illustrate that restricting
my sample to those children that immigrated at an age below four does not aﬀect my
results.
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2.5.4 Alternative Measures of National Pride
Finally, the empirical strategy of this study relies on only one measure of national
pride in the origin countries. As argued in Section 2.3.2.1, the national pride measure
from the IVS is very similar to measures of national pride in other surveys, and it
rather reﬂects the concept of nationalism than that of constructive patriotism. The
disadvantage of other surveys, such as the ISSP, is that it has only been conducted in
a few countries. In Table 2.B.8, one can see reduced-form estimates where diﬀerent
measures of national pride (columns (1)-(3)), nationalism (column (4)), and civic pride
(column (5)) are used as independent variables. The source of those variables are the
Integrated Values Survey (IVS, columns (1)-(2)), and the International Social Survey
Programm in 2003 (ISSP, columns (3)-(5)). The dependent variables cover parent and
child outcomes from the diﬀerent integration dimensions analyzed in the main analysis
(i.e., identity, social networks, language use and skills, education). Due to the low
number of origin countries covered in the ISSP, IV-regressions were not always feasible.
However, it should support the credibility of the measure used in the main analysis
if it gains similar reduced-form estimates than other measures of national pride. In
column (1), reduced-form estimates of the measure of national pride that is used as
an instrument in the main analysis are presented. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for
all outcomes and point in the same direction as the corresponding IV-estimates. The
estimates in column (2) show that simply using the mean value of national pride from
origin countries produces the same results as using country ﬁxed eﬀects from regressions
in the IVS. Column (3) reports the results for the identical question regarding national
pride from the ISSP. One can see that the number of observations is much lower than
for the variables from the IVS, but the estimates are fairly similar to those in the
ﬁrst two columns, even if they are not always signiﬁcant. Columns (4) and (5) report
the reduced-form estimates for the composite measures on nationalism and civic pride
that have been introduced in Section 2.3.2.1. The direction of the coeﬃcients is again
the same as for the IVS-variables on national pride. However, the coeﬃcients of the
nationalism-variable seem to be slightly more in line with the main results than those
of civic pride. Overall, the results in Table 2.B.8 support the idea that the results do
not depend on some artifact of the national pride variable in the Integrated Values
Survey.
2.6 Conclusion
In recent years, the identity of immigrants has increasingly attracted attention in public
debates on integration in many countries. In particular, a strong attachment to the
origin country of immigrants, especially among the second and third generation, is
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often considered a problem for successful integration or as a symptom of a weak record
of integration. At the same time, the identity of immigrants is increasingly becoming a
focus of interest for policy makers, since they actively try to establish norms and values
of the destination society among immigrants through compulsory integration courses
or through requirements for citizenship.
This paper examines how the national identity of immigrants, measured as at-
tachment to their origin country, inﬂuences the long-term integration of the second
generation. The empirical analysis relies on data from the Children of Immigrants
Longitudinal Study (CILS) and an IV strategy, where the national attachment of par-
ents is instrumented with an aggregate measure of national pride in the country of
origin. I ﬁnd that the origin attachment of immigrant parents negatively aﬀects the
integration of their children. Children whose parents are strongly attached to the origin
country develop a stronger ethnic identity, have less contact with natives, speak En-
glish less frequently and more poorly, and perform worse in school compared to peers
whose parents are less attached to their origin country. Furthermore, results from the
CPS suggest that a stronger origin identity leads to disadvantages in the labor market
for adult male second-generation immigrants.
This study has some important implications for the public and political debate on
the integration of immigrants in many countries, since it illustrates that the long-term
integration of immigrants and their children does not only depend on factors such as
potential or education. Instead, the results indicate that also the national identity
of immigrants inﬂuences their development. Whether immigrants orient themselves
towards their origin country or whether they are open to the new society, matters for
the integration success of immigrants and their descendants.
The results of this study support inclusive policies that promote incentives for
immigrants to participate in the new society. Policy makers could address this issue by
oﬀering better economic, social and political opportunities to immigrants, since greater
participation in these dimensions might weaken immigrants' origin ties and encourage
the formation of a destination country identity. Further, it may reduce the probability
that immigrants develop a strong origin identity in response to negative experiences in
the destination country. Policies in question include a liberal access to citizenship and
other measures that promote the feeling of belonging to the destination society. The
recent eﬀorts in many countries for targeting the identity of immigrants more directly
through compulsory immigration courses or citizenship requirements could be another
way to support the long-term integration of immigrants.
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2.A Additional Figures
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Figure 2.A.1: Heterogeneity in the Wage-Penalty of Second-Generation Immigrants
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Notes: The graph displays coeﬃcients from log-wage regressions for men in the CPS (1994-2015). The coeﬃcients refer to dummy variables indicating second-generation immigrants by their
origin. Additional to these second-generation immigrant indicators, the regression includes an indicator for ﬁrst-generation immigrants, polynomials of age, education controls, month-year
ﬁxed eﬀects, and state ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Figure 2.A.2: Local-to-Zero Approximation Bounds (Conley et al., 2012)
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the upper and lower bound of the 90% conﬁdence interval of the second-stage coeﬃcient on
parents' origin country attachment, using the main IV speciﬁcation. The instrument is the average national pride in the
country of origin. Following Conley et al. (2012), I allow for a direct eﬀect of the instrument on the diﬀerent integration
outcomes, assuming that this is uniformly distributed over an interval [0, δ] with δ > 0 for outcomes with positive
IV-estimates, and an interval [δ, 0] with δ < 0 for outcomes with negative IV-estimates. The percentage shares (interval
size δ / reduced-form estimate) are plotted on the x-axis.
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2.B Additional Tables
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Table 2.B.1: Origin Countries of Respondents in the CILS
Origin Country Main Sample Less restricted
(1) (2)
Argentina 15 18
Canada 4 5
Chile 1 1
China 12 22
Colombia 65 83
Dominican Republic 25 41
Ecuador 16 23
Egypt 0 1
El Salvador 7 15
Germany 3 4
Guatemala 9 14
Hungary 5 6
India 8 9
Indonesia 3 3
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 1
Italy 0 1
Japan 7 10
Mexico 198 325
Peru 15 20
Philippines 264 343
Romania 2 2
Russian Federation 1 1
South Korea 0 3
Spain 1 1
Taiwan 3 8
Thailand 3 8
United Kingdom 4 4
Vietnam 128 246
Total 799 1,218
Notes: The table reports the number of observations for the diﬀerent origin
countries in the CILS. The sample includes immigrant children, who have at
least one foreign-born parent and who were born in the U.S., or who immi-
grated at an age younger than nine. Furthermore, the sample is restricted to
those children, whose parents are observed in the parent survey. In column
(1), the sample is restricted to those children who are observed in all three
waves. In column (2), this restriction is not imposed.
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Table 2.B.2: Summary Statistics of the CILS
Main Sample Less restricted
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Parents:
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) -0.166 1.371 -0.0984 1.372
Very proud of the country of origin 0.783 0.413 0.792 0.406
Talk a lot with Child about Origin 0.501 0.500 0.519 0.500
Celebrate a lot Origin Holidays 0.338 0.473 0.362 0.481
Buy from Origin-Stores 0.213 0.410 0.240 0.428
Contact to Compatriots very important 0.451 0.498 0.459 0.499
Most Neighbors Foreigners 0.289 0.453 0.293 0.455
Most Neighbors White Americans 0.338 0.473 0.341 0.474
English Skills 3.002 0.858 2.859 0.899
14-Years Old:
Ethnic Self-Identity: National Origin 0.287 0.453 0.326 0.469
Ethnic Self-Identity: American 0.076 0.264 0.070 0.255
USA best country 0.626 0.484 0.605 0.489
Americans feel superior 0.738 0.440 0.733 0.443
Most Friends Foreigner 0.606 0.489 0.599 0.490
No English with Friends 0.630 0.483 0.682 0.466
Often/Always no English with Parents 0.841 0.366 0.854 0.354
English Skills 3.789 0.378 3.650 0.541
Math Achievement Percentile 56.93 29.95 54.43 29.87
Reading Achievement Percentile 48.41 29.36 43.64 29.55
Grade Point Average 2.834 0.856 2.765 0.895
17-Years Old:
Ethnic Self-Identity: National Origin 0.400 0.490 0.434 0.496
Ethnic Self-Identity: American 0.027 0.161 0.023 0.150
USA best country 0.744 0.437 0.719 0.450
Americans feel superior 0.826 0.379 0.811 0.392
Most Friends Foreigner 0.593 0.492 0.585 0.493
No English with Friends 0.516 0.500 0.588 0.492
English Skills 3.809 0.375 3.705 0.476
Grade Point Average 2.816 0.933 2.734 0.951
24-Years Old:
Ethnic Self-Identity: National Origin 0.268 0.443 0.264 0.441
Ethnic Self-Identity: American 0.027 0.162 0.026 0.158
Only English with Friends 0.561 0.497 0.529 0.499
No English with Parents 0.345 0.476 0.381 0.486
Hope to raise Children in English 0.301 0.459 0.279 0.449
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English Skills 3.853 0.366 3.818 0.415
Years of Education 14.527 1.672 14.495 1.704
College degree 0.366 0.482 0.362 0.481
Controls:
Parent: Female 0.601 0.490 0.606 0.489
Parent: Native Partner 0.130 0.337 0.113 0.317
Parent: Years since Migration 20.18 7.550 18.65 8.128
Parent: Age 46.551 6.558 46.331 7.093
Parent: High education 0.250 0.433 0.212 0.409
Parent: Medium education 0.478 0.500 0.472 0.499
Parent: Unemployed 0.049 0.216 0.055 0.228
Parent: Out of Labor Force 0.202 0.401 0.253 0.435
Child: Female 0.534 0.499 0.501 0.500
Child: Foreign-born 0.431 0.495 0.507 0.500
Origin: National Pride 2.637 0.157 2.632 0.165
Origin: Share of immigrants from origin 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.029
Origin: English Language 0.350 0.477 0.296 0.457
Origin: Real GDP per Capita 5672 3875 5620 3818
Region of Origin:
Europe 0.019 0.136 0.015 0.121
Asia 0.537 0.499 0.536 0.499
Middle East 0 0 0.002 0.041
South America 0.121 0.327 0.103 0.304
North America 0.323 0.468 0.345 0.476
Total 799 1218
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the CILS sample. The sample includes immigrant
children, who have at least one foreign-born parent and who were born in the U.S., or who immigrated
at an age younger than nine. Furthermore, the sample is restricted to those children, whose parents
are observed in the parent survey. In the two columns on the left, the sample is restricted to those
observations who are observed in all three waves. On the right, this restriction is not imposed.
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Table 2.B.3: Macro Variables on National Pride and National Feelings
National Pride Nationalism Civic Pride
Country
IVS:
Country-
FE
IVS: Mean
ISSP:
Mean
ISSP:
Principal C.
ISSP:
Principal C.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Albania 2.326 2.462 . . .
Algeria 2.492 2.619 . . .
Andorra 2.229 2.256 . . .
Argentina 2.442 2.445 . . .
Armenia 2.349 2.472 . . .
Australia 2.595 2.667 2.649 0.643 0.681
Austria 2.301 2.405 2.394 0.416 0.771
Azerbaijan 2.404 2.485 . . .
Bangladesh 2.646 2.724 . . .
Belarus 1.995 2.069 . . .
Belgium 1.964 2.033 . . .
Bosnia & H. 1.908 2.055 . . .
Brazil 2.298 2.357 . . .
Bulgaria 2.009 2.130 1.927 -0.292 -1.130
Burkina Faso 2.731 2.806 . . .
Canada 2.533 2.589 2.656 0.751 1.027
Chile 2.416 2.471 2.719 0.246 0.065
China 2.049 2.121 . . .
Colombia 2.767 2.821 . . .
Croatia 2.197 2.258 . . .
Cyprus 2.376 2.495 . . .
Czech Rep. 2.010 2.100 1.995 -0.415 -0.911
Denmark 2.210 2.266 2.215 0.228 0.796
Dom. Rep. 2.674 2.675 . . .
Ecuador 2.827 2.892 . . .
Egypt 2.671 2.702 . . .
El Salvador 2.721 2.805 . . .
Estonia 1.902 1.967 . . .
Ethiopia 2.610 2.648 . . .
Finland 2.347 2.366 2.311 0.051 0.524
France 2.114 2.167 2.166 -0.476 0.336
Georgia 2.564 2.642 . . .
Germany 1.771 1.834 1.708 -0.532 -0.010
Ghana 2.893 2.931 . . .
Greece 2.418 2.505 . . .
Guatemala 2.765 2.827 . . .
Hong Kong 1.542 1.623 . . .
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Hungary 2.193 2.379 2.390 -0.289 -0.431
Iceland 2.520 2.535 . . .
India 2.571 2.649 . . .
Indonesia 2.335 2.394 . . .
Iran 2.616 2.691 . . .
Iraq 2.604 2.633 . . .
Ireland 2.640 2.707 2.726 -0.046 0.488
Israel 2.282 2.345 2.299 -0.200 -0.515
Italy 2.178 2.246 . . .
Japan 1.875 1.871 2.326 0.333 0.114
Jordan 2.680 2.736 . . .
Kazakhstan 2.499 2.561 . . .
Kosovo 2.780 2.866 . . .
Kyrgyzstan 2.363 2.359 . . .
Latvia 2.063 2.106 2.050 -0.763 -1.233
Lebanon 2.093 2.147 . . .
Libya 2.685 2.738 . . .
Lithuania 1.834 1.904 . . .
Luxembourg 2.274 2.360 . . .
Macedonia 2.316 2.429 . . .
Malaysia 2.550 2.625 . . .
Mali 2.787 2.884 . . .
Malta 2.584 2.702 . . .
Mexico 2.611 2.644 . . .
Moldova 1.856 1.942 . . .
Montenegro 2.014 2.111 . . .
Morocco 2.558 2.632 . . .
Netherlands 1.884 1.963 1.965 -0.362 0.554
New Zealand 2.524 2.637 2.667 0.508 0.368
Nigeria 2.497 2.526 . . .
Norway 2.283 2.347 2.220 -0.105 0.348
Pakistan 2.700 2.781 . . .
Palestine 2.556 2.625 . . .
Peru 2.615 2.660 . . .
Philippines 2.690 2.767 2.760 0.375 0.126
Poland 2.476 2.595 2.369 -0.278 -0.978
Portugal 2.408 2.545 2.502 -0.041 -0.654
Puerto Rico 2.793 2.892 . . .
Romania 2.157 2.269 . . .
Russia 2.004 2.064 2.200 -0.093 -1.488
Rwanda 2.745 2.787 . . .
Saudi Arabia 2.650 2.684 . . .
Serbia 2.207 2.289 . . .
Singapore 2.338 2.400 . . .
Slovakia 2.046 2.155 2.168 -0.602 -1.289
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Slovenia 2.387 2.469 2.487 -0.520 -0.416
South Africa 2.604 2.560 2.640 0.574 0.500
South Korea 1.987 2.116 2.003 -0.212 -0.779
Spain 2.319 2.435 2.338 0.043 0.580
Sweden 2.190 2.244 2.168 -0.387 0.254
Switzerland 2.083 2.163 2.165 -0.886 0.877
Taiwan 1.682 1.754 2.279 0.050 -0.470
Tanzania 2.707 2.743 . . .
Thailand 2.722 2.839 . . .
Trinidad & Tob. 2.781 2.872 . . .
Tunisia 2.430 2.503 . . .
Turkey 2.531 2.655 . . .
Uganda 2.548 2.554 . . .
Ukraine 1.823 1.890 . . .
United Kingdom 2.312 2.399 2.310 0.028 0.440
United States 2.617 2.667 2.772 0.598 0.892
Uruguay 2.472 2.602 2.680 0.037 0.199
Venezuela 2.861 2.915 2.911 0.405 0.418
Vietnam 2.676 2.782 . . .
Yemen 2.718 2.790 . . .
Zambia 2.475 2.493 . . .
Zimbabwe 2.666 2.687 . . .
Total 2.387 2.459 2.357 -0.036 0.002
Notes: The table reports the macro variables on national feelings for diﬀerent countries. Columns (1)
and (2) show the measures of national pride from the Integrated Values Survey (1981-2014). Column
(3) shows the mean value of national pride in the ISSP (2003). Column (4) and (5) displays the
country averages of diﬀerent composite measures on nationalism and civic pride.
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Table 2.B.4: Summary Statistics of the CPS
LFP-Sample Wage-Sample
Men Women Men Women
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Labor Force Participation 0.865 0.342 0.739 0.439 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Unemployed 0.046 0.210 0.043 0.202 0.040 0.197 0.030 0.172
Log Wage 10.564 0.960 10.060 1.073 10.678 0.821 10.369 0.776
Log Total Income 10.186 2.116 8.992 3.062 10.754 0.775 10.450 0.725
Age 44.041 11.475 43.994 11.505 41.845 10.518 41.533 10.558
Race: non-white 0.122 0.328 0.122 0.327 0.136 0.342 0.155 0.361
High Education 0.370 0.483 0.361 0.480 0.387 0.487 0.407 0.491
Medium Education 0.546 0.498 0.561 0.496 0.540 0.498 0.541 0.498
Low Education 0.084 0.278 0.078 0.268 0.073 0.260 0.052 0.221
Origin: National Pride 2.359 0.298 2.365 0.295 2.385 0.298 2.399 0.294
Origin: English Language 0.305 0.460 0.304 0.460 0.279 0.449 0.276 0.447
Origin: Real GDP per Capita 16939 9068 16833 9077 15817 9074 15285 9096
Region of Origin:
Europe 0.461 0.498 0.454 0.498 0.407 0.491 0.382 0.486
Asia 0.134 0.340 0.130 0.336 0.136 0.343 0.146 0.353
Middle East 0.014 0.119 0.014 0.116 0.013 0.112 0.012 0.108
Africa 0.005 0.072 0.005 0.071 0.005 0.072 0.005 0.069
Oceania 0.005 0.068 0.004 0.066 0.004 0.066 0.004 0.064
South America 0.019 0.137 0.018 0.134 0.024 0.153 0.024 0.154
North America 0.362 0.481 0.375 0.484 0.411 0.492 0.428 0.495
Observations 474,403 492,368 38,255 29,356
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the samples of male and female second-generation immigrants in the CPS
(1994-2015). The sample includes second-generation immigrants who are aged between 25 and 65. Second-generation
immigrants are deﬁned as respondents who were born in the United States, but have at least one foreign-born parent.
The LFP-Sample includes all individuals who are active in the labor market. Since wages are observed only once a year,
the Wage-Sample includes less observations. Furthermore it is restricted to full-time employed respondents.
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Table 2.B.5: OLS and Reduced-Form Results
Identity Socialization Language use and skills Education
A14: Et.
Self-Id.:
Nat.
A17: Et.
Self-Id.:
Nat.
P: Most N.
White Am.
A17: Most
Fr. For.
A14: No
Eng. w/
Fr.
A17: No
Eng. w/
Fr.
A24: Only
Eng. w/
Fr.
A24: Eng.
Skills
A14: GPA A17: GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: OLS
Ties to Origin Country (PCA) -0.002 0.011 -0.008 0.041*** 0.007 0.016 -0.011 0.009 0.056 0.016
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006) (0.034) (0.041)
Observations 710 711 714 690 645 714 701 652 711 711
R-Squared 0.0890 0.2012 0.1385 0.1223 0.2790 0.3586 0.3047 0.0712 0.2656 0.2477
Panel B: Reduced Form
National Pride in Origin Country 0.230** 0.269* -0.331** 0.540*** 0.360* 0.423*** -0.472*** -0.330*** -0.968*** -1.094**
(0.098) (0.147) (0.149) (0.155) (0.175) (0.133) (0.145) (0.059) (0.282) (0.418)
Observations 710 711 714 690 645 714 701 652 711 711
R-Squared 0.0906 0.2025 0.1414 0.1196 0.2819 0.3620 0.3099 0.0758 0.2673 0.2563
Parent Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports OLS and reduced-form estimates for outcomes regarding social networks (columns (1)-(2)), language use and skills (columns (3)-(6)), identity (columns (7)-(8)), and education (columns (9)-(10))
in the diﬀerent CILS-waves (P: Parents; A14: Age 14; A17: Age 17; A24: Age 24). The main independent variable in Panel A is the national attachment of parents, a principal component of diﬀerent variables indicating
an attachment to the origin country. In Panel B, the main independent variable is the average national pride in the country of origin (variable from the IVS). The speciﬁcations correspond otherwise to the main analysis.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.B.6: Robustness to Other Explanatory Variables
Identity Social Networks Language use and skills Education
A14: Et.
Self-Id.:
Nat.
A17: Et.
Self-Id.:
Nat.
P: Most N.
White Am.
A17: Most
Fr. For.
A14: No
Eng. w/
Fr.
A17: No
Eng. w/
Fr.
A24: Only
Eng. w/
Fr.
A24: Eng.
Skills
A14: GPA A17: GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Origin: Female Avg. Years of Edu. 0.110** 0.091 -0.134* 0.184*** 0.186** 0.161*** -0.196*** -0.147*** -0.402*** -0.462**
(0.045) (0.057) (0.069) (0.054) (0.073) (0.053) (0.053) (0.038) (0.155) (0.210)
Origin: Index of Knowledge Distr. 0.090** 0.118** -0.149* 0.237*** 0.216*** 0.165*** -0.191** -0.127*** -0.345** -0.387**
(0.045) (0.056) (0.081) (0.049) (0.081) (0.063) (0.079) (0.030) (0.138) (0.166)
Origin: Non-Agricultural Pop. 0.068 0.233*** -0.194 0.346*** 0.232** 0.187** -0.210*** -0.172*** -0.305** -0.339*
(0.073) (0.079) (0.128) (0.109) (0.105) (0.081) (0.078) (0.054) (0.154) (0.204)
Origin: Human Development Index 0.078* 0.141** -0.185* 0.278*** 0.207*** 0.187*** -0.204*** -0.143*** -0.350** -0.397*
(0.044) (0.057) (0.098) (0.053) (0.067) (0.054) (0.059) (0.032) (0.142) (0.206)
Child: Math Achievement Percentile 0.127** 0.115** -0.078 0.218*** 0.186*** 0.183*** -0.195*** -0.134*** -0.221* -0.224
(0.062) (0.048) (0.061) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.051) (0.032) (0.122) (0.196)
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates for outcomes regarding identity (columns (1)-(2)), social networks (columns (3)-(4)), language use and skills (columns (5)-(8)), and education (columns (9)-(10)) in the diﬀerent
CILS-waves (P: Parents; A14: Age 14; A17: Age 17; A24: Age 24). The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents, a principal component of diﬀerent variables indicating an attachment to the origin
country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country of origin (variable from the IVS). IV models include the same control variables as in the main speciﬁcation, but vary in
diﬀerent additional characterstics that are used to test the robustness of the main results. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.B.7: Robustness to Alternative Samples
Identity Social Networks Language use and skills Education
A14: Et.
Self-Id.:
Nat.
A17: Et.
Self-Id.:
Nat.
P: Most N.
White Am.
A17: Most
Fr. For.
A14: No
Eng. w/
Fr.
A17: No
Eng. w/
Fr.
A24: Only
Eng. w/
Fr.
A24: Eng.
Skills
A14: GPA A17: GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Drop Mexicans 0.118** 0.132*** -0.101* 0.189*** 0.184** 0.160*** -0.209*** -0.143*** -0.342** -0.388**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.061) (0.054) (0.076) (0.054) (0.058) (0.030) (0.143) (0.182)
Drop Philipponos 0.088** 0.162** -0.160** 0.229*** 0.204*** 0.178*** -0.199*** -0.116*** -0.433*** -0.494***
(0.040) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.061) (0.052) (0.032) (0.135) (0.187)
Drop Mex. and Phil. 0.099 0.245*** -0.188* 0.262*** 0.277*** 0.176** -0.240*** -0.156*** -0.495*** -0.555***
(0.067) (0.074) (0.098) (0.070) (0.096) (0.075) (0.081) (0.039) (0.152) (0.213)
Drop Attrition Restrictions 0.151*** 0.226** -0.157* 0.212*** 0.213** 0.185*** -0.197*** -0.125*** -0.502* -0.593*
(0.051) (0.096) (0.088) (0.069) (0.089) (0.065) (0.047) (0.025) (0.272) (0.326)
Age at Arrival < 4 0.035 0.123* -0.109* 0.224*** 0.237*** 0.161*** -0.167** -0.110*** -0.400*** -0.461**
(0.042) (0.066) (0.061) (0.077) (0.078) (0.060) (0.068) (0.030) (0.144) (0.192)
Notes: The table reports IV-estimates for outcomes regarding identity (columns (1)-(2)), social networks (columns (3)-(4)), language use and skills (columns (5)-(8)), and education (columns (9)-(10)) in the
diﬀerent CILS-waves (P: Parents; A14: Age 14; A17: Age 17; A24: Age 24). The main independent variable is the national attachment of parents, a principal component of diﬀerent variables indicating an
attachment to the origin country. National attachment of parents is instrumented with the average national pride in the country of origin (variable from the IVS). The diﬀerent rows show results for diﬀerent
sample-restrictions. All speciﬁcations correspond to the main analysis. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.B.8: Alternative Measures of National Pride in Origin Country
National Pride
National-
ism
Civic Pride
IVS:
Country-FE
IVS: Mean
Value
ISSP:
Mean-Value
ISSP:
Principal C.
ISSP:
Principal C.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 14: Ethnic Self-Id. National 0.230** 0.197** 0.157 0.212 0.546***
(0.098) (0.094) (0.407) (0.317) (0.143)
Observations 710 710 254 254 254
R-Squared 0.0906 0.0904 0.1113 0.1114 0.1169
Parent: Most N. White Americans -0.331** -0.305** -1.198** -1.199* -1.148***
(0.149) (0.140) (0.452) (0.613) (0.229)
Observations 714 714 253 253 253
R-Squared 0.1414 0.1414 0.1273 0.1279 0.1391
Age 17: No English with Friends 0.423*** 0.356** 0.608*** 0.505* 0.064
(0.133) (0.146) (0.171) (0.245) (0.170)
Observations 714 714 254 254 254
R-Squared 0.3620 0.3611 0.0948 0.0938 0.0914
Age 24: Only English with Friends -0.472*** -0.402** -0.385 -0.190 -0.120
(0.145) (0.154) (0.301) (0.345) (0.274)
Observations 701 701 249 249 249
R-Squared 0.3099 0.3088 0.0907 0.0895 0.0895
Age 24: English Skills -0.330*** -0.318*** -0.252 -0.072 -0.134
(0.059) (0.058) (0.159) (0.125) (0.103)
Observations 652 652 249 249 249
R-Squared 0.0758 0.0760 0.0652 0.0643 0.0651
Age 14: Grade Point Average -0.968*** -0.881*** -1.314** -0.947 -0.092
(0.282) (0.257) (0.560) (0.821) (0.646)
Observations 711 711 253 253 253
R-Squared 0.2673 0.2667 0.2151 0.2133 0.2109
Age 17: Grade Point Average -1.094** -0.946** -0.785 -0.797* -0.280
(0.418) (0.367) (0.437) (0.370) (0.400)
Observations 711 711 253 253 253
R-Squared 0.2563 0.2548 0.2922 0.2923 0.2914
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates where diﬀerent measures of national pride (columns (1)-(3)), nationalism (column
(4)), and civic pride (column (5)) are used as main independent variables. The source of those variables are the International
Values Survey (IVS, columns (1)-(2)), and the International Social Survey Programm (ISSP, columns (3)-(5)). The dependent
variables are outcomes of parents and children in the diﬀerent areas covered in the main analysis (social networks, language use
and skills, identity, education). All speciﬁcations include the same control variables as the main speciﬁcations. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by origin country. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
63
64
Chapter 3
Citizenship and Social Integration
3.1 Introduction
The dramatic pictures and stories of refugees crossing the Mediterranean and Aegean
Sea into Europe are still fresh in people's mind. In 2015 alone, more than 1.4 million
applications for asylum were submitted in Europe, most of them in Germany. The
large inﬂows of refugees and other migrants in their wake has brought the issue of
immigration back to the center of public attention in destination countries, many with
sizable immigrant populations ranging from 10% in Italy to 12-15% in France, Germany,
the U.K. and the U.S. and almost 30% in Australia or Switzerland.
The recent refugee crisis has reignited an increasingly emotional political debate
about the costs and beneﬁts of immigration and whether immigrants integrate into
the host society or not. Anti-immigration sentiments have dominated the Brexit
referendum in the U.K. to leave the European Union (e.g., The Economist, 2016).
A similar rhetoric, mostly against non-EU immigrants from Muslim countries, has
emerged during the electoral campaigns in the Netherlands and France. And one of
Trump's ﬁrst executive orders in oﬃce was a travel ban for immigrants from certain
Muslim countries under the notion that they pose a threat to national security and
American culture.
How can we explain this resurgence of skepticism or outright anti-immigration sen-
timents? Part of the explanation is related to economic concerns about increased
competition for jobs or housing and the associated ﬁscal costs of immigration. Yet, a
number of studies show that economic concerns alone cannot explain the negative atti-
This chapter is joint work with Christina Gathmann and Nicolas Keller. We thank Alicia Adsera,
Joe Altonji, Thomas Bauer, Irene Bloemraad, Delia Furtado, Dominik Hangartner, Paanu Poutvaara,
Helmut Rainer, Ludger Woessmann and participants at Society of Labor Economists Meeting in
Montreal, European Association of Labor Economists, the European Economic Association, the First
Migration Observatory in Turin, RWI Essen, Heidelberg, Ifo Institute, Verein für Socialpolitik, the
ZEW Workshop on the Assimilation and Integration of Immigrants, and the Ifo Migration Workshop
for valuable comments.
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tudes toward immigration (see, e.g., Card et al., 2012; Hainmueller et al., 2015; Mayda,
2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Rather, it appears that the perceived cultural or
social impacts of immigration on the host society play a key role (e.g., Card et al.,
2012; Hainmueller et al., 2015).
Many people think, for instance, that immigrants, rather than adapting to the
values and norms of the host country, are tied to the social norms and values of their
country of origin instead. The visibility of other ethnic or religious identities and diﬀer-
ent lifestyles in the local community are then often interpreted as a sign that integration
has failed. The reaction might be intolerance, overt or covered discrimination by the
majority society and feelings of alienation among the immigrant population. Hostility
between immigrants and natives may then not only threaten the social cohesion in the
host country, but also prevent that immigrants reach their full potential  with large
economic and social costs to immigrants and destination country alike.
These societal challenges raise the question what governments can do to support
the integration of immigrants and thus support the social cohesion in society. One of
the most important policy instruments to further integration is the citizenship policy
of the host country. While most countries have the option to naturalize, they diﬀer a
lot in their eligibility requirements, in particular with respect to the number of years
an immigrant has to reside in the country in order to get eligible for naturalization.
Traditional immigration countries like Canada and the U.S. allow immigrants to natu-
ralize after only four or ﬁve years of residency. In contrast, countries with traditionally
restrictive immigration policies like Austria or Switzerland require 10 or even 12 years
of residence.
Little is known, however, whether a liberal citizenship policy with short waiting
periods helps or hinders the integration of immigrants. Identifying the causal eﬀect
of liberal access to citizenship poses substantial empirical challenges. Countries that
impose diﬀerent residency requirements also vary along many other dimensions which
inﬂuence the selection of destination and immigrant's choices after arrival. Residency
requirements are typically shorter in traditional immigration countries which have ac-
cumulated a lot of experience with large-scale migration and integration. Residency
requirements at times vary between groups within a given country. Immigrants who are
married to natives, for example, may naturalize faster than immigrants on a work visa.
Yet, marrying a native is likely to speed up the assimilation process even independently
of the residency requirement (Meng and Gregory, 2005).
In this paper, we contribute to the contentious, current debates on immigration by
providing much needed causal evidence on the link between citizenship and integra-
tion. In particular, our article addresses three questions: Does a more liberal access to
citizenship speed up the assimilation of immigrants in the host society? What role do
immigrant expectations about their assumed waiting time play for their long-term de-
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cisions? And ﬁnally, is there evidence for the widespread concern that some immigrant
groups do not assimilate at all  even under a liberal citizenship policy?
In tackling these questions, we rely on two national reforms that liberalized access
to citizenship in Germany. Traditionally, citizenship in Germany was closely tied to
ancestry and ethnic origin. In 1991, however, the federal government introduced for
the ﬁrst time explicit criteria how immigrants could naturalize. In particular, the
reform imposed age-dependent residency requirements for naturalization: immigrants
who arrived at the age of 15 or older could naturalize after 15 years of residency. Yet,
there were two exceptions to this rule: immigrants who arrived between the ages of
8 and 14 could naturalize after only 8 years. And foreign-borns who arrived before
the age of 8 could naturalize when they turn 16. The second reform in 2000 reduced
the residency requirement to 8 years for all immigrants arriving at age 8 or older;
younger immigrants still get eligible when they turn 16. The timing of the reforms
provides additional variation across immigrants depending on their year of arrival:
older immigrants arriving in Germany prior to 1985 had to wait 15 years, while those
arriving between 1986 and 1991 had to wait less than 15 years  as they got eligible
with the second reform in 2000. Our basic estimation approach then compares the
choices of immigrants from the same arrival cohort who get eligible for citizenship in
diﬀerent years while controlling ﬂexibly for year of birth, general assimilation, age and
time eﬀects.
We ﬁrst show that giving immigrants faster access to citizenship makes them more
likely to naturalize. Yet, conditional on naturalizing, there is no evidence that immi-
grants with faster access to citizenship naturalize earlier than immigrants with longer
residency requirements. This result is somewhat surprising because all immigrants
eventually become eligible for naturalization. That immigrants with short residency
requirement have a higher propensity to naturalize suggests that a liberal citizenship
policy inﬂuences how immigrants perceive their position in the host society, for exam-
ple, because they feel more welcome or accepted as equals.
We then turn to the question how a more liberal citizenship policy aﬀects the social
assimilation of immigrants. Here, we focus on long-term decisions like whom to marry
and when to have children for several reasons.1 Fertility and marriage decisions are
strongly linked to how much immigrant women invest in human capital and partici-
pate in the labor market  which are important indicators for women's economic and
actual independence. These decisions thus reveal a lot about preferences or norms
about women's rights and opportunities among immigrants relative to the host society.
How contentious the issue of women's rights and gender equality has become in the
1Clearly, there are other dimensions, such as social interaction with natives, location choices or
engagement in churches or local clubs, that might matter for social assimilation. Given the data
available to us, we decided to focus on revealed preferences about long-term decisions rather than
social activities or the perceived interaction with natives, for instance.
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wake of the refugee crisis is illustrated by the recent political debate about child mar-
riages among refugees and whether these should or should not be annulled in Germany
(Spiegel Online, 2016).
Even more importantly, marriage and fertility decisions shape, through the quantity-
quality trade-oﬀ and parental investments, the cultural traits and social norms embod-
ied in the next generation. This issue is especially pressing in countries like Germany
where almost one-third of children under six now have at least one foreign-born par-
ent. Furthermore, a strong preference for preserving cultural or religious traits is often
associated with a high propensity to marry within one's own ethnic or religious group
(Bisin et al., 2004). Hence, partnership and marriage choices determines whether the
host society has cross-cutting social ties between diﬀerent social and ethnic groups;
or whether it is segregated into exclusive social groups instead with little interaction
between these groups. The degree of segregation in turn has important implications
for social mobility and the public support for redistribution, for instance (e.g., Alesina
et al., 2001; Dahlberg et al., 2012). As such, social integration is a crucial determinant
of the cohesion and future conﬂicts in the host society. Finally, while there is a sizable
literature on the determinants of economic assimilation, economists have paid little
attention to other dimensions of integration. Yet, the extent and speed of integra-
tion may vary substantially between economic, social, cultural or political integration
outcomes (see, e.g., Abramitzky et al., 2016; Algan et al., 2012).
Economic theory suggests three channels why a more liberal citizenship policy could
aﬀect social assimilation: income, human capital and social norms. Citizenship removes
any existing restrictions on career access and mobility that immigrants might face in
the labor market. Naturalized immigrants may work in any job, at any time and place,
which should improve the match quality between workers and ﬁrms, for instance. To
the extent that these jobs and newly attainable career options oﬀer better pay or
working conditions than jobs available to the average immigrant, citizenship raises the
lifetime income of immigrants. Higher lifetime income would in turn aﬀect fertility
and marriage choices through an income eﬀect. A second channel is human capital: If
match quality and career opportunities are complements to worker skill, both factors
should raise the returns to host country skills like language or training. Additional
human capital does not only inﬂuence the set of potential partners one meets but
also the opportunity costs of early marriage and childbearing, for instance. Finally,
citizenship may inﬂuence which norms or values immigrants may choose to follow or
feel obliged to adhere to. Immigrants are exposed both to the norms and values of
their country of origin but also to those of the host country. Access to citizenship
could increase the importance of the host country's norms and values relative to those
in the country of origin, for instance, because immigrants feel more welcome or less
discriminated. As a result, marriage and fertility decisions might converge to those in
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the native population. All three arguments suggest that faster access to citizenship
could speed up the social assimilation of immigrants.
Our empirical results support the hypothesis that citizenship is a catalyst for in-
tegration. First, we show that faster access to citizenship reduces the demand for
children. Because not all women in our sample have completed their fertility, the
declining number of children reﬂects in part a postponement of births among immi-
grants. In line with such an interpretation, we document a sizable increase in the age
at ﬁrst birth. Both the decline in fertility and the rise in the age at ﬁrst birth indi-
cate that immigrants converge to the fertility choices of natives: if immigrants face a
8-year rather than 15-year residency requirement, for example, the immigrant-native
gap in total fertility declines by up to 20 percent. The immigrant-native age gap at
ﬁrst birth is 4.1 years and declines by 1.3 years or 31% with a shorter waiting period.
Second, a more liberal citizenship policy also inﬂuences marriage choices: both men
and women are less likely to be currently or ever married. As eligibility has few eﬀects
on marital stability and cohabitation, the main channel for the decline in marriage is
that immigrants postpone their marriage to search for a suitable match. As immigrant
women marry on average at age 20, the postponement reduces the immigrant-native
gap in women's age at ﬁrst marriage by up to 20 percent. Interestingly, immigrants
with faster access to citizenship do not have higher intermarriage rates or fewer endog-
amous partnerships. This result is surprising as intermarriage rates are often taken as
evidence for a successful integration (Furtado and Trejo, 2013).
Our unique setting allows an additional test whether immigrants anticipate the
future beneﬁts of citizenship. The timing of the reforms was such that they came as
a complete surprise for many immigrants. All immigrants arriving before 1990, for
instance, arrived in Germany under the assumption that naturalization was basically
unattainable  until the ﬁrst reform was passed in 1990. For these immigrants, the
actual waiting period for citizenship they faced after the 1991 reform was much shorter
than they expected. If expected future beneﬁts inﬂuence fertility and marriage choices,
as theory would predict, immigrants who get surprised by the option to naturalize
make diﬀerent choices than those that knew their actual waiting period. Our estimates
indicate that immigrants who were surprised by the reforms converge much less in their
fertility and marriage choices than immigrants who anticipated their waiting period.
This pattern supports the notion that immigrants take the future expected beneﬁts of
citizenship into account when making long-term decisions like when to marry or have
children.
Finally, we show that social assimilation varies a lot with the cultural background
of the immigrant. Immigrants who originate from more traditional cultures with high
fertility rates are more likely to be married and have more children than immigrants
from countries with low fertility rates. Even more importantly, they also assimilate
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more slowly under a liberal citizenship policy. These pattern indicate not only that
the speed of assimilation varies substantially across immigrant groups; but also that
diﬀerences in marriage and fertility choices between natives and some immigrant groups
persist to the next generation.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related literature
and why a more liberal citizenship policy may inﬂuence fertility, marriage and partner
choices. Section 3.3 introduces the reforms of citizenship policy in Germany, while
Section 3.4 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 3.5 reports the main
results on social integration and the role of expectations, while Section 3.6 presents a
range of sensitivity checks to demonstrate the robustness of the results. Section 3.7
investigates whether some immigrant group fail to integrate. Section 3.8 discusses the
implications of our ﬁndings in the light of the recent refugee crisis and concludes.
3.2 Related Literature and Theoretical Mechanisms
3.2.1 Related Literature
Our study is closely related to the literature on citizenship which investigates how an
immigrant's decision to naturalize aﬀects labor market assimilation (e.g., Chiswick,
1978; Bratsberg et al., 2002; Bevelander and Devoretz, 2008; Gathmann and Keller,
2017). We make three contributions here: ﬁrst, we analyze whether changes in the
citizenship policy of the host country, rather than the individual decision to naturalize,
can speed up or delay integration. Second, we can rely on arguably exogenous variation
in eligibility rules from two national immigration reforms for identiﬁcation. Finally,
we investigate the impact on marriage and fertility decisions rather than labor market
performance. Closest to our analysis is Hainmueller et al. (2015, 2017) who use local
referenda about citizenship applications in Switzerland to study whether winning the
referendum improves social and political integration. Yet, they investigate a very
diﬀerent policy and a more subjective set of social outcomes, like the intention to stay
or whether an immigrant feels discriminated, rather than revealed preferences about
family and fertility choices as we do.
A few recent papers study the link between birthright citizenship for second genera-
tion immigrants and parental decisions (Avitabile et al., 2014, for fertility choices; Felfe
et al., 2016, for educational attainment; and Avitabile et al., 2013, for social contact
to natives). Our analysis diﬀers from these earlier studies in several ways: we focus on
how ﬁrst-generation immigrants (rather than second-generation immigrants) respond
to a more liberal citizenship policy. In addition, we study diﬀerences in the waiting
period for citizenship rather than a citizenship by birth policy. Finally, we focus on
actual partnership, marriage and fertility choices of eligible adults.
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Our study also contributes to a large literature on immigrant assimilation. Most
studies in economics have focused on assimilation in the labor market (e.g., Algan et al.,
2010; Borjas, 1985, 1995; Card, 2005; Hu, 2000; LaLonde and Topel, 1997; Lubotsky,
2007; Duleep, 2015, provides a recent survey). Yet, as noted by Algan et al. (2012), the
extent and speed of economic integration might be very diﬀerent from social or cultural
integration; and some groups might integrate faster along some dimensions than others.
A small literature analyzes cultural assimilation measured, for instance, by immigrant's
national identity (e.g., Dustmann, 1996; Manning and Roy, 2010), their self-assessed
values and beliefs (Algan et al., 2012; Bisin et al., 2011a) or the choice of names in
the host country (Abramitzky et al., 2016). A much larger literature in economics
and sociology compares natives and immigrants with respect to family formation and
fertility behavior (e.g., Ben-Porath, 1973; Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Adserà and Ferrer,
2015; Furtado and Trejo, 2013, survey the literature). Rather than studying immigrants
relative to natives, we compare the social integration of immigrants who face a more
or less liberal citizenship policy.2 Our main contribution here is that we can directly
evaluate whether host country policies speed up or rather delay social integration.
As such, our study has direct implications for policy-makers who wish to promote
immigrant integration and foster social cohesion in their countries.
Finally, we contribute to a recent literature examining the impact of culture and
identity on economic and social behavior (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2011; Bisin et al., 2004; Blau, 1992; Blau et al., 2011; Fernández and
Fogli, 2009; Giuliano, 2007). Key questions in this rapidly growing literature are how
alternative identities aﬀect the behavior and position of immigrants in the host country;
and through which conditions the identity as a (minority) group gets strengthened or
weakened. The literature highlights that the integration process is not a one-way
street where immigrant's identities slowly diﬀuse into the host society. Minorities
may preserve their cultural or religious identity, for instance, if parents have a strong
preference that their children keep the same ethnic and cultural traits (e.g., Bisin et al.,
2004). Our empirical results demonstrate in a diﬀerent setting that norms and values
shape how immigrants respond to the integration oﬀer by the host country and may
maintain persistent diﬀerences.
A mostly empirical strand in this literature investigates how the culture of the
country of origin inﬂuences outcomes like female labor supply (Blau, 1992; Blau et al.,
2011; Fernández and Fogli, 2009), fertility (Fernández and Fogli, 2009) or living ar-
rangements (Giuliano, 2007) in the host country among second- or third-generation
immigrants (see Fernández, 2011, for a survey).3 Our contribution here is that we
2Similarly, LaLonde and Topel (1997) and Blau et al. (2011) also use diﬀerent immigrant cohorts
to study the link between years since migration and economic integration.
3The basic idea of the epidemiological approach is that immigrants have been exposed to diﬀerent
traditions and values, either in the country of origin or, for second-generation immigrants, through
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investigate two questions that have not been analyzed so far: can faster access to citi-
zenship tilt the choices of an immigrant in the direction of the host country? And does
the cultural background of an immigrant speed up or delay this integration process?
3.2.2 Three Channels: Income, Human Capital and Social Norms
A liberal citizenship policy may aﬀect the marriage and fertility decisions of eligible
immigrants through three channels: income, human capital and social norms. The
option to naturalize faster in the host country improves the earnings of immigrants in
the labor market (see Bratsberg et al., 2002; Gathmann and Keller, 2017, for empirical
evidence). Citizenship removes entry barriers and any restrictions on career mobility
that immigrants face. Immigrants may work in any job, at any time and place, which
should improve the match quality between workers and ﬁrms. Furthermore, employers
might be more willing to invest in an employee who has signaled a long-term commit-
ment to the host country  which could eliminate explicit or implicit impediments to
training or promotion (see, e.g., LaLonde and Topel, 1997).4
A second important channel is that access to citizenship encourages additional
investments in human capital. If match quality and training opportunities by employers
are complements to worker skill, the returns to formal education and possibly language
skills increase. Faster eligibility guarantees a longer time period to reap these higher
returns. Available evidence indeed shows that citizenship encourages investments in
language skills and vocational training (Gathmann and Keller, 2017).
A third potential channel is that citizenship opens the door for immigrants to be-
come equal members of the host society with all rights and responsibilities. As a result,
the option to naturalize could inﬂuence the social norms or values that immigrants
want or feel obliged to follow or reduce the tendency of oppositional identities among
immigrants (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). First-generation immigrants are raised and
educated in accordance with the traits and norms of their respective source country.
The option to naturalize could, for instance, change the weight immigrants attach to
the values and norms of the host culture relative to the values and norms they were
raised with. We next turn to a discussion how the three channels might inﬂuence the
marriage and fertility choices of immigrants.
parents and ethnic neighborhoods, but face the same institutional and economic incentives in the host
country. Under certain assumptions, immigrants from diﬀerent source countries can then be used to
separate the inﬂuence of culture and norms from other institutional factors in a host country.
4In addition, non-EU citizens, even with a permanent residency status, still require visa to travel
into other EU countries. As such, employers might hesitate to hire a non-EU citizen for a job with
extensive traveling or assignments abroad due to additional visa costs and reduced ﬂexibility.
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3.2.3 Consequences for Fertility, Family Formation and Partner
Choice
3.2.3.1 Fertility
Access to citizenship could have consequences for fertility decisions among immigrants
through all three channels. A better economic position generates both an income and
substitution eﬀect on fertility (Becker, 1960; Hotz et al., 1997, survey the literature).
The income eﬀect raises the demand for children, while the substitution eﬀect increases
the opportunity cost of children and hence, reduces parental demand. If the better
economic condition is mostly the result of more human capital and more labor market
attachment, the rise in opportunity costs might dominate the income eﬀect. In that
case, access to citizenship is likely to reduce the total demand for children among
immigrant women.5
More education and better career opportunities in the labor market should aﬀect
the timing of birth as well. In economic models of fertility, couples time fertility to
maximize lifetime income. Two factors determine the timing of birth: whether skills
depreciate during parental leave, and whether credit markets are perfect or imperfect.
With no skill depreciation and perfect credit markets, fertility is high early in the labor
market career when female wages are low. With imperfect credit markets, income is
diﬃcult to shift intertemporally; as a result, fertility moves with the husband's income.
If skills deteriorate during labor market absence, the additional cost from human capital
loss pushes women to postpone their birth. As faster access to citizenship encourages
educational investments, we expect that eligible women postpone their ﬁrst birth to
later ages.
Immigrants often come from countries with much higher fertility rates and very
diﬀerent norms about the family and the role of women in society, for example. If
faster access to citizenship increases the weight on norms about fertility prevalent in
the host country, we would expect that immigrant women have lower fertility and later
birth.
3.2.3.2 Family Formation
Access to citizenship should improve the position of immigrants in the marriage mar-
ket. A passport of the host country is itself a valuable asset, especially among recently
arrived immigrants, because foreign spouses may naturalize after only three years in
the country. In addition, higher income and more education are also attractive traits
5Note that women may adjust not only the number of children, but also the quality of their
oﬀspring. While we will focus on the quantity eﬀect, our prediction apply to the quality-constant
demand for children; hence, the prediction regarding the number of children are ambiguous once the
quality dimension is taken into account (see, e.g., Hotz et al., 1997).
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and hence, make eligible immigrants more desirable spouses in the marriage market.
Finally, an improved economic position, better education and language skills are likely
to change the immigrant's social network at work or in their neighborhood. Eligible
immigrants might have more interactions with (or face less reservations from) natives.
In a marriage market with search frictions, all three factors would raise the reservation
value for accepting a partner as spouse. As a result, we would expect that eligible
immigrants search for a spouse longer, marry later, and potentially ﬁnd a better match
(Becker, 1973, 1974; Burdett and Coles, 1999; Browning et al., 2014, for a comprehen-
sive survey).
Access to citizenship might also aﬀect the likelihood of divorce. Within a dynamic
search or matching framework, a divorce may occur due to an unexpected shock to
spouse quality, to match productivity, or to outside options (Becker, 1981; Burdett
and Coles, 1999). An unexpected increase in women's earning capacity, for instance,
seems to raise the divorce risk (see Weiss and Willis, 1997, for evidence). At the same
time, an increase in joint household income raises the gains from the marriage which
works in the opposite direction. A better economic position also improves the options
for re-marriage which would again increase the divorce risk (Becker, 1981; Browning
et al., 2014, for a survey). Overall then, the link between citizenship and divorce is
theoretically ambiguous.6
The inﬂuence of cultural norms and values in the country of origin should inﬂu-
ence family formation in a similar way than fertility. If access to citizenship tilts the
weight immigrants attach to the norms and values in the host country, we expect that
immigrants marry later, for instance.
3.2.3.3 Partner Choice
How would access to citizenship aﬀect partner choice? In models of assortative match-
ing, couples are formed when traits are complements in the production or consumption
of household goods (see Becker, 1973; Lam, 1988).7 Immigrants often marry within
their own ethnic or cultural group, for instance, because such a couple ﬁnds it easier
to raise children who share the same cultural values and norms (Bisin et al., 2004).
Marrying a native, in contrast, has the beneﬁt of fast access to naturalization.
6In addition, an increase in the relative earnings of women would also shift the bargaining power
within the household in favor of women - as long the bargaining weight depends on women's relative
earnings. How the shift in bargaining power shifts the risk of divorce, depends on which partner wants
to leave the marriage and whether the couple can reach an eﬃcient bargaining agreement or not (see,
e.g., Browning et al., 2014).
7In the absence of search costs, this matching maximizes aggregate surplus in the marriage market.
In a world with search costs, however, individuals need to consider the option value of continued search
relative to the search cost. Here, choices will also depend on the availability of information, the spatial
distribution of traits in the population and any restrictions on spousal choice imposed by the immigrant
community. We abstract from these additional factors here.
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With access to citizenship, immigrants can obtain the passport of the host coun-
try without intermarriage. Eligible immigrants also become more desirable spouses,
especially for recent arrivals who do not yet qualify for naturalization. Both factors
reduce incentives for eligible immigrants to marry a native. At the same time, natu-
ralization should reduce reservations in the native population, while better language
skills, education and income should increase contacts with natives.8 Both might then
increase the likelihood of intermarriage. Finally, if the culture of the source country
favors endogamous marriages, we would accept that access to citizenship should reduce
the pressure to marry within one's ethnic or cultural group. Overall, it is not obvious
whether access to citizenship increases or decreases intermarriage rates.
Access to citizenship could inﬂuence assortative matching along other characteris-
tics like age, education or income as well. Researchers typically ﬁnd positive assortative
matching in education which seems related to consumption and leisure complementar-
ities (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). Immigrants in turn often downgrade in the mar-
riage market by having a less educated partner; and immigrant women often accept a
larger age diﬀerence (Adserà and Ferrer, 2015). With access to citizenship, immigrants
become more desirable spouses which should reduce the need to downgrade in the
marriage market. We now turn to our empirical setting and the reforms of citizenship
policy.
3.3 Institutional Background
Today, more than 12 million  or about 15%  of Germany's population is foreign-born
(United Nations Population Division, 2018). After World War II, most immigrants,
especially from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Italy came to Germany as guest workers. From
the late 1950s until the program was abolished, the guest worker program actively
recruited mostly low-skilled workers to supply labor to Germany's booming industry.
The guest worker program was originally intended as a short- to medium-run measure.
In practice, however, many guest workers stayed, brought their families, and settled
down in Germany.9 Since the late 1980s and especially after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, new waves of immigrants arrived in Germany from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, over one million immigrants, about 1% of its
population, arrived in Germany each year.10 These gross ﬂows are comparable to the
8Evidence from the European Social Survey supports the interpretation: naturalized immigrants
indeed feel much less discriminated against in Germany than non-naturalized immigrants (OECD,
2011, Figure 8.1).
9The Federal Constitutional Court played a key role here arguing that a denial of family reuniﬁ-
cation infringed upon Germany's Basic Law which guarantees basic individual rights of freedom.
10Many of these were ethnic Germans (i.e., immigrants with some German ancestry), mostly from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. While the number of admitted ethnic Germans was
397,000 in 1990, it fell to 222,000 in 1994 and to 105,000 in 1999, in part because of government
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immigration to the United States during the era of mass migration.
Despite a sizable immigrant population, Germany had no explicit naturalization
policy at the time. Prior to 1991, access to citizenship was closely tied to ancestry
(jus sanguinis) as laid down in the law of 1913. Explicit criteria how a foreign-born
immigrant without German roots would qualify for naturalization did not exist. The
oﬃcial doctrine was that foreigners were only temporary residents  though many
had lived in the country for several decades. Instead, guest workers initially obtained
work and residence permits for just one year. The regulations after that depended
on the country of origin. For Turkish guest workers, the largest immigrant group in
Germany, the work permit was tied to a particular employer and occupation for the
ﬁrst years. Only after three years could guest workers apply for other jobs within the
same occupation.11 Furthermore, temporary work permits are subject to a proof of
precedence which requires that no German or EU employee is available for the job.
Permanent work permits and hence, full job mobility could only be obtained after 4
years of gainful employment in addition to 6 (before 2005) or 5 (since 2005) years of
residence.
The passage of the Alien Act by the federal parliament on April 26, 1990 (and
the upper house on May 5, 1990) marked a turning point in Germany's approach to
citizenship. The reform which came into eﬀect on January 1, 1991 deﬁned, for the
ﬁrst time, explicit rules and criteria for naturalization. Most importantly, the new
law imposed age-dependent residency requirements for citizenship. Immigrants who
arrived at age 15 or older became eligible for citizenship after ﬁfteen years of residence
in Germany. In contrast, immigrants who arrived between the ages of 8 and 14 got
eligible after only eight years in Germany. Immigrants arriving under the age of 8 could
naturalize when they turn 16.12 These residency requirements are still quite restrictive
compared to traditional immigration countries where immigrants may naturalize after
4 (Canada) or 5 years (U.K. and U.S.). Yet, they are comparable to countries like
Sweden, Austria or Switzerland, for instance, where residency requirements are 9, 10
and 12 years respectively.
Applicants for German citizenship had to fulﬁll several other criteria: ﬁrst, they had
to renounce their previous citizenship upon naturalization as the new law did not allow
dual citizenship. Few exemptions to this rule existed at the time. The most important
exception applied to EU citizens who could keep their citizenship if their country of
restrictions on inﬂows and ﬁnancial assistance (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2009). Below, we
drop ethnic Germans from our sample as they can naturalize within 3 years of arrivals and are thus
not aﬀected by the immigration reforms we study.
11Regulations for guest workers from Yugoslavia and most countries in Africa were somewhat more
restrictive, but overall similar to those for Turkish guest workers.
12See  85 and 86 of the Alien Act. If the applicant stayed abroad for no more than 6 months, the
period of absence still counted toward the residency requirement. Temporary stays abroad (between
6 months and 1 year) may still count for the residency requirement.
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origin allowed dual citizenship as well.13 A third requirement was that the applicant
must not be convicted of a criminal oﬀense.14 Older immigrants (age of arrival 15 and
older) further had to demonstrate economic self-suﬃciency, i.e., they should be able
to support themselves and their dependents without welfare beneﬁts or unemployment
assistance. Younger and child immigrants (under age 15 upon arrival) in contrast had to
have completed a minimum of six years of schooling in Germany, of which at least four
years had to be general education. Note that these criteria are actually less restrictive
than the requirements for obtaining a permanent residence or work permit. Finally,
an applicant had to declare her loyalty to the democratic principles of the German
constitution. Spouses and dependent children of the applicant could be included in the
application for naturalization even if they did not fulﬁll the criteria individually. With
the exception of the need to renounce the citizenship of the source country, similar
criteria for naturalization are found in many developed countries.
The second reform came into eﬀect on January 1, 2000 and reduced the residency
requirement to eight years for all immigrants older than 8 upon arrival. All other
requirements (absence of a criminal record, loyalty to democratic principles and eco-
nomic self-suﬃciency) remained in place supplemented by the requirement to demon-
strate German language skills prior to naturalization. As before, the Citizenship Act
of 2000 did not recognize dual citizenship though exemptions became more common in
practice.15 The 2000 reform further introduced elements of citizenship by birthplace
into German law. A child born to foreign parents after January 1, 2000 was eligible for
citizenship if one parent had been a legal resident in Germany for eight years and had
a permanent residence permit for at least three years. Since our analysis focuses on
ﬁrst-generation immigrants, our sample is not directly aﬀected by the jus soli provisions
of the 2000 reform.16
It is not a coincidence that Germany remodeled its citizenship policy shortly after
13Children of bi-national marriages, for example, did not have to give up their dual citizenship until
they turned 18. Other exceptions were granted if the country of current citizenship did not allow the
renunciation of citizenship or delayed the renunciation for reasons outside the power of the applicant;
if the applicant was an acknowledged refugee or if the renunciation imposed special hardships on older
applicants. In practice, few exceptions to the general rule were granted in the 1990s.
14Applicants with minor convictions, such as a suspended prison sentence up to 6 months (which
would be abated at the end of the probation period), a ﬁne not exceeding 180 days (calculated
according to the net personal income of the individual), or corrective methods imposed by juvenile
courts, were still eligible. Convictions exceeding these limits were considered on a case-by-case basis
by the authorities.
15In addition to citizens of the EU member states, it became easier for older applicants and refugees
to keep their previous citizenship.
16There might be an indirect eﬀect on ﬁrst-generation immigrants, however. Before the 2000 reform,
second-generation immigrants could only become naturalized if their parents applied for citizenship.
After the 2000 reform, newborn children had access to German citizenship independently of their
parents' decision (subject to parental residency requirements). Hence, the reform of 2000 might
have actually decreased the inter-generational beneﬁts of citizenship for foreign parents with newborn
children. We address this question in the robustness section below.
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the fall of the Iron curtain and uniﬁcation.17 A jus sanguinis policy was useful in a
divided Germany with many ethnic Germans scattered across Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union. With uniﬁcation, the need to integrate dissidents and refugees
from East Germany, for instance, ceased to be a concern. Changes in Germany's
population structure were a second motor for reform: while in 1960, only 700,000
foreigners lived in Germany, the number had soared to over 7 million in the 1980s. Many
of these were second- and third-generation immigrants who were born and educated in
Germany but could not naturalize while ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe or the
Former Soviet Union even without speaking the language could naturalize within three
years.
Responding to this diﬀerential treatment, several large cities like Hamburg or Berlin
wanted to grant foreigners voting rights in local elections. In 1990, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court ruled these attempts unconstitutional on the grounds that the basic
principle of popular sovereignty could only be executed by Germany's citizens. Yet,
the Court also mandated that a change in citizenship law was required to allow the
permanent immigrant population to naturalize (see Morjé Howard, 2008, for a detailed
discussion of the reform process). The 2000 reform in turn was made possible after the
1998 general election which brought about a leftist coalition of Social Democrats and
Greens favorable to granting foreigners political rights.
This discussion highlights that the reforms were not motivated by concerns about
the actual or perceived lack of immigrant integration  as foreigners were still considered
temporary residents at the time. The question of how to best integrate immigrants
into society became a political issue only in the 21st century.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Data Sources
To study social assimilation, we use the German Microcensus, a repeated cross-sectional
survey of 1% of the population. Three features make the data uniquely suited to study
family formation and fertility choices: ﬁrst, the data contain detailed information on the
composition and socio-demographic characteristics of each household. In particular, we
can identify married or cohabitating couples, observe each partner's education, labor
supply and personal income as well as the number and age structure of all children
in the family. Most importantly, the Microcensus has large, representative samples of
about 50,000 foreigners per year including information on their year of arrival, year of
birth as well as current and previous citizenship. We use data between 2005 and 2010
17While several reform attempts were made during the 1980s, mostly from left-wing parties, all of
them were defeated by the political opposition or inﬂuential social groups.
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for the analysis as we only observe a person's current citizenship prior to 2005. Even
more importantly, the immigrants in our sample arrived in Germany as young children
or teens (the mean age of arrival is 12 years), and most are still in full-time education
or training when they become eligible for citizenship. By focusing on the 2005-2010
period, we can study whether immigrants with faster access to citizenship as teen or
youth change their marriage and fertility decisions as adults.
The sample is restricted to ﬁrst-generation immigrants, i.e., immigrants born abroad.
We drop ethnic Germans as they are not aﬀected by the 1991 and 2000 citizenship
reforms. Ethnic Germans have some German ancestry and can therefore apply for
citizenship within three years of arrival.18 Our sample contains economic immigrants,
mostly guest workers and their families, as well as refugees, which came to Germany as
asylum seekers. We further restrict the analysis to immigrants arriving between 1976
and 2002 who become eligible some time between 1991 and 2010. To make the sample
even more homogeneous, we focus on immigrants who arrived in Germany between the
ages of 0 and 22.
Our main outcome variables are fertility choices, family formation and the char-
acteristics of partners. To study changes in fertility behavior, we analyze whether an
immigrant woman has any children, the total number of children born, the age when
she gave birth to her ﬁrst child, and whether she is a single mother. With respect to
family formation, we study whether an immigrant is currently married, has ever been
married, has had a divorce, or is cohabitating without being married. To investigate
a postponement in marriage decisions, we analyze the age at ﬁrst marriage, which is
observed in the 1999-2004 Microcensus. Finally, we also analyze the characteristics of
partners immigrants choose: whether the partner is a native; an immigrant from the
same region of origin; the partner's duration of residence in Germany as well as their
age, education and personal income.19 Figure 3.1 shows that immigrants and natives
in the same age range diﬀer substantially in their marriage and fertility behavior: im-
migrants are much more likely to be married and less likely to be divorced; they also
have much higher fertility than natives in the same age group.
The main control variables are year of birth, year of arrival, the number of years
living in Germany and current age. To account for diﬀerences across source countries,
we deﬁne ten regions of origin: the traditional EU-15 member states (e.g., Italy or
Portugal), immigrants from countries that recently joined the European Union (the
EU-12, e.g., Poland or the Czech Republic), immigrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia
18In our sample, we deﬁne ethnic Germans as individuals born abroad who naturalized within three
years (which is legally impossible for regular immigrants) and whose previous nationality was Czech,
Hungarian, Kazakh, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovakian or Ukrainian (Birkner, 2007).
19Personal income combines labor earnings, income from self-employment, rental income, public
and private pensions as well as public transfers (like welfare or unemployment beneﬁts, child beneﬁts
or housing subsidies) but is net of taxes and other contributions. We deﬂate personal income with
the national consumer price index to 2005 prices.
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Figure 3.1: Immigrant-Native Gap in Family Formation and Fertility Choices
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Notes: The graph shows summary statistics for selected social integration outcomes (on the y-axis) for immigrants and
natives in the age range 16 to 48. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
(except Slovenia) and the Former Soviet Union (except the Baltic states). We lump
together other immigrants into broad regions of origins (Asia, Africa, the Middle East
and North or South America).
To shed light how the culture of the country of origin inﬂuences the process of
social integration, we follow the epidemiological literature and use characteristics of the
immigrant's country of origin as a proxy for culture in the source country. In particular,
to trace attitudes and norms about fertility and women's role in the country of origin,
we use information on fertility rates in the source country (The World Bank, 2016).20
Data on total fertility rates in the source country are consistently available in 5-year
intervals since 1975. To merge these data to our sample of immigrants, we assume that
immigrants who leave their country between 1976 and 1980, for instance, are imprinted
with the source country culture in 1975. Hence, we take the total fertility rate in Turkey
in 1975, for example, as the relevant reference point for all Turkish immigrants who
arrived in Germany between 1976 and 1980. Information for other years and source
countries are merged accordingly.
Table 3.A.1 shows summary statistics for our sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants.
20Alternatively, we used the average age at ﬁrst marriage for women in the country of origin as our
proxy for the cultural inﬂuence of the source country. The results we ﬁnd are very similar to the ones
we report here using the fertility rates in the country of origin.
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The largest immigrant groups come from Turkey, Eastern Europe, former Yugoslavia
and the European Union. Table 3.A.1 further illustrates that our sample is quite
young (the average age is 30) and has lived in the country for almost two decades.
The share of naturalized immigrants in our sample is with 38% very similar to the
aggregate naturalization rates of 35-40% for Germany (OECD, 2015). We next discuss
our estimation strategy.
3.4.2 Identifying Variation and Estimation Strategy
The liberalization of citizenship law after the 1991 and 2000 reforms creates variation
in the waiting period immigrants face before they can naturalize. More speciﬁcally,
the waiting period for citizenship varies from 8 years to 16 years depending on an
immigrant's age and year of arrival. For a given year of arrival, we can distinguish
three groups of immigrants: child immigrants (who arrive in Germany before the age
of 8) can naturalize when they turn 16 - or after 9 to 16 years in Germany. Teen
immigrants (who arrive in Germany between the ages of 8 and 14) can naturalize after
8 years in Germany. Finally, older immigrants (who arrive in Germany at the age of
15 or older) can naturalize after 15 years since 1991 and after 8 years since 2000. It is
important to stress here that there is no linear relationship between an immigrant's age
of arrival and the waiting period: child immigrants face longer residency requirements
than teen immigrants who in turn face a shorter waiting period than older immigrants.
The timing of the reforms creates additional variation depending on their year of
arrival. For arrivals until 1982, teen immigrants have to wait longer than 8 years
because they can only naturalize after the ﬁrst reform came into eﬀect in 1991. For the
same reason, child immigrants arriving before 1983 might had to wait longer than age
16 to get eligible for citizenship. The 2000 reform in turn reduces the waiting period for
older immigrants: arrivals between 1986 and 1991 had to wait between 9 and 14 years,
while arrivals since 1991 get eligible after 8 years in Germany. Table 3.1 summarizes
the variation in residency requirements for child, teen and older immigrants and within
each group for diﬀerent arrival cohorts (shown in parentheses). The last column shows
the share of each group in our sample.
Our empirical approach then relates the waiting time immigrants face to their family
and fertility choices as adults. In particular, we estimate variants of the following
model:
Yiabt = αWaitab +
L∑
l=1
βlCohal +
K∑
k=1
µkY Bbk + γ1Y SMat + γ2Y SM
2
at
+π1Agebt + π2Age
2
bt + θt + εiabt
(3.1)
where Yiabt is a social integration outcome (like fertility or marriage choices) of im-
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Table 3.1: Variation in Access to Citizenship after the 1991 and 2000 Citizenship Reforms
Age of Arrival in
Germany
Residency Requirement for Citizenship Access to Citizenship at Age
% in the
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child Immigrant Ages 0-7 9-16 Years Age 16 23.9%
(possibly longer for arrival cohorts 1976-1982) (older for arrival cohorts 1976-1982)
Younger Immigrant Ages 8-14 8 Years Ages 16-22 26.7%
(9-15 years for arrival cohorts 1976-1982) (older for arrival cohorts 1976-1982)
Older Immigrant Ages 15-22 15 Years Ages 30-38 49.4%
(9-14 years for arrival cohorts 1986-1991) (younger for arrival cohorts 1986-1991)
8 Years Ages 23-30
(arrival cohorts 1992-2000) (arrival cohorts 1992-2000)
Notes: The table reports the variation in residency requirements induced by Germany's citizenship reforms in 1991 and 2000. The main variation is for immigrants of diﬀerent ages (column (1)).
In addition, residency requirements also vary within the same immigrant group for diﬀerent cohorts of arrivals because of the timing of reforms: Column (2) in the table shows the typical residency
requirement faced by each immigrant group as well as the deviations in parentheses. Column (3) shows at which age an immigrant group typically gets access to citizenship as well as the deviations
for some arrival cohorts in parentheses. Column (4) shows the share of each immigrant group in our sample.
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migrant i from birth cohort b who arrived in year a and is observed in calendar year
t. The main independent variable is the waiting period (Waitab) which, as discussed
above, varies by arrival year a and birth year b.
Equation (3.1) controls for separate ﬁxed eﬀects for each cohort of arrival (Coha)
to adjust for changes in the quality of immigrants coming to Germany over time. We
further include individual year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects (Y Bb) to control for diﬀerences in
fertility and marriage decisions across birth cohorts as well as year ﬁxed eﬀects (θt) to
adjust for aggregate changes in fertility and marriage behavior over time.
We also need to control for general assimilation eﬀects as the time spent in the host
country is likely to inﬂuence fertility and marriage choices independently of citizenship;
likewise, age plays an important role for fertility and marriage choices. Yet, we cannot
control for years since migration or age nonparametrically as we face two well-known
adding-up constraints: year of arrival plus years since migration as well as year of birth
plus age are both equal to the current calendar year. Therefore, we include in our
main analysis a second-order polynomial of years since migration (Y SMat, Y SM2at)
and age (Agebt, Age2bt). We show in Section 3.6.1 below that more ﬂexible parametric
speciﬁcations do neither aﬀect our results nor improve model ﬁt.
Additional controls include region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects to allow fertility and mar-
riage decisions to diﬀer across source countries. We also include state ﬁxed eﬀects and
state-speciﬁc linear trends to capture diﬀerences across state of residence and changes
therein over time. Finally, we estimate all models separately by gender. Marriage and
partner choices are likely to diﬀer for immigrant men and women, for example, because
immigrant women have been much less attached to the labor market than men. All
standard errors are clustered by age ∗ arrival year to adjust for the level of aggregation
in the treatment variable.
The main parameter of interest is α which measures whether and how a longer wait-
ing period aﬀects social integration in the host country.21 This intent-to-treat eﬀect is
the primary parameter of interest for policy makers who aim to improve the integration
of immigrants in the host country. For immigrants, the reduced-form represents the
option value of naturalization.22 Conditional on year of arrival, year of birth, year ﬁxed
eﬀects and other controls, the parameter is identiﬁed from the interaction between year
of arrival and year of birth. Our identifying assumption is then that social integration
outcomes have an (arbitrary) year of birth pattern that remains constant across arrival
cohorts conditional on our control variables. This assumption would be violated, for
example, if younger birth cohorts had children earlier than older birth cohorts among
21It is important to stress that the residency requirements we observe have a limited range which
is, however, policy-relevant for many countries with traditionally restrictive citizenship policies.
22Note that this option value may aﬀect marriage and fertility choices even in the absence of an eﬀect
on naturalization rates if eligibility changed the norms immigrants follow or reduces discrimination
by natives.
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recent immigrants, while the opposite pattern is observed for the same birth cohorts
among earlier arrival cohorts. Note that our identifying assumption does not imply
that 20 year-olds arriving in 1980 have to make the same fertility choices than 20 year-
olds arriving in 2000, for example. The reason is that they belong to diﬀerent birth
and arrival cohorts which are accounted for by our ﬁxed eﬀects. As we show in Section
3.6.1 below, allowing for even more ﬂexible dependencies between birth and arrival
cohorts does not alter our results.
Another potential concern with equation (3.1) is that we cannot control for age of
arrival eﬀects because of adding-up constraints. As is well-known, immigrants arriving
as young children have better language skills and labor market outcomes, among others
(Bleakley and Chin, 2010). Finally, our estimates in equation (3.1) could be aﬀected by
selective outmigration if emigration is correlated with the waiting period immigrants
face. We test for the inﬂuence of age of arrival eﬀects and selective migration after we
present our main results; overall, we ﬁnd that these alternative factors cannot account
for our ﬁndings.
3.4.3 Access to Citizenship and Naturalization
We start out with examining whether the citizenship reforms actually encouraged nat-
uralization. The aggregate statistics seem to suggest that. Prior to the 1991 reform,
less than 20,000 persons became naturalized on average each year. After 1991, natural-
izations increased to 60-70,000 per year; and after 2000, the number of naturalizations
jumped to over 180,000 and then stabilized above 100,000 per year. Relative to the
stock of immigrants, the annual propensity to naturalize was below 0.4% prior to 1991
and increased to 2% after 1991.
Yet, is that increase caused by the more liberal citizenship policy or just a time ef-
fect? To answer this question, we estimate equation (3.1) where the dependent variable
is the propensity to naturalize or the timing of naturalization. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in
Table 3.2 (in columns (1) and (2)) shows that immigrants with longer waiting periods
are less likely to naturalize. Taking the 7 year-diﬀerence between the reduced 8-year
and the regular 15-year requirement, immigrants are 9 percentage points (7 ∗ −0.13)
less likely to naturalize when facing the longer waiting period  an increase of 25%
(0.091/0.358). Column (2) adds formal education to the speciﬁcation; here, the re-
sults suggest a positive relationship between being naturalized and formal education.
Note that this relationship does not identify a causal eﬀect of education as access to
citizenship is likely to encourage additional educational investments.
Does faster access to citizenship also aﬀect the timing of naturalization? In the
second speciﬁcation (columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2), we use the number of years
since an immigrant has naturalized conditional on naturalizing. The results in column
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Table 3.2: Does the Residency Requirement Matter for Naturalization Decisions?
Naturalized Years since Naturalized
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Residency Requirement (in years) -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.079*** -0.074**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.030) (0.030)
Years since Migration 0.029*** 0.029*** -0.108 -0.106
(0.004) (0.004) (0.102) (0.103)
Years since Migration2 -0.000 -0.000 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.253** 0.235*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.127) (0.137)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Medium-skilled 0.089*** 0.238**
(0.005) (0.093)
High-skilled 0.166*** -0.688***
(0.009) (0.181)
In School 0.009 -0.063
(0.011) (0.202)
Observations 56,462 56,462 20,226 20,226
R Squared 0.262 0.271 0.395 0.397
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.358 0.358 10.51 10.51
Notes: The table reports results from estimating equation (3.1). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary indicator
equal to one if a migrant has naturalized in a given year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the number
of years an immigrant has naturalized conditional on naturalizing. Even columns add controls for the education of the immigrant. The
sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived
in Germany. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than
regular immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of years an immigrant has to wait before becoming eligible for
citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). All speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year
of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional
EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other
former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
(3) show some, albeit a small eﬀect on the timing of naturalization: an immigrant
facing an 8-year rather than a 15-year waiting period naturalizes about half a year
(0.553 = 7 ∗ 0.079) earlier. Yet, this eﬀect is small relative to the sample mean of
10.5 years since naturalization or relative to the 7-year diﬀerence in the waiting period.
Adding education (in column (4)) shows that the medium-skilled naturalize earlier and
the high-skilled later than low-skilled immigrants.
Overall, while shorter residency requirements indeed raise naturalizations, the propen-
sity to naturalize in Germany remains low in international comparison: by 2007, only
around 40% of ﬁrst-generation immigrants with more than ten years of residency had
naturalized; the share is about 60% in the United Kingdom and over 80% in Canada
(OECD, 2011). We next turn to our main results.
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3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Fertility Choices
We now turn to the question whether the liberalization of citizenship policy also aﬀects
long-term choices like fertility, for instance. As Figure 3.1 indicates that immigrants
have more children at a younger age than natives, we would expect that the option
to naturalize encourages immigrant women to make fertility choices closer to those of
native women. To test this prediction, we estimate equation (3.1) for a number of
fertility outcomes. Table 3.3 indeed shows substantial eﬀects of the waiting period on
fertility behavior: Facing a shorter residency requirement reduces both the likelihood
of having at least one child (in column (1)) and the total number of children born (in
column (2)). In column (3), we use the number of children conditional on having at
least one child as the dependent variable. The evidence there shows that the demand
for children declines mostly at the extensive margin; there is little eﬀect on the number
of children beyond the ﬁrst birth.23
To put these estimates in perspective, we compare the fertility choices of immigrant
and native women. In our data, 62% of immigrant women have at least one child,
while only 44% of native women in the same age range do  resulting in an immigrant-
native gap of around 18 percentage points. How fast do immigrants adjust to the
native fertility level when they face shorter residency requirements? Taking the 7 year
diﬀerence in residency requirements, the share of having children among immigrant
women declines about 4 percentage points (0.005 ∗ 7). Hence, facing a shorter waiting
period closes about 19% of the immigrant-native gap in the share of mothers. Similarly,
the immigrant-native gap in the number of children is about 0.6. Evaluated at the 7
year diﬀerence, facing the shorter residency requirement reduces the average number of
children born to immigrant women by 0.08 (7∗0.011). Here, faster access to citizenship
closes the immigrant-native gap in number of children by about 13%, mostly because
fewer women have had their ﬁrst birth.24
Because not all women in our sample have completed their fertility, the decline in
the number of children may reﬂect in part a tempo eﬀect. Column (4) of Table 3.3
indicates that immigrant women indeed postpone their ﬁrst birth: women facing a
8-year residency requirement have their ﬁrst child a stunning 1.3 years (7 ∗ −0.184)
later than women facing a 15-year residency requirement. Hence, how much does the
23For ease of comparison, we report the corresponding OLS estimates for fertility choices of natu-
ralized immigrants in the top panel of Table 3.A.2.
24Is the eﬀect of the residency requirement really linear? Adding a quadratic term for the residency
requirement does not suggest that non-linearities matter much. In addition, we created two binary
indicators equal to one if an immigrant faces an 8 year or up to 10 years of residency requirement; and
zero otherwise. For both binary treatments, we ﬁnd that facing a shorter waiting period inﬂuences
fertility choices (not reported).
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Table 3.3: Residency Requirements and Fertility Choices
Having
Children
No. of Kids
(incl. 0)
No. of Kids
(if >0)
Age at First
Birth
Single
Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.005*** 0.011** -0.001 -0.184*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.029) (0.002)
Years since Migration -0.007 0.027* 0.022 -0.170*** 0.005
(0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.063) (0.005)
Years since Migration Squared -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001** 0.007*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Age 0.070*** 0.128*** 0.209*** 0.887*** 0.011
(0.007) (0.020) (0.031) (0.132) (0.012)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,319 29,319 18,273 18,273 18,273
R-Squared 0.414 0.386 0.174 0.227 0.034
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.623 1.318 2.114 23.34 0.138
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates between the residency requirement immigrants face and their fertility choices. The dependent variables are
whether a female immigrant has any child (column (1)); the number of children born to the female immigrant including zero (column (2)); the number of
children if there is at least one (column (3)); the age of the mother at the birth of her ﬁrst child (column (4)); and whether she is a single mother (column (5)).
The sample includes all immigrant women who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude
ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. The residency requirement
denotes the number of years an immigrant has to wait before becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). All
speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends and ten region of
origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia
and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
timing of ﬁrst birth converge to that of natives? Immigrant women have their ﬁrst
child at age 23.3 on average, while native women have it at age 27.5 or more than 4
years later. Hence, a shorter waiting period reduces the immigrant-native gap in age
at ﬁrst birth by 31%.25 Finally, faster access to citizenship also raises the likelihood
of single motherhood by about 4 percentage points (7 ∗ −0.005). As for the other
fertility outcomes, we ﬁnd that a liberal citizenship policy contributes substantially to
a convergence between the fertility choices of immigrants and natives.
Overall, the evidence shows that a liberal citizenship policy reduces the demand
for children and encourages women to postpone childbirth. In light of the theoreti-
cal discussion in Section 3.2, the evidence is in line with the hypothesis that higher
opportunity costs of women's time, through more human capital and labor market op-
portunities, outweigh any income eﬀect. The evidence is also in line with the argument
that access to citizenship shifts the weight immigrants put on the fertility norms in the
host country. A liberal citizenship policy is however, not a viable instrument to boost
25We also ﬁnd that the postponement eﬀect is much stronger among more educated immigrants (not
reported). This result is in line with the idea that the costs of labor market disruptions are higher for
educated women, for example, their skills and networks depreciate during labor market absence.
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the host country's total fertility rate in the long-run. As immigrants converge in their
behavior to natives over time, our evidence thus casts doubt that higher immigration
rates may solve population aging in countries with fertility rates below replacement
levels.
3.5.2 Family Formation
Does faster access to citizenship aﬀect marriage decisions among immigrants as well?
Our estimates are again based on equation (3.1) where the dependent variables are
now whether and when immigrants get married or cohabitate. The top panel of Table
3.4 shows that faster access to citizenship reduces women's marriage rates: both the
probability of being currently married in column (1) and the probability of ever being
married in column (2) are higher among immigrants facing longer residency require-
ments. The bottom panel of Table 3.4 reveals that we observe the same pattern for
men.26
A lower share married might reﬂect either that marriages have become less stable
or that immigrants are more likely to cohabitate rather than getting married. Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3.4 indicate that higher divorce or cohabitation rates are unlikely
explanations for the lower marriage rates observed. Another explanation for the lower
marriage rates is that immigrants postpone marriage because the gains from searching
for a mate have increased (see the discussion in Section 3.2). A longer search process
would imply that immigrants are more likely to live alone without a partner  which
is conﬁrmed by column (5) of Table 3.4.
A second indicator for longer search would be that immigrants marry at a later age.
To investigate this explanation, we use data on age at ﬁrst marriage in the 1999-2004
Microcensus; the speciﬁcation is the same as before.27 Column (6) in Table 3.4 shows
that women indeed postpone their marriage: their age of ﬁrst marriage increases by
almost one year (7 ∗ −0.132 = −0.92). Men in turn actually marry at a younger age:
their age at ﬁrst marriage decreases by one year (7 ∗ 0.156 = 1.09). As immigrant
women marry almost 3 years earlier than immigrant men, a liberal citizenship policy
narrows the gender gap in age at ﬁrst marriage by almost two-thirds.
What do these patterns imply for the process of social integration? To answer this
question, we again compare immigrants to natives. Take the example of being currently
26Table 3.A.2 reports in Panel B the marriage choices of naturalized immigrants. Interestingly, we
ﬁnd no relationship between naturalization and marriage behavior for women; for men, in turn, we
ﬁnd the opposite pattern than in the reduced-form: men are more likely to be married and less likely
to be divorced and cohabitating. These diﬀerences point to the importance of selection eﬀects into
naturalization or reverse causality as intermarriage facilitates naturalization, for example.
27In the 1999-2004 Microcensus, we only observe current citizenship but not the country of origin
of a person. We therefore classify citizenship into the same 10 categories as countries of origin but
add German as an additional category to the speciﬁcation. Otherwise, the model is the same as in
equation (3.1).
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Table 3.4: Residency Requirements and Family Formation
Currently
Married
Ever Married Divorced
Cohabitation
(if a Partner)
Single
Household
Age at First
Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Immigrant Women
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.000 0.000 -0.007*** -0.132***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.032)
Observations 29,362 29,362 20,639 18,997 8,723 14,312
R-Squared 0.371 0.528 0.033 0.127 0.128 0.191
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.627 0.703 0.108 0.080 0.871 20.33
Panel B: Immigrant Men
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.004** 0.156***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.033)
Observations 27,298 27,298 16,108 15,897 11,190 10,860
R-Squared 0.447 0.540 0.034 0.139 0.134 0.256
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.544 0.589 0.0767 0.103 0.882 23.23
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates of the relationship between the residency requirement immigrant face and family formation. Results in Panel A are for women, those in Panel B are for
men. The dependent variables are whether an immigrant is currently married (column (1)); whether an immigrant has ever been married (column (2)); whether the immigrant is divorced (column (3));
whether an immigrant is cohabitating with a partner without being married; the variable is zero if the person is married (column (4)); whether an immigrant lives without a partner (column (5)); and
the age at ﬁrst marriage (column (6)). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude ethnic
Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of years an immigrant has to wait
before becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). All speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and
state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends, second-order polynomials in current age and years since migration as well as ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants
(EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for column (6).
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married: the shares married are 62.7% among immigrant women and 47.3% among
native women for an immigrant-native gap of 15.4 percentage points. Hence, faster
access to citizenship reduces the share of married immigrant women by 7 percentage
points  closing the immigrant-native gap in marriage rates by 45%. For men, the
immigrant-native gap in marriage rates is 13.4 percentage points which declines by 2.8
percentage points or 21% with shorter waiting periods. We also ﬁnd sizable convergence
in women's age at ﬁrst marriage. As the average immigrant woman marries early (at
age 20.3), the immigrant-native gap is 4.9 years. A liberal citizenship policy reduces
this gap by 0.9 years or 19%.
While faster access to citizenship results in substantial convergence in marriage
rates and age, we do not ﬁnd eﬀects on divorce or cohabitation behavior. The absence
of an eﬀect on divorce rates remains even if we condition on immigrants who are
married when they have lived in the country for eight years (not reported). Given
sizable immigrant-native gaps in divorce (immigrants are around 6 percentage points
less likely to be divorced) and cohabitation (immigrants are 11 percentage points less
likely to be cohabitating), immigration actually slows down the upward trend in divorce
and cohabitation rates observed in many developed countries.
3.5.3 Partner Characteristics
Given that immigrants search longer and marry later, we might expect them to choose
diﬀerent partners as well. To investigate this, we restrict our sample to married or
cohabitating immigrants. We ﬁrst investigate intermarriage which is often taken as
a proxy for successful integration. Around 20% of immigrants in our sample have a
native partner, while slightly over 70% have a partner from the same region of origin
(which leaves between 8-10% who have a migrant partner from a diﬀerent origin).
Intermarriage rates are thus substantially lower than in France or the Netherlands
where about one-third of immigrants have a native partner (Adserà and Ferrer, 2015).
Yet, intermarriage rates among natives are 5-6% in Germany and hence, comparable
to other European countries (where the share ranges from 5% to 7%).
Table 3.5 suggests that women with shorter residency requirements are not more
or less likely to marry or cohabitate with a native (column (1)). They are however,
slightly less likely to marry or cohabitate with an immigrant from the same region of
origin (column (2)) or a second-generation immigrant from the same country of origin
(column (3)).28 We ﬁnd very similar results  and hence no intermarriage eﬀect  if we
restrict the sample to married couples instead. For men, we even ﬁnd a small negative
eﬀect on the likelihood of marrying a native.
28We show the corresponding OLS estimates for naturalized immigrant men and women in Table
3.A.3.
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Table 3.5: Residency Requirements and Partner Characteristics
Native
Partner
Partner from
Same Origin
Partner Same
Origin, 2nd
Generation
Partner's
YSM at
Marriage
Gap in
Education (in
years)
Age Gap
between
Partners
Personal
Income of
Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Immigrant Women
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.001 0.003* 0.006*** 0.185*** -0.015 0.107*** 2.830
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.066) (0.018) (0.033) (7.969)
Observations 18,493 14,683 13,688 8,298 18,188 18,493 18,493
R-Squared 0.235 0.118 0.103 0.083 0.032 0.100 0.061
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.191 0.932 0.0788 6.260 0.678 4.396 1617
Panel B: Immigrant Men
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.005** -0.001 0.007*** 0.246*** 0.017 0.011 6.180
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.065) (0.017) (0.024) (3.950)
Observations 15,367 11,963 10,932 6,065 15,124 15,367 15,367
R-Squared 0.186 0.100 0.124 0.060 0.038 0.084 0.097
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.212 0.914 0.107 4.189 -0.231 -2.361 508.9
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates of the relationship between the residency requirement immigrants face and the characteristics of partners or spouses. Results in Panel A are for immigrant women,
those in Panel B for immigrant men. The sample includes both married and cohabitating couples. The dependent variables are whether an immigrant has a native partner or spouse (column (1)); whether the partner
or spouse comes from the same region of origin (column (2)); whether the partner or spouse is a second generation immigrant from the same region of origin (column (3)); the number of years an immigrant partner or
spouse has lived in the host country when they married (column (4)); the gap in years of education between partners or spouses (column (5)); the age gap between partners or spouses (column (6)); and the personal
income (including non-workers) of the partner or spouse (column (7)). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived.
We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of years an immigrant has
to wait before becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). All speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state
ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends, second-order polynomials in current age and years since migration as well as ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia,
Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for column (4).
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One explanation for the absence of an eﬀect on intermarriage is that eligible im-
migrants become more attractive marriage partners for recent arrivals (as spouses of
German citizens can apply after 3 years of residency).29 If access to citizenship is
indeed an asset on the marriage market, partners of immigrants with shorter waiting
periods should have arrived in Germany more recently. To investigate this possibility,
we use the time period the partner of an eligible immigrant has lived in Germany. As
we do not observe the year a partnership outside of marriage was ﬁrst formed, the
sample is restricted to immigrants with foreign-born spouses. Column (4) of Table 3.5
shows that immigrants facing shorter residency requirements are indeed more likely
to marry partners with fewer years in Germany. The higher incidence of marrying a
foreigner with short residency might just oﬀset any more intense contact with natives
for immigrants with shorter waiting periods  implying a net intermarriage eﬀect of
zero.
In addition to the migratory background, faster access to citizenship could aﬀect as-
sortative matching along other attractive traits like education, income or age. Column
(6) of Table 3.5 shows that the age gap between partners declines for women indicating
that they improve their position in the marriage market. Hence, immigrant women
with shorter waiting periods have to downgrade less with respect to partner age. We
ﬁnd no eﬀects for partner's education or income of immigrant men and women (see
columns (5) and (7) of Table 3.5).30
Overall, Table 3.5 suggests that faster access to citizenship has only modest eﬀects
on the type of partner chosen  in contrast to our evidence on marriage and fertility
choices. At the same time, the results also show that intermarriage rates might not be a
good indicator for social integration, especially when analyzing naturalization policies.
3.5.4 The Surprise Element of the 1991 and 2000 Reforms
The results so far point to the conclusion that a liberal citizenship policy has important
implications for long-term decisions like whom to marry or when to have children. As
immigrants marry and have children early, many make these lifelong decisions even be-
fore they get eligible for citizenship. In our sample, 83% of the immigrants are married
and 71% have a child prior to eligibility.31 If immigrants are forward-looking, marriage
and fertility decisions should reﬂect the options and beneﬁts of future naturalization.
29The immigrant has to be married for at least two years by the time he or she applies for natural-
ization; furthermore, the spouse has to be naturalized for at least two years. Finally, the couple has
to have a permanent resident permit.
30Given that faster access to citizenship increases investments in formal education (for both men
and women), the results in column (5) indicate that partner's education goes up. Yet, the gap in
education between partners remains roughly constant.
31In contrast, just under 20% are married and only 5% have a child before they even arrive in
Germany. As these shares are uncorrelated with the residency requirement, they have no consequences
for our ﬁndings.
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Immigrants might then search longer for a partner, for instance, and reap the beneﬁts
later when they get eligible for or have obtained citizenship.
Our empirical setting allows to test directly whether expectations of future beneﬁts
from eligibility indeed matter for these long-term decisions. The timing of the 1991
and 2000 reforms implies that many immigrants were surprised by the new citizenship
policy: all immigrants arriving in Germany prior to 1990, for instance, had no idea
that they would get access to citizenship after 1991. They arrived in Germany under
the notion that naturalization was basically unattainable. Furthermore, all older im-
migrants who arrived in Germany after 1990 (at the age of 15 or older) expected to
wait for 15 years before they could naturalize. Only in 1999 did they learn that they
had to wait only 8 years rather than 15 years to get eligible for citizenship. We would
expect that immigrants who get surprised by the reform make fertility and marriage
choices that are more a reﬂection of the norms in their culture of origin compared to
immigrants who knew their actual waiting period. To test this prediction, we create
an indicator whether an immigrant's expected waiting period is longer than the actual
waiting period; the indicator is zero if actual and expected waiting period coincide.
The top panel of Table 3.6 shows that immigrants who are caught by surprise
are more likely to have a child and have higher fertility overall; they also marry at a
younger age and have their ﬁrst child much earlier than immigrants who knew their
waiting period. The bottom panel of Table 3.6 adds the surprise indicator to our
baseline speciﬁcation. The eﬀect of the residency requirement remains economically
and statistically signiﬁcant; in some cases, the coeﬃcient is even larger (in absolute
terms) than in the baseline. Yet, expectation still play an important role: immigrants
who get surprised by the reform make systematically diﬀerent choices even conditional
on the actual residency requirement.
This pattern in line with the idea that immigrants take future options and bene-
ﬁts into account when making fertility and marriage choices. The ﬁndings in Table 3.6
are, however, diﬃcult to reconcile with the view that some unobservable characteristics
correlated with the residency requirement drive our results. Rather, the patterns pro-
vide additional credibility to our ﬁnding that a liberal citizenship policy has a strong
inﬂuence on immigrants' long-term decisions like when to marry and have children.
3.6 Additional Results
3.6.1 Speciﬁcation Checks
We now demonstrate that our main results remain unchanged when we relax the func-
tional form and identifying assumptions in equation (3.1). Recall that our empirical
strategy imposes a second-order polynomial for general assimilation and age eﬀects.
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Table 3.6: Reform Surprise and Social Integration
Sample: Immigrant Women
Having
Children
No. of Kids
(incl. 0)
Age at First
Birth
Single
Mother
Currently
Married
Ever
Married
Divorced
Age at First
Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Surprised by the Reforms 0.075*** 0.213*** -1.411*** 0.001 0.010 0.021 0.018* -1.162***
(0.016) (0.038) (0.179) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.172)
Observations 29,319 29,319 18,273 18,273 29,362 29,362 20,639 14,312
R-Squared 0.415 0.387 0.228 0.034 0.370 0.528 0.033 0.193
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.007*** 0.016*** -0.242*** -0.005** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.000 -0.179***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.030) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.032)
Surprised by the Reforms 0.083*** 0.231*** -1.719*** -0.006 0.021 0.033** 0.019* -1.405***
(0.016) (0.039) (0.174) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.167)
Observations 29,319 29,319 18,273 18,273 29,362 29,362 20,639 14,312
R-Squared 0.415 0.388 0.232 0.034 0.371 0.529 0.033 0.195
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows reduced form estimates of an indicator equal to one if the expected waiting period was larger than the actual waiting period; and zero otherwise (Surprised by the reform). The top panel only includes
the indicator in addition to all control variables except the residency requirement. The bottom panel adds the residency requirement immigrants actually faced to the speciﬁcation. All other control variables are based on
equation (3.1) and the same as in previous tables. See Table 3.3 and 3.4 for a description of the dependent variables. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0
and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of
years an immigrant has to wait before becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for column (8).
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To check whether our results are sensitive to this assumption, we allow for a linear up
to a quartic in years since migration; all other control variables are the same as before.
The ﬁrst four columns of Appendix Table 3.A.4 indicate that the estimate for the wait-
ing period are very stable for all fertility and marriage outcomes. The AIC criterion
reported at the bottom of each panel further suggests little improvements beyond the
quadratic speciﬁcation. Similarly, columns (5)-(8) of Table 3.A.4 allow for a linear up
to a quartic function in current age instead. As before, higher-order polynomials have
little eﬀect on our estimates. We also ﬁnd only modest improvements in model ﬁt
beyond the quadratic speciﬁcation. Overall then, alternative speciﬁcations for general
assimilation and age eﬀects have little inﬂuence on our results.
A second concern with equation (3.1) is that our identifying assumption might
be too restrictive. Recall that the eﬀect of the waiting period is identiﬁed from the
interaction between year of arrival and year of birth. Given that we control for year of
arrival and year of birth eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on the residency requirement would pick
up any diﬀerential trends in birth cohorts across subsequent arrival cohorts. Hence, if
immigrants from the same birth cohort and country of origin have higher fertility among
earlier than later arrivals, our estimates would be biased. To address this concern, we
include interaction between year of arrival and 10-year birth cohorts (in column (1)
of Table 3.A.5) and between year of arrival and 5-year birth cohorts (in column (2)
of Table 3.A.5). The results are again unchanged suggesting that our sample is not
subject to diﬀerential year of birth trends.
3.6.2 Age of Arrival Eﬀects and the Impressionable Years Hy-
pothesis
Our ﬁndings so far indicate that a more liberal citizenship policy boosts social inte-
gration among eligible immigrants. Yet, there might be two alternative explanations
for this pattern. Eligible immigrants not only face diﬀerent waiting periods but also
arrive in Germany at diﬀerent ages. Research in psychology suggests that immigrants
who migrate at younger ages are more likely to learn the host country's language than
immigrants arriving at an older age (e.g., Birdsong, 2006; Newport, 2002). In partic-
ular, psychologists speak of a sensitive period for learning foreign languages that ends
around age 10 or 11. As a result, immigrating arriving before age 11 might be better
integrated into the host society because better language skills facilitate the social con-
tact with natives, for instance. It is not obvious how age of arrival eﬀects would aﬀect
our results as residency requirements do not vary linearly with arrival age (see Table
3.1): younger immigrants (arrival age 8-14) face a shorter waiting period than child
immigrants (arriving under the age of 8) as well as older immigrants (arrived at ages
15 and older).
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To test for the inﬂuence of age of arrival eﬀects, we run two additional tests: ﬁrst,
we include a variable equal to one if an immigrant arrived prior to age 11 and zero if
she arrived at a later age (following Bleakley and Chin, 2010).32 Second, we drop all
child immigrants arriving before age 8. The results in columns (3) of Table 3.A.5 show
that our estimates become economically and statistically somewhat weaker when we
control for age of arrival eﬀects. Column (4) however, shows that our main results hold
for immigrants arriving at age 8 or later. The only exception is being married which
suggests that lower marriage rates are more prevalent among immigrants who arrived
as young children.
Another alternative explanation for our ﬁndings is that immigrants who get eligible
at particular ages are more prone to integrate. Research in social psychology sug-
gests that core attitudes, beliefs, and values crystallize during a period of great mental
plasticity in adolescence and early adulthood (the so-called impressionable years) and
remain largely unchanged thereafter. Empirical studies have documented that political
socialization takes place mainly around the ages of 17 and 18 (Krosnick and Alwin,
1989; Sears, 1975, 1983). Suppose immigrants are more likely to take over the values,
norms and aspirations of the host country when they get eligible during these im-
pressionable years. Then, child and younger immigrants (who get eligible at the ages
16-22) make choices closer to the native norms compared to older immigrants (who get
eligible at age 30 or older). To test this alternative explanation, we drop the group of
older immigrants from the estimation. The last column of Table 3.A.5 shows that the
eﬀects of the waiting period are even stronger if we restrict the sample to child and
younger immigrants. The only exceptions are age at marriage and ﬁrst birth which
seems especially important in the older immigrant group. Overall then, neither age of
arrival eﬀects nor the impressionable years hypothesis explain our ﬁndings.
3.6.3 Selective Return Migration
Our results could be aﬀected by selective in- or out-migration. The immigration re-
forms could have changed the selection of immigrants arriving in Germany. As our
empirical approach controls for cohort of arrival and region of origin, our estimates are
not aﬀected by changes in the composition of arrivals over time. Table 3.A.5 further
demonstrated that our results remain unchanged when allowing for birth cohorts ef-
fects to diﬀer across arrival cohorts. These robustness checks suggest that the residency
requirement is not correlated with unobserved immigrant quality conditional on arrival
year, region of origin and our other control variables in equation (3.1).
A potentially more severe issue is selective out-migration.33 The literature ﬁnds
32Note that we cannot control for a full set of age of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects because of a third adding-up
constraint: age minus years since migration equals age of arrival.
33As the immigrant sample is relatively young  its age varies from 16 to 49 during the 2005-2010
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that up to 50% of an immigrant cohort leaves within 10 years of arrival (Lubotsky,
2007; Dustmann and Görlach, 2015). Selective out-migration could account for the
patterns of social assimilation we ﬁnd if the following two conditions hold: immigrants
with a shorter waiting period (who tend to be younger and have arrived more recently)
are less likely to return, possibly in response to the more liberal citizenship policy; and
those with less success in the labor market or values closer to their source country are
more likely to return home. Under these two assumptions, we would overestimate the
eﬀect of the waiting period on social integration.34
As we cannot directly test for return migration in the repeated cross-sections of
the Microcensus, we use two alternative strategies to address this concern. Our ﬁrst
strategy tests whether the distribution of predetermined characteristics in our sample
remains stable over time. If selective return migration is not an issue, predetermined
characteristics like age or country of origin should not change for a given arrival cohort
between 2005 and 2010. Panel A of Table 3.A.6 shows that the age distribution indeed
remains very stable for all arrival cohorts; this is reassuring as arrival cohort and age
are important determinants of the waiting period. Turning to the region of origin, the
share of two of the three largest immigrant groups changes over time for recent arrivals:
immigrants from former Yugoslavia are less likely to leave the sample, while immigrants
from the traditional EU-15 member states are more likely to return. These diﬀerences
across source countries are not a direct issue for our estimation as we control in all
our estimations for the region of origin. Yet, it might raise concerns that other un-
observables are correlated with both our treatment variable and out-migration. Given
that diﬀerential out-migration is concentrated among recent arrivals, we re-estimate
equation (3.1) dropping all arrivals after 1995. The result shown in the ﬁrst row of Ta-
ble 3.A.7 remain qualitatively unchanged which indicates that recent return migration
does not alter our conclusions.
Our second test for the inﬂuence of selective return migration is to estimate bounds
on the average treatment eﬀect (Lee, 2009). Given that the bounds approach applies
to binary treatments, we re-deﬁne the waiting period into a binary variable equal to
one if an immigrant is eligible after 8 years, and zero otherwise. We further assume
that immigrants with an 8-year residency requirement, i.e., the treatment group, are
either 3% or 5% less likely to leave the sample  possibly because of faster access to
period  survivor bias due to mortality is of minor concern.
34If instead immigrants with a shorter waiting period are less likely to leave and the most successful
leave; or if immigrants with a shorter waiting period are more likely to leave and the least successful
leave, we would actually estimate a lower bound (in absolute terms). If immigrants with a shorter
waiting period and those most successful are more likely to leave, we would again get an overestimate.
That last scenarios seems, however, unlikely because the citizenship policy should reduce return mi-
gration and prior evidence points, if anything, to negative selection into return migration (Constant
et al., 2009).
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citizenship.35 The basic idea of the bounds approach is to trim the outcome distribution
of the treatment group by the excess attrition in the control group from the top and
bottom to obtain the lower and upper bound on the average treatment eﬀect. We
implement this procedure for our two quasi-continuous variables age at marriage and
age at ﬁrst birth. For comparison, we ﬁrst report our baseline model with the binary
treatment variable in Panel B in Table 3.A.6. We then report the raw bounds, but also
use countries of origin (as Panel A shows them to be important for return migration)
and whether immigrants lived in the country for more than ﬁfteen years (as return
migration typically declines with time in the host country) to tighten the bounds. The
raw bounds are wide and sometimes become negative (see columns (4)-(5) and (9)-(10)
in Table 3.A.6, Panel B). The tightened upper and lower bounds (in columns (6)-(7)
and (11)-(12) of Panel B) show that a shorter residency requirement still postpones
both marriage and fertility. There is only one case where the lower bound for age at
ﬁrst birth includes zero. Taken together, these additional tests suggests that selective
return migration cannot account for our results.36
3.6.4 Changes in Sample Composition
Our sample might be aﬀected by other changes in sample composition. After the open-
ing of the Iron Curtain, for example, many asylum seekers arrived in Germany which
prompted the government to tighten access to political asylum in 1993.37 Unfortu-
nately, as in most data sources, our data do not record whether an immigrant arrives
as a refugee or applies for asylum. As a proxy, we use immigrants from former Yu-
goslavia and the Middle East as they formed the largest groups of refugees over the
period. Dropping all potential refugees from our sample weakens the statistical signif-
icance for the demand for children, but has otherwise little eﬀect on our estimates (see
row (2) in Table 3.A.7). Further, our sample might still contain some ethnic Germans
who are not aﬀected by the immigration reforms. Row (3) therefore restricts the data
to the 2007-10 Microcensus where immigrants can be identiﬁed as ethnic Germans or
not. The results again remain unchanged.
Immigrants may also qualify for citizenship through marrying a native. To check
35Alternatively, the age pattern of return migration in earlier studies (Constant et al., 2009) show
that younger workers are somewhat more likely to return. It is important to stress however, that our
treatment group is at most 5 years younger on average than the control group which would imply a
diﬀerential attrition of at most 3%. Even more importantly, our immigrant sample has lived in the
country for almost 20 years where attrition rates are substantially lower than for recent cohorts of
arrivals.
36As a third test, we also employed the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to check whether attrition
from the sample due to out migration or mortality is systematically correlated with the residency
requirement immigrants face but do not ﬁnd any eﬀect (not reported).
37Refugees who are granted political asylum face the same naturalization criteria as all other immi-
grants. In some cases, however, the resident requirement might be reduced to six years which would
introduce measurement error in our treatment variable.
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for the importance of this alternative route to citizenship, we drop in row (4) all immi-
grants who report having a native spouse in 2005-2010.38 The results are very similar to
the overall sample. Similarly, the 2000 reform not only changed the residency require-
ment for adult immigrants but also granted citizenship to children born in Germany
to foreign-born parents. Immigrants with dependent children had a higher incentive
to naturalize prior to 2000 because they could include spouses and dependent children
in their application. After 2000, newborn children were eligible for citizenship inde-
pendently of their parents. Hence, the beneﬁts of citizenship might have declined for
parents with children born since 2000. Controlling for the presence and age structure
of children (in row (5)) in the household does however not alter our results. We also
reran our analysis dropping all immigrants with children under ﬁfteen in the household
(in row (6)). Children in the remaining eligible households were all born prior to 1995
and hence not directly aﬀected by the reform.39 In all cases, our estimates are robust
to these alternative deﬁnitions of the sample.
3.7 Who Integrates?
3.7.1 Non-EU and Turkish Immigrants
Our ﬁndings so far indicate that a more liberal citizenship policy speeds up the con-
vergence in fertility and marriage choices between immigrants and natives. Yet, do we
observe such convergence among all immigrants? Or, do some immigrant groups adapt
little or not all to the host society? These are important questions as the support
for liberal immigration policies in the native population hinges on the perception that
immigrants try to ﬁt in. To investigate them, we focus on two groups which have been
at the center of political debates on failed assimilation: immigrants from outside the
EU and Turkish immigrants.
Table 3.7 shows the impact of a short waiting period on fertility and marriage
outcomes. The results are obtained from estimating equation (3.1) on the sample of
immigrant women from outside the EU (excluding Turkey) and Turkey. Interestingly,
38Note that we only observe their current spouse, not the spouse or partner an immigrant had when
she ﬁrst arrived or when she got eligible for citizenship. Some immigrants we drop from the sample
might have naturalized through the provisions of the 1990 or 2000 reforms but married a native only
afterward. And some immigrants might have naturalized through a native spouse, but got divorced
before we observe them in the 2005-2010 sample period. We think that the number of immigrants we
misclassify should be small relative to the number of immigrants with a native spouse in the 2005-2010
period.
39The 2000 reform also included a transitory provision: Parents with children born between 1990
and 1999 could apply for citizenship for their child between 2000 and 2001. The parent had to fulﬁll
the other requirements of the 2000 reform granting citizenship by birthplace (most importantly, an
8-year resident requirement). In practice, less than 10 percent of parents did apply which suggests
that children older than ﬁfteen did rarely beneﬁt from the jus soli provision.
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Table 3.7: Eﬀects of Citizenship for Immigrants Outside the EU and Turkey
Sample: Immigrant Women
Having
Children
No. of Kids
(incl. 0)
Age at First
Birth
Single
Mother
Currently
Married
Ever
Married
Divorced
Age at First
Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Outside European Union (excluding Turkey)
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.010*** 0.016** -0.023 0.001 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.000 -0.037
(0.003) (0.007) (0.050) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.044)
Observations 12,033 12,033 6,341 6,341 12,046 12,046 7,118 6,541
R-Squared 0.413 0.373 0.213 0.053 0.382 0.516 0.058 0.151
Mean Dependent Variable (Turkey) 0.527 1.081 23.41 0.153 0.527 0.591 0.108 20.96
Panel B: Turkey
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.011*** 0.029*** -0.257*** -0.007** 0.010*** 0.007*** -0.005* -0.179***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.041) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.045)
Observations 9,966 9,966 7,947 7,947 9,987 9,987 8,674 4,905
R-Squared 0.431 0.340 0.221 0.040 0.335 0.566 0.030 0.110
Mean Dependent Variable (Turkey) 0.797 1.874 22.48 0.109 0.795 0.869 0.0842 18.76
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates between the residency requirement and their fertility and marriage choices of immigrant women. Panel A shows results for immigrants from the European Union, Panel B
for immigrants outside the EU and not from Turkey, and Panel C for Turkish immigrants. The dependent variables for fertility are whether a female immigrant has any child (column (1)); the number of children born
to the female immigrant (column (2)); the age of the mother at the birth of her ﬁrst child (column (3)); and whether she is a single mother (column (4)). For marriage choices, the dependent variables are whether the
immigrant is currently married (column (5)); has ever been married (column (6)); whether she is divorced (column (7)); and the age at her ﬁrst marriage (column (8)). The sample includes all immigrant women who
arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than
regular immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of years an immigrant has to wait before becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). All speciﬁcations
include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends, a second-order polynomial in current age and years since migration as well as ten region of
origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship).
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for column (8).
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a shorter waiting period has even stronger eﬀects on the demand for children and
marriage for non-EU women (in the top panel) and Turkish women (in the bottom
panel) compared to the full sample. The most striking result is how much Turkish
women postpone their marriage and childbearing: their age at ﬁrst birth increases by
1.8 years (7 ∗ −0.257) compared to around 1.3 years in the full sample. Similarly, the
age at ﬁrst marriage increases by a sizeable 1.25 years (7 ∗ −0.179). Turkish women
marry young at age 19 and have their ﬁrst child at age 22 on average. As such, the
sizeable postponement eﬀect observed yield a convergence in the immigrant-native gap
in age at ﬁrst marriage that is quite similar than in the full sample: 19% (1.25/6.44
years, where 6.44 is the immigrant-native gap in age at ﬁrst marriage) which equals
the 19% observed in the full sample.
Overall then, Table 3.7 does not support the widespread public concern that immi-
grants from outside the European Union fail to integrate; instead, the evidence clearly
supports the idea that a liberal citizenship policy encourages social assimilation among
non-EU immigrants including Turkish immigrants, the largest group in Germany.40
The discussion of the theoretical mechanisms in Section 3.2 provides a potential
explanation for this result: on the one hand, immigrants from outside the EU should
beneﬁt the most from unhindered access to the labor market and better career options
associated with citizenship. If the income eﬀect on marriage and fertility is important,
non-EU immigrants have strong incentives to assimilate. On the other hand, immi-
grants from outside the EU come from cultural backgrounds that might impose very
diﬀerent norms about marriage and fertility. To the extent that the cultural back-
ground inﬂuences family and fertility choices directly, it might slow down the speed of
social assimilation. We next turn to a more systematic analysis of how the cultural
background inﬂuences the process of assimilation.
3.7.2 The Inﬂuence of Source Country Culture
To identify the role of the cultural background for the integration process more sys-
tematically, we turn to the epidemiological approach. The basic idea here is that
immigrants are imprinted with the values and norms of their source country through
parents, immigrant peers and the local community. At the same time, immigrants from
diﬀerent countries of origin face a similar institutional environment and similar incen-
tives in the host country, for example, with respect to labor market access or parental
leave legislation. By comparing immigrants from diﬀerent source countries in the same
40The evidence for social assimilation among Turkish immigrants diﬀers from a recent study by
Bisin et al. (2011a) who ﬁnd for the U.K. that Muslim immigrants assimilate more slowly in terms
of their religiosity than non-Muslim immigrants. One potential explanation for this diﬀerence is that
religious values might exhibit even more persistence than fertility and marriage choices. An alternative
reason is that there are diﬀerences in the degree of assimilation between Turkish immigrants and other
immigrants of Muslim faith.
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policy environment, we can identify whether the cultural background delays or boosts
social assimilation.
Here, we employ the epidemiological approach to test whether immigrants from
diverse cultural backgrounds respond diﬀerentially to a more liberal citizenship policy.
Empirically, we focus on the sample of immigrants from outside the EU who, without
a German passport, face similar restrictions in the labor market. A potential concern
with our approach is that immigrants are not a random sample of the population in the
country of origin. This concern is however, not an issue here as immigrants are actually
our population of interest; we do not want to make claims about the average individual
in the source country. A second potential concern is that the migration process itself
disrupts or delays fertility or family formation. Such disruption or delay are less of a
concern here as our sample has lived in Germany for almost two decades; furthermore,
we only compare immigrants from the same arrival cohort who would have experienced
similar delays in their family formation.
As proxy for source country culture, we use the fertility rate (TFR) in the country
of origin just before an immigrant left.41 The fertility rate in the home country should
reﬂect the norms about women's role in society that immigrants were socialized with.
To simplify interpretation, we convert the TFR rate into a binary indicator whether
the source country has a fertility rate above the median in that year. Accordingly,
Turkey, Iraq or Kosovo are high-fertility countries, while Croatia, Serbia or Russia are
low-fertility countries.
The top panel of Table 3.8 reruns the baseline for the set of immigrants for which
we could merge the TFR rate. The bottom panel of Table 3.8 adds the source coun-
try characteristic and its interaction with the residency requirement to equation (3.1).
The main eﬀect of the TFR rate indicates whether cultural norms have a direct eﬀect
on fertility or marriage choices; the interaction eﬀect in turn indicates whether immi-
grants from high fertility countries assimilate faster or slower with access to citizenship.
As expected, fertility is substantially higher for immigrant women from high-fertility
countries (see Table 3.8, columns (1) and (2)); they also have children much earlier
(column (3)) than the average non-EU immigrant.
More surprisingly, we ﬁnd that immigrants from high-fertility countries reduce their
fertility less when facing a liberal citizenship policy. Take the estimates for the proba-
bility of having kids (bottom panel of Table 3.8, column (1)): women from low-fertility
countries are 11.9 percentage points (7 ∗ 0.017) less likely to have a child when facing
short waiting periods; while the decline is only 6.3 percentage points (7∗(0.017−0.008))
41Alternatively, we use the female labor force participation rate in the country of origin. The results
are qualitatively very similar to the ones reported here. Women from countries with high female labor
participation have a lower probability to be married and marry later. Women from source countries
with a high female employment rate postpone their marriages more when facing a shorter residency
requirement than women from countries with low female labor force participation.
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Table 3.8: The Inﬂuence of Source Country Culture on Fertility and Marriage Choices
Sample: Immigrant Women
Having
Children
No. of Kids
(incl. 0)
Age at First
Birth
Single
Mother
Currently
Married
Ever
Married
Divorced
Age at First
Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Residency Requirement 0.012*** 0.022*** -0.210*** -0.006** 0.015*** 0.013*** -0.004* -0.140***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.032)
Observations 18,521 18,521 12,405 12,405 18,550 18,550 13,677 9,891
R-Squared 0.478 0.415 0.208 0.036 0.421 0.588 0.027 0.194
Residency Requirement 0.017*** 0.036*** -0.250*** -0.005 0.022*** 0.021*** -0.000 -0.070*
(0.003) (0.008) (0.050) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.036)
Res. Requirement*High Fertility Country -0.008*** -0.019*** 0.047 -0.001 -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.004 -0.127***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.042) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.027)
High Fertility Country of Origin 0.161*** 0.437*** -1.048** -0.019 0.155*** 0.158*** 0.004 -2.610
(0.028) (0.068) (0.409) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (3.101)
Observations 18,521 18,521 12,405 12,405 18,550 18,550 13,677 9,891
R-Squared 0.481 0.417 0.209 0.036 0.423 0.589 0.028 0.197
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.670 1.486 22.79 0.121 0.671 0.737 0.0902 19.90
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates for fertility and marriage choices of female immigrants. The sample is restricted to immigrants from outside the European Union. The dependent variables for fertility choices are
whether the immigrant has any child (in column (1)); the number of children born including zero (in column (2)); the age at ﬁrst birth for immigrants with at least one child (in column (3)); and whether the immigrant is a single
mother or not (in column (4)). For marriage choices, the dependent variables are whether the immigrant is currently married (column (5)); has ever been married (column (6); is divrced (column (7)); and the age when she ﬁrst
got married (column (8)). The top panel shows the baseline estimates for the subsample for which we have valid information on the fertility rates in the country of origin prior to immigration. The bottom panel augments the basic
model using fertility rates in the country of origin as a proxy for culture. The variable High Fertility Country of Origin is an indicator equal to one if the respective country of origin has fertility rates above the median in the
sample for that year; the indicator is zero otherwise. The interaction eﬀect between this indicator and the residency requirement tells us whether longer waiting periods have a diﬀerential eﬀect on fertility and marriage choices for
immigrants from high fertility countries of origin. All speciﬁcations include the same controls as in previous tables. See notes to Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for details. Standard errors are clustered at the age ∗ arrival year level. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for column (8); The World Bank (2016).
103
for women from high-fertility countries. We see the same pattern for the number of kids
(in column (2)). In contrast to the total demand for children, all immigrant women 
independently of their cultural background  postpone their ﬁrst birth by about 1.75
years (7 ∗ −0.25). We ﬁnd a similar pattern for marriage choices (see the right-hand
side of Table 3.8): women from countries with a low fertility rate reduce their mar-
riage rate by 15 percentage points (7 ∗ 0.022) when facing an 8-year rather than a
15-year waiting period (Table 3.8, column (5)). Women from countries with a high
fertility rate respond to the same incentive with a decline of only 8 percentage points
(7 ∗ (0.022− 0.010)).
To illustrate the social assimilation graphically, Figure 3.2 shows how the total
number of children (in the top panel) and the share currently married (in the bottom
panel) varies with the residency requirement. We start from the mean number of chil-
dren (or share currently married) among immigrants from low-fertility countries facing
an 8-year waiting period. We then use our estimates (in the bottom panel of Table 3.8,
columns (1) and (5)) to calculate how fertility and marriage changes with longer resi-
dency requirements. Figure 3.2 illustrates that immigrants from high-fertility countries
adapt their fertility and marriage choices less in response to a liberal citizenship policy
than immigrants from low-fertility countries; the ﬁgure also reveals that the diﬀerential
response is more pronounced for fertility than for marriage behavior.
One explanation for the slower speed of assimilation is that immigrants from more
traditional cultural backgrounds are less likely to naturalize, or beneﬁt less from cit-
izenship in the labor market. To investigate this possibility, Table 3.A.8 reruns the
same analysis where the dependent variables are now the propensity to naturalize, the
formal education and labor supply of immigrant women. While women from more tra-
ditional societies have the same likelihood of naturalizing, they do invest less in formal
education and are less likely to work than other immigrant women.
Overall then, cultural values and norms inﬂuence fertility and marriage choices
through at least two channels: ﬁrst, there is a direct eﬀect as immigrant women from
more traditional source countries have higher marriage rates and fertility rates to start
with. Furthermore, they converge more slowly to the marriage and fertility choices
of the native population  with the exception of the timing of birth and marriage.
This muted response is in part explained by fewer investments in human capital which
result in lower opportunity costs of childbearing, for example. The inﬂuence of culture
implies that sizable diﬀerences in marriage and fertility between non-EU immigrant
and native women will persist in the long-run.
Our results diﬀer from a recent study by Abramitzky et al. (2016) who ﬁnd that
immigrants from more distant cultures were less likely than other immigrants to use
foreign-sounding names in the U.S. during the Age of Mass Migration. Similarly,
Manning and Roy (2010) document that immigrants from culturally distant countries
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Figure 3.2: Access to Citizenship, Source Country Culture and Assimilation
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Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the diﬀerential eﬀects of residency requirement for immigrant women from low and high
fertility countries. The dependent variable in the upper graph is the number of children born including 0; in the bottom
graph, the dependent variable is whether an immigrant is currently married. We ﬁrst use the mean of the dependent
variable for natives and immigrants from low fertility countries who face an 8-year residency requirement to deﬁne the
starting point at 8 years. We then calculate the mean for immigrants from high fertility countries who face an 8-year
residency requirement as the sum of the value for immigrants from low fertility countries plus the main eﬀect in Table
3.8. We then use the estimates of the interaction eﬀects in Table 3.8 (column (2) and (5)) to calculate how fertility and
marriage behavior changes with a higher residency requirement. See notes to Table 3.8 for details on the sample and
the deﬁnition of high fertility countries. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010); The World Bank (2016).
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are more likely to declare their national identity as British than immigrants from
cultures closer to the U.K. There are two potential explanations for these diﬀerent
ﬁndings: ﬁrst, integration is not a uniform process. The subjective identiﬁcation with
the host country or the choice of a name might be easier to change than lifetime
decisions about family and children which are heavily inﬂuenced by the cultural norms
and traditions of one's family and broader community. As such, social assimilation
might be much harder to achieve, especially for immigrants who were brought up
with very diﬀerent norms and values. Second, the two studies mentioned analyze the
assimilation process more broadly while we focus on how immigrants respond to the
option to naturalize in the host country.
3.8 Conclusion
In recent years, Germany which long denied to be an immigration country has ranked
second as destination country for immigrants  just behind the United States but
before other traditional immigration countries like Australia and Canada. Over the
last couple of years, the refugee crisis has brought many more refugees to Germany
as asylum seekers. The large stock and sizable inﬂows of immigrants raise important
questions on how to integrate the new members into society economically and socially.
Traditionally, Germany, like many other Continental European countries, has had a
relatively weak record of integration compared to traditional immigration countries.
Over the past decades, Germany has overhauled most of its immigration and citi-
zenship policy. Starting in 1991, Germany has moved from a country where citizenship
was closely tied to ancestry to a more liberal understanding of citizenship and nat-
uralization. To identify how a more liberal citizenship policy aﬀects integration, we
exploit variation in residency requirements immigrants faced following the 1991 and
2000 reforms. We ﬁnd that faster access to citizenship speeds up social assimilation:
Immigrant women have fewer children and have their children at a later age. Both
men and women are less likely to be married and converge in their age of ﬁrst marriage
to the native population. While immigrants from outside the EU assimilate at a simi-
lar speed to the native population, non-EU immigrants from more traditional cultures
do assimilate at a slower pace than immigrants from less traditional cultures. Hence,
while access to citizenship pulls immigrants in the direction of the native population,
the pull factor is not uniform across immigrant groups. As such, sizable diﬀerences in
social integration outcomes will persist into the next generation.
Our study yields some tentative insights for the recent refugee crisis. Our evidence
clearly demonstrates that policies that provide incentives to integrate and feel welcome
can speed up integration, even for long-term decisions like fertility and marriage. At
the same time, most of the immigrants who came to Germany in the recent wave come
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from very diﬀerent cultural backgrounds with high fertility rates, for instance. Hence,
we are likely to see persistent diﬀerences in these long-term choices as these immigrants
adapt more slowly to the majority culture.
More generally, the ﬁndings in this study have important implications for the po-
litical debate on citizenship policy. One view, often found in more conservative circles,
is that citizenship should be used as a reward the host country bestows on immigrants
who are well integrated. In that perspective, access to citizenship should be restricted
to those worthy of naturalization. The polar opposite view builds on the idea that
access to citizenship actually boosts integration. In that perspective, a more liberal
citizenship policy acts as a motor for integration. Our results are more in line with the
latter view that access to citizenship speeds up integration eﬀorts among immigrants.
From this perspective, recent proposals in Germany and other European countries to
restrict access to citizenship and mandate more integration prior to naturalization seem
ill-conceived and are likely to undermine the incentives inherent in a liberal citizenship
policy.
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Table 3.A.1: Summary Statistics of the Microcensus
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Having Children 0.623 0.485 0.479 0.500
Total Number of Children (including 0) 1.318 1.306 1.027 1.278
Total Number of Children (if at least 1) 2.114 1.026 2.145 1.006
Age at First Birth 23.343 4.349 26.382 5.027
Single mother 0.138 0.345 0.014 0.116
Currently Married 0.627 0.484 0.545 0.498
Ever Married 0.703 0.457 0.590 0.492
Divorced 0.108 0.310 0.077 0.266
Cohabitating 0.080 0.271 0.103 0.304
Single Household 0.871 0.335 0.882 0.323
Age at First Marriage 20.33 3.764 23.23 4.390
Partner: German 0.191 0.393 0.212 0.409
Partner: Same Origin 0.932 0.251 0.914 0.281
Partner: Same Origin (2nd Generation) 0.079 0.269 0.107 0.309
Partner: Years in Germany 21.874 9.802 17.403 9.379
Partner: Years in Germany at Marriage 6.261 6.402 4.189 5.949
Partner: Age 39.155 8.686 34.343 7.777
Partner: Age Gap 4.396 5.284 -2.361 4.731
Partner: Years of Education 11.862 2.866 11.318 2.767
Partner: Years of Education Gap 0.678 2.618 -0.231 2.626
Share Naturalized 0.348 0.476 0.370 0.483
Years since Naturalized (if naturalized) 10.691 7.176 10.343 7.063
Residency Requirement (in years) 10.757 2.983 11.082 3.014
Years in Germany 18.042 7.915 19.190 7.839
Age 31.676 9.240 31.846 9.754
Low Education 0.506 0.500 0.440 0.496
Medium Education 0.370 0.483 0.423 0.494
High Education 0.061 0.240 0.064 0.245
Region of Origin
Traditional EU member States (EU-15) 0.122 0.327 0.153 0.360
New EU Member States (EU-12) 0.128 0.334 0.083 0.275
Former Yugoslavia 0.104 0.305 0.106 0.308
Turkey 0.340 0.474 0.330 0.470
Middle East 0.071 0.257 0.097 0.296
Africa 0.040 0.196 0.048 0.213
Asia 0.057 0.233 0.054 0.227
America 0.022 0.147 0.019 0.138
Former Soviet Union (without EU-12) 0.102 0.303 0.093 0.290
Other or No Citizenship 0.014 0.119 0.017 0.128
Observations 29,365 27,303
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1976 and 2002 and who were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude ethnic
Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular
immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of years an immigrant has to wait before
becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). Low-skilled
individuals are those without a highschool degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with a
highschool degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with a college degree. Sources: Microcensus
(1999-2004) for age at ﬁrst marriage; Microcensus (2005-2010) for all other variables.
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Table 3.A.2: Fertility and Marriage Choices of Naturalized Immigrants
Panel A: Fertility Choices
Having
Children
No. of Kids
(incl. 0)
No. of Kids
(if >0)
Age at First
Birth
Single
Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant Women
Naturalized -0.024*** -0.104*** -0.092*** 0.689*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.018) (0.074) (0.007)
Observations 29,319 29,319 18,273 18,273 18,273
R-Squared 0.414 0.387 0.175 0.229 0.035
Panel B: Marriage Choices
Currently
Married
Ever Married Divorced
Cohabitation
(if partner)
Single
Household
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Immigrant Women
Naturalized -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 29,362 29,362 20,639 18,997 8,723
R-Squared 0.370 0.528 0.033 0.127 0.127
Immigrant Men
Naturalized 0.020*** 0.007 -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 27,298 27,298 16,108 15,897 11,190
R-Squared 0.447 0.540 0.035 0.139 0.134
Linear and Quadratic in Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear and Quadratic in YSM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of fertility (Panel A) and marriage choices (Panel B) and whether an immigrant has naturalized. The dependent
variables in Panel A are whether a female immigrant has any child (column (1)); the number of children born to the female immigrant including 0 children
(column (2)); the number of children conditional on having at least one child (column (3)); the age of the mother at the birth of her ﬁrst child (column (4)); and
whether she is a single mother (column (5)). The dependent variables in Panel B are whether an immigrant is currently married (column (1)), has ever been
married (column (2)), is divorced (column (3)), is cohabitating (column (4)) or a single household (column (5)). The main independent variable is an indicator
equal to one if the immigrant has been naturalized and zero otherwise. The sample includes all immigrant women who arrived in Germany between 1975 and
2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to
German citizenship than regular immigrants. Naturalized is an indicator equal to one if the immigrant is naturalized in certain year and zero otherwise. All
speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends, second-order
polynomials in current age and years since migration as well as ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival
year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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Table 3.A.3: The Correlation between Naturalization and Partner Choice
Native
Partner
Partner from
Same Origin
Partner Same
Origin, 2nd
Generation
Partner's
YSM
Gap in
Education (in
years)
Age Gap
between
Partners
Personal
Income of
Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Immigrant Women
Naturalized 0.043*** -0.003 -0.016*** -1.359*** -0.044 -0.502*** 141.910***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.170) (0.049) (0.091) (20.369)
Observations 18,493 14,683 13,688 13,931 18,188 18,493 18,493
R-Squared 0.237 0.118 0.103 0.455 0.032 0.101 0.064
Panel B: Immigrant Men
Naturalized 0.032*** -0.016*** -0.010 -0.184 -0.094* -0.215** 23.297*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.179) (0.049) (0.093) (11.964)
Observations 15,367 11,963 10,932 10,921 15,124 15,367 15,367
R-Squared 0.187 0.101 0.123 0.337 0.038 0.085 0.097
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between being naturalized and the characteristics of partners or spouses. Results in Panel A are for the partners of immigrant women, those in Panel B for the
partners of immigrant men. The sample includes both married and cohabitating couples where one partner is eligible for citizenship. The dependent variables are whether an immigrant has a native partner or spouse
(column (1)); whether the partner or spouse comes from the same region of origin (column (2)); whether the partner or spouse is a second generation immigrant from the same region of origin (column (3)); the number
of years an immigrant partner or spouse has lived in the host country (column (4)); the gap in years of education between partners or spouses (column (5)); the age gap between partners or spouses (column (6)); and
the personal income (including non-workers) of the partner or spouse (column (7)). The sample includes all immigrant women who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old
when they arrived. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Naturalized is a binary indicator equal to one if a migrant
is naturalized in the current year and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends and ten region of
origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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Table 3.A.4: Functional Form Assumptions
Different Polynomials of Years in Germany Different Polynomials of Current Age
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Having Kids
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(N=29,319) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-Squared 0.414 0.414 0.414 0.414 0.412 0.414 0.416 0.417
AIC 25279 25280 25280 25278 25387 25280 25186 25146
Number of Kids (incl. 0)
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011**
(N=29,319) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R-Squared 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.387 0.385 0.386 0.389 0.391
AIC 84801 84777 84776 84775 84823 84779 84633 84585
Age at First Birth
Residency Requirement (in years) -0.181*** -0.184*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.182*** -0.184*** -0.186*** -0.185***
(N=18,273) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
R-Squared 0.226 0.227 0.227 0.228 0.227 0.227 0.228 0.229
AIC 101112 101090 101095 101071 101099 101092 101061 101053
Currently Married
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(N=29,362) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-Squared 0.370 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.369 0.371 0.371 0.372
AIC 27305 27298 27300 27303 27386 27300 27302 27227
Ever Married
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(N=29,362) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-Squared 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.527 0.528 0.529 0.530
AIC 15496 15495 15499 15501 15585 15497 15492 15381
Age at First Marriage
Residency Requirement (in years) -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132***
(N=14,312) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
R-Squared 0.191 0.191 0.192 0.192 0.190 0.191 0.191 0.191
AIC 75734 75731 75723 75727 75751 75733 75729 75732
Notes: The table reports alternative speciﬁcations of the reduced-form estimates for immigrant women. The dependent variables are fertility choices (having kids, number
of children and age at ﬁrst birth) and family formation (whether an immigrant is currently married, has ever been married and the age at ﬁrst marriage). The ﬁrst four
speciﬁcations (columns (1)-(4)) include diﬀerent polynomials in years since migration. Columns (5)-(8) include diﬀerent polynomials for current age. The sample includes all
immigrant women who arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2002 and were between 0 and 22 years old when they arrived. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e., immigrants with
German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. The residency requirement denotes the number of years an immigrant has to wait
before becoming eligible for citizenship in Germany; it varies between 8 and 16 years (see Table 3.1). All speciﬁcations include in addition year of arrival and year of birth
ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends, second-order polynomials in current age and years since migration as well as ten region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010);
Microcensus (1999-2004) for age at ﬁrst marriage.
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Table 3.A.5: Identifying Assumption and Alternative Interpretations
Sample: Immigrant Women
Arrival ∗ Birth Cohort FE Age of Arrival Effects Impressionable
Years
Arrival ∗
10-Year Birth
Cohort FE
Arrival ∗ 5-Year
Birth Cohort
FE
Before Age 11
Drop Arrival
Age < 8
Drop Arrival
Age > 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Having Kids
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.002 0.007** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 29,319 26,386 29,319 23,018 12,730
R-Squared 0.414 0.424 0.415 0.302 0.482
Number of Children (including 0)
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.011** 0.019*** 0.003 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Observations 29,319 26,386 29,319 23,018 12,730
R-Squared 0.386 0.384 0.388 0.316 0.455
Age at First Birth
Residency Requirement (in years) -0.184*** -0.301*** -0.170*** -0.408*** -0.031
(0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.042) (0.058)
Observations 18,273 16,838 18,273 16,416 5,330
R-Squared 0.227 0.223 0.230 0.235 0.178
Currently Married
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 29,362 26,419 29,362 23,056 12,745
R-Squared 0.371 0.373 0.371 0.252 0.415
Ever Married
Residency Requirement (in years) 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.002 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 29,362 26,419 29,362 23,056 12,745
R-Squared 0.528 0.536 0.529 0.407 0.519
Age at First Marriage
Residency Requirement (in years) -0.132*** -0.289*** -0.114*** -0.361*** -0.104
(0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.040) (0.064)
Observations 14,312 13,921 14,312 13,539 3,087
R squared 0.191 0.196 0.199 0.200 0.189
Notes: The table reports alternative speciﬁcations of the reduced-form estimates for immigrant women: columns (1) and (2) include separate 10- or 5-year birth cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects for each arrival cohort respectively. Column (3) adds an indicator for immigrants who migrated before age 11; column (4) drops all immigrants arriving
before age 8. Column (5) drops all immigrants who arrived at age 15 or later. The dependent variables are fertility choices and family formation (see Table 3.3 and 3.4
for details). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived between 1976 and 2002 and who were between 0 and 22 years-old when they arrived. All speciﬁcations
include in addition year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends, second-order polynomials in current
age and years since migration as well as ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for age at ﬁrst marriage.
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Table 3.A.6: Evolution of Pre-Determined Characteristics and Lee Bounds on Average Treatment Eﬀect
Panel A: Evolution of Pre-Determined Characteristica
Mean Age Turkey Ex-Yugoslavia EU-15 Member States
Arrival Cohort 2005 2010 T-Statistic 2005 2010 T-Statistic 2005 2010 T-Statistic 2005 2010 T-Statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Immigrant Women
1975-1979 39.87 44.60 0.72 0.59 0.56 1.14 0.07 0.10 -2.01 0.18 0.18 0.13
1980-1984 36.25 41.71 -1.13 0.47 0.45 0.53 0.05 0.08 -1.48 0.19 0.17 0.88
1985-1989 30.35 35.25 0.30 0.40 0.37 1.08 0.05 0.10 -3.44 0.17 0.13 2.29
1990-1994 26.39 31.17 0.73 0.31 0.26 2.59 0.14 0.25 -6.52 0.12 0.08 3.52
1995-1999 23.29 27.91 1.30 0.26 0.25 0.38 0.05 0.12 -5.12 0.10 0.09 1.14
Immigrant Men
1975-1979 39.43 43.76 2.00 0.60 0.56 1.46 0.03 0.05 -2.49 0.23 0.21 0.90
1980-1984 36.83 41.38 1.22 0.49 0.52 -1.04 0.03 0.05 -1.77 0.19 0.17 0.97
1985-1989 29.66 34.20 1.20 0.33 0.28 1.92 0.07 0.10 -2.65 0.17 0.17 -0.02
1990-1994 25.70 30.19 1.59 0.27 0.20 3.98 0.15 0.29 -7.18 0.13 0.11 1.76
1995-1999 22.16 26.43 2.10 0.21 0.20 0.75 0.05 0.16 -6.71 0.14 0.10 2.27
Panel B: Lee Bounds on Average Treatment Eﬀect
Baseline Binary Treatment 3% Trimming Margin 5% Trimming Margin
Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Age at First Marriage 1.209*** (0.164) 0.081 0.459*** 0.197** 0.550*** -0.034 0.547*** 0.398*** 0.966***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.086) (0.082) (0.073) (0.074) (0.136) (0.141)
Age at First Birth 0.925*** (0.152) -0.069 0.393*** 0.213** 0.684*** -0.137* 0.612*** 0.068 0.800***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.111) (0.116) (0.071) (0.076) (0.115) (0.115)
Notes: Panel A compares several characteristics of 5-year arrival cohorts in 2005 and 2010: mean age (columns (1)-(2)); the share of immigrants from Turkey (columns (4)-(5)); the share from successor states of Yugoslavia (columns
(7)-(8)); and the share from the traditional 15 EU member states (column (10)-(11)). The T-statistic in column (3) is for the hypothesis that the mean age in 2005 plus 5 is equal to the mean age in 2010. The T-statistic in columns (6),
(9) and (12) are for the hypotheses that the share of immigrants from the source countries shown in the top row are equal in 2005 and 2010. The ﬁrst set of results are for immigrant women, the second set of results for immigrant men.
Panel B shows bounds on the treatment eﬀect following Lee (2009). The binary treatment variable is equal to one if an immigrant faces an 8-year residency requirement; and zero if an immigrant faces a longer residency requirement.
Columns (1)-(2) re-estimates equation (3.1) using the binary treatment variable. Columns (4)-(7) estimate the lower and upper bound on the average treatment eﬀect under the assumption that immigrants in the treatment group
are 3% less likely to return. Trimming the outcome variable for the treatment group from above, we obtain the lower bound; trimming the outcome variable at the bottom, we obtain the upper bound. Columns (4)-(5) calculates the
raw bounds, columns (6)-(7) uses an indicator for a long residence in Germany (more than 15 years) and region of origin dummies to tighten the bounds. In columns (9)-(12), we use the same bounds approach under the alternative
assumption that the treated group is 5% less likely to return. All estimates in Panel B include the same control variables as in the main tables. Standard errors are bootstrappend with 50 replications. Statistical signiﬁcance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); Microcensus (1999-2004) for age at ﬁrst marriage in Panel B.
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Table 3.A.7: Alternative Samples
Fertility Choices Family Formation
Having Kids
No. of Kids
(incl. 0)
Age at 1st
Birth
Currently
Married
Ever
Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drop Arrival Cohorts 1996-2002 0.003 0.011 -0.202*** 0.004* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.030) (0.002) (0.002)
Drop Former Yugoslavia and Middle East 0.003 0.001 -0.227*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.031) (0.002) (0.002)
Drop All Ethnic Germans 0.006*** 0.011* -0.178*** 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.034) (0.002) (0.002)
Drop Immigrants with German Partner 0.010*** 0.021*** -0.165*** 0.020*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.038) (0.002) (0.002)
Control for Children in Household (2000 Reform) 0.007*** 0.005 -0.187*** 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002)
Households with Children 15+ (2000 Reform) 0.006*** 0.008 -0.102*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.034) (0.003) (0.002)
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates where the dependent variables are fertility choices (columns (1)-(3)) and family formation (columns (4)-(5)). The key
independent variable is the residency requirement for naturalization. The ﬁrst row drops all immigrants arriving in the country after 1995; the second row drops all immigrants
from former Yugoslavia and the Middle East which formed the largest group of refugees over the period; and the third row uses the 2007-2010 Microcensus where we can
directly identify (and drop) ethnic Germans who are not aﬀected by the citizenship reforms. The fourth row drops immigrants with a native spouse in 2005-10; the ﬁfth row
includes controls for the number and age structure of children in the household; and the sixth row drops immigrants with children under 15 who might have been aﬀected
by birthright citizenship for all children born on or after January 1, 2000. See notes to previous tables for the deﬁnition of the sample. All speciﬁcations include the same
individual characteristics as before (year of arrival, year of birth and calender time ﬁxed eﬀects, second-order polynomials of current age and years since migration), state
ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear time trends and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by age ∗ arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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Table 3.A.8: The Eﬀect of Source Country Culture on Naturalization, Income and Education
Sample: Immigrant Women
Naturalized Employed
Log Personal
Income
Low-Skilled Medium-Skilled High-Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Residency Requirement -0.019*** -0.006** -0.014*** 0.008** -0.009*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 18,551 18,551 11,881 18,495 18,495 18,495
R-Squared 0.244 0.102 0.141 0.208 0.192 0.063
Residency Requirement -0.019*** -0.009** -0.015** 0.023*** -0.020*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Res. Requirement*High Fertility Country -0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.020*** 0.015*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
High Fertility Country of Origin 0.142*** -0.052 -0.118* 0.313*** -0.189*** -0.110***
(0.028) (0.036) (0.062) (0.036) (0.034) (0.016)
Observations 18,551 18,551 11,881 18,495 18,495 18,495
R-Squared 0.249 0.102 0.142 0.214 0.194 0.069
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects and Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.359 0.415 6.341 0.587 0.313 0.0373
Notes: The sample is restricted to immigrant women who originate from outside the European Union. The dependent variables are: whether the immigrant has naturalized (column (1)); the personal income
(in logs) (column (2)); whether an immigrant is low-skilled with no vocational or high school degree (column (3)); whether she is medium-skilled with a high school or vocational degree (column (4)); or whether
she is high-skilled with a tertiary degree (column (5)). The top panel shows the baseline estimates for the subsample for which we have valid information on the fertility rates in the country of origin prior to
immigration. The bottom panel augments the basic model using fertility rates in the country of origin as a proxy for culture. The variable High Fertility Country of Origin is an indicator equal to one if the
respective country of origin has fertility rates above the median in the sample for that year; the indicator is zero otherwise. The interaction eﬀect between this indicator and the residency requirement tells us
whether longer waiting periods have a diﬀerential eﬀect on outcomes for immigrants from high fertility countries of origin. All speciﬁcations include the same controls as in previous tables. See notes to Tables
3.3 or 3.4 for details. Standard errors are clustered at the age ∗ arrival year level. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Microcensus (2005-2010); The World Bank (2016).
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Chapter 4
The Labor Market Assimilation of
Immigrants in Germany
4.1 Introduction
Immigration is one of the most important and most contentious policy issues in Eu-
rope today. From the perceived lack of economic, political and cultural assimilation
to the fear of generous European welfare states being magnets for unemployed or non-
employed immigrants to the recent refugee crisis of 2015, the question of how immi-
grants fare in the host countries has been at the limelight of the public debate.
In Europe, Germany is an especially interesting case to study the labor market
integration of immigrants. Until recently, Germany did not deﬁne or consider itself
an immigration country. While Germany invited large numbers of guest workers in
the 1960s and early 1970s to supply its booming manufacturing sector with low-skilled
labor, these immigrants were considered temporary. As such, there was little interest
in learning about their labor market performance or other dimensions of assimilation
at the time. And while some returned in the 1970s, many guest workers stayed and
settled in Germany with their families. New waves of immigrants arrived in Germany
when the Iron Curtain started to get lifted in the late 1980s. Figure 4.A.1 shows the
sizable immigration ﬂows into Germany from the late 1980s to around 1995. After a
period of small net migration between 1996 and 2008, net migration has been rising
since 2010.
As a result of the sizable immigration ﬂows, in 2017, 15% of the German popula-
tion is foreign-born, a number comparable to the share of foreign-born in traditional
immigrant countries such as Australia, Canada or the United States (United Nations
Population Division, 2018). The composition of immigrants arriving in Germany has
also been changing substantially over time. The early waves of guest workers mostly
This chapter is joint work with Christina Gathmann. We thank participants at the Workshop on
Immigration and Integration in Cross-National Comparison in Mannheim for valuable comments.
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came from Turkey, Italy, Greece and some North African states. Figure 4.A.2 shows
the share of immigrants arriving in Germany from diﬀerent regions of origin between
1992 and 2014. In the 1990s, a sizable share of immigrant inﬂows originated from the
former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia and Albania. Since the early 2000s, the
largest group of immigrants coming to Germany have been from the recent accession
countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Given the observed changes in the countries of origin, one might expect that this
translated into shifts in the level of skill immigrants bring to the German labor market.
Table 4.1 indeed suggests that arrival cohorts have become much more skilled over time:
among immigrants arriving in Germany between 1985 and 1990, one-third of men and
almost half of the women were low-skilled; less than 20% of men and 15% of women
had a college or university degree. The picture looks completely diﬀerent for the 2005-
2010 arrival cohort: here, only one-ﬁfth of men and one-fourth of women have low
education, while more than one-third have a tertiary education. Hence, Germany has
been able to attract many more high-skilled immigrants over time, doubling the share
of immigrants with a tertiary education.
Yet, we know surprisingly little about the labor market assimilation of immigrants
in Germany.1 Most of the public scrutiny has focused on asylum seekers who arrived in
large numbers in 2015 and 2016. How the broader group of immigrants who arrived to
Germany under a variety of circumstances and programs fare in the labor market has
received much less public attention. This lack of knowledge translates into disagree-
ments about the type of immigration policy that should be pursued: should Germany
impose a point system as in Canada favoring high-skilled immigration or should it also
welcome low-skilled workers to ease the pressure of demographic aging?
This paper revisits the economic assimilation of immigrants in Germany over the
past three decades, from 1975 to 2010. Most of the existing evidence uses the Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) and concludes that earnings of immigrants do not assimilate
to those of German natives over time despite large earnings diﬀerentials upon arrival
(e.g., Dustmann, 1993; Pischke, 1992; Licht and Steiner, 1993; Schmidt, 1997; Bauer
et al., 2005). Constant and Massey (2005) and Fertig and Schurer (2007) in contrast,
report some assimilation in wages based on the same dataset.
1There is, in contrast, a large literature that analyzes the assimilation of immigrants in traditional
immigration countries. Using cross-sectional data, the early literature on assimilation generally draws
a rather positive picture of the wage growth of immigrants in the United States, since immigrants are
found to catch up to and ultimately to outperform natives on (Chiswick, 1978; LaLonde and Topel,
1992). More recent analyses based on repeated cross-sectional and longitudinal data have shown
that the existing evidence paints an overly optimistic picture of the assimilation process. Changes in
cohort quality or selective return or transitory migration may have lead to an overestimation of the
convergence process (e.g., Borjas, 1985, 1995; LaLonde and Topel, 1992; Duleep and Regets, 1999; Hu,
2000; Lubotsky, 2007; Abramitzky et al., 2012; Dustmann and Görlach, 2015). While most studies
agree that there is some convergence in wages in the US labor market, the degree and speed of
convergence to natives remains a topic of intense scholarly debate (e.g., Card, 2005).
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Table 4.1: Education of Arrival Cohorts after Immigration
Men Women
Year of Arrival
Cohort
Low
Education
Medium
Education
High
Education
Low
Education
Medium
Education
High
Education
1985-1989 (in 1991) 34.15 47.60 18.25 46.00 39.24 14.75
1990-1994 (in 1995) 33.26 49.86 16.88 44.26 39.28 16.47
1994-1999 (in 2000) 32.30 47.29 20.22 36.84 43.37 19.79
2000-2004 (in 2005) 29.49 45.20 25.30 33.28 45.00 21.71
2005-2010 (in 2010) 21.40 42.55 36.05 26.02 39.31 34.67
Notes: The table illustrates the change in cohort quality over time. It shows the level of education of diﬀerent immigrant cohorts
directly after migration. The education variables are binary indicators equal to one if an immigrant is low skilled (has no high school or
vocational degree), medium-skilled (has a high school degree or vocational degree), or high-skilled (has a university or college degree).
The percentage shares are calculated separately for the arrival cohorts 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009,
with data from the Microcensus in 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010, respectively. The diﬀerent samples are restricted to immigrants
who migrated in a particular arrival cohort at age 20 or older, who are between 20 and 60 years-old at the time of the survey.
We instead employ a new dataset of longitudinal earnings histories from social
security records merged with household survey data. The household data PASS has
surveyed individuals annually since 2006. We use the ﬁrst ﬁve waves from 2006 to
2011, which have been linked to the social security records of participating individuals.
The survey oversamples individuals in beneﬁt units (where at least one household
member receives welfare transfers) and households living in low-status areas. The
survey interviews all members of a household, irrespective of whether they receive
beneﬁts, and follows individuals even if they move out of the original household or out
of a low-status area. While the household sample earns lower wages than the average
worker in a social security job, immigrants in the household sample are actually quite
similar to the average immigrants in Germany. We devote some eﬀort to show that
the characteristics of immigrants and earnings in our sample and a large representative
data, the Microcensus, are comparable. These patterns suggest that our data are a
valuable alternative data source to study the progress of immigrants in the German
labor market.
From the household survey, we obtain two pieces of information that are key for
the study of immigrant assimilation: the year of immigration and the country of birth.
Both variables are typically not measured reliably in social security data. Instead, social
security records contain the date of the ﬁrst job subject to social security contributions
and current citizenship. The year of entering the social security system might be
diﬀerent from the year of immigration reported in survey data for two reasons: many
immigrants initially work in jobs outside the social security system, such as helping in
a family business or as self-employed. In that case, the actual immigration year will be
earlier than the ﬁrst entry in the social security records. Yet, the opposite scenario is
also possible: an immigrant might have entered the country as a temporary migrant, for
example as a seasonal worker, and worked in a social security job before immigration.
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In that case, the actual year when an immigrant came to Germany to stay might occur
after the ﬁrst job recorded in the social security records (see Lubotsky, 2007, for a
related discussion).2
There are also reasons to believe that current citizenship is likely to misclassify
many immigrants as natives. If there is positive selection into naturalizing (see Gath-
mann and Keller, 2017, for empirical evidence for Germany), foreigners identiﬁed by
current citizenship become an increasingly negatively selected sample over time. As
a consequence, we would underestimate the progress of ﬁrst-generation immigrants,
whether naturalized or not, in the German labor market.3
Using the actual year of immigration and place of birth to identify ﬁrst-generation
immigrants, we show that the common perception that there is little assimilation is
not an accurate picture of the current labor market performance of immigrants in
Germany. We ﬁnd that both immigrant men and women catch up with natives in
terms of employment rates; mirroring the relative employment growth of immigrants,
we also observe a substantial decline in unemployment rates of immigrants with time
spent in the country. Because of the sizable changes along the employment margin,
we compare the characteristics of immigrants entering the labor market to the average
working immigrant. For men, entrants have lower observable and unobservable skills,
which suggests that the estimation of wage assimilation is likely to be biased downward.
For women, we observe few selection eﬀects as entrants into the labor market look quite
similar to the average female immigrant worker.
We consider alternative methods to account for the selection into employment: our
ﬁrst approach uses the bounds approach proposed by Lee (2009); a second approach
imputes missing wages exploiting the panel structure of the data; a third approach uses
observable characteristics to predict missing wages; a ﬁnal method assumes that all non-
workers would have earned wages below the median wage of workers (Johnson et al.,
2000; Neal, 2004; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). Our imputation methods show that
negative selection into employment results in a downward bias in wage assimilation,
especially among men. After correcting for the type of selection, we observe sizable
wage assimilation for both immigrant men and women.
The sizable assimilation in employment and wages we observe is robust to alterna-
tive speciﬁcations, such as controlling for educational attainment, allowing for separate
experience proﬁles for immigrants and natives, or controlling for local unemployment
rates (Bratsberg et al., 2006). In addition, assimilation is faster for immigrants from
outside the European Union who also face much higher barriers to transfer their skills
2Almost one in two immigrants (46%) entered social security records after the reported year of
migration. On the contrary, about 7% of worked in a social security job before the reported year of
migration.
3Based on the information on citizenship in the social security records, we misclassify almost one
in three immigrants (30%).
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like educational credentials, for instance. The only exception are male immigrants from
Turkey, since they are not found to assimilate with respect to employment or wages.
Furthermore, we observe employment and wage assimilation for immigrants arriving
prior as well as those arriving after 1990 suggesting that our results cannot be explained
by changes in the sample of immigrants residing in Germany alone.
In a ﬁnal step, we use the depth of our linked dataset to explore several potential
channels for the observed wage assimilation in Germany. First, we assess whether
immigrants use job changes to improve their relative position in the labor market.
Upon arrival, immigrants who typically lack the necessary networks and information
to ﬁnd jobs that ﬁt their skills and experience, often downgrade in the labor market
initially. We report evidence that immigrants initially are much more likely to switch
occupations and industries than natives; immigrants also switch jobs more frequently
compared to natives. Over time, all types of job mobility declines with the decline
being most pronounced for occupational and industry mobility. These patterns are
consistent with a job search strategy where immigrants ﬁrst search over occupations
and industries, and only then for the best ﬁrm match within an occupation or industry
 suggesting that occupation- and industry-speciﬁc human capital are more valuable
than ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (Neal, 1999; Pavan, 2011).
A second channel for relative improvements in wages is that immigrants ﬁnd jobs in
better-paying ﬁrms over time. A recent literature has stressed the role of ﬁrms in the
determination of wages and their contribution to wage diﬀerentials across workers (e.g.,
Card et al., 2013, 2018). A few studies establish that immigrants are more likely to
be employed in low-paying ﬁrms and low-paying positions within ﬁrms (Pendakur and
Woodcock, 2010; Barth et al., 2012; Bossler, 2014). We show that immigrants initially
work in smaller ﬁrms, which tend to pay lower wages. Over time, they sort into larger
ﬁrms, especially immigrant men. In addition, immigrants are initially much more likely
to be employed in ﬁrms with a low share of Germans and a high share of their own
region of origin pointing to the importance of job referrals through ethnic networks for
recent arrivals (Dustmann et al., 2016). Our results indicate that immigrants rely less
on these ethnic networks over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces our data sources and
compares our sample of immigrants to a 1% random sample of the total population.
Section 4.3 provides evidence on the assimilation of immigrant men and women in
the German labor market. We further document that selection along the employment
margin is important for understanding the observed assimilation patterns. In Section
4.4, we then analyze occupational upgrading and the role of the ﬁrm as possible expla-
nations for wage assimilation. We conclude with a discussion of our ﬁndings in Section
4.5.
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4.2 Data Sources and Empirical Strategy
4.2.1 Social Security Records Linked to Household Survey Data
Our analysis builds on new longitudinal earnings data from social security records
matched to information on year of arrival and place of birth from a large household
survey. Respondents in the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the Labour Market and Social Security
(PASS) survey have been matched to their social security records spanning more than
three decades, from 1975 to 2010.
The ﬁrst wave of the PASS survey was conducted in 2006 and then repeated annu-
ally until 2011. The PASS survey consists of two subsamples: the ﬁrst one is a random
sample of beneﬁt units in which at least one person has received welfare beneﬁts (Ar-
beitslosengeld II) on the reference date. All members of the household are interviewed
irrespective of whether they receive any beneﬁts or not. The second random sample is
drawn from the universe of zip codes but oversamples households from zip codes with
low socio-economic status.4 For both samples, all household members are interviewed
and followed if they move out of a PASS household. Later waves include refreshment
samples of about 1,000 households to keep up the sample size (Trappmann et al., 2013).
The fact that PASS survey oversamples individuals who have been unemployed or
living in a low-income area in one of the survey years might cast doubt whether our re-
sults are representative of the immigrant population. We investigate this question more
systematically in the next subsection demonstrating that the immigrants interviewed
in the survey are broadly representative of the immigrant population in Germany.
The household survey reports the country of birth for each individual, which we use
to identify ﬁrst-generation immigrants. These immigrants might have come to Germany
as guest workers, ethnic Germans, non-EU immigrants or EU immigrants making use
of the freedom of movement.5 The sample includes all ﬁrst-generation immigrants who
arrived in Germany between 1975 and 2010 and were at least 20 years of age upon
arrival. We thus exclude immigrants who arrived in the country as children, as they
are likely to assimilate faster, especially if they obtain some or all of their education
and training in Germany. The ﬁrst-generation immigrants in our sample may or may
not be German citizens at the time they participate in the household survey.
Furthermore, the household survey asks about the year of arrival in the country. As
in most surveys, the immigrant is asked: When did you move to Germany to live here?
Please provide the exact month and year. For immigrants who did not work initially
4Socio-economic status uses information on unemployment, income, the types of cars, educational
attainment and prevalence of high-status occupations to construct a measure of low, medium and high
status areas, from which the sample is drawn at a ratio of 4:2:1.
5Ethnic Germans arrived from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since the late 1980s.
If they could demonstrate some German ancestry, they had access to German citizenship within three
years of arrival.
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or whose ﬁrst job is to help in the family business or being self-employed (or other jobs
outside the social security system), the year of arrival in Germany will precede the year
of entry into a social security job.
The opposite is true for back-and-forth migrants. Immigrants who made multiple
trips to Germany, such as seasonal workers in agriculture or the tourism industry,
are likely to answer with the date of their most recent arrival rather than their initial
arrival. For them, their actual year of entry in the social security system might therefore
precede their year of immigration reported in the household survey. A comparison of
the year of immigration (from the household survey) and the year of entry into a social
security job (from the administrative records) in Table 4.B.1 reveals that 46.3% of
the sample has immigrated to Germany before entering the social security records.
In contrast, back-and-forth migrants with date of entry in the social security system
prior to reported date of arrival make up only 6.7% of our sample.6 The two pieces
of information coincide for less than half of our sample (47% of our sample). In the
empirical analysis below, we use the minimum of the year of immigration from the
PASS and the year of ﬁrst entry in the social security records. As comparison, we also
report results for a variable based only on the information of immigration year from
the household survey.7
The respondents in the household survey are matched to their social security records
using record linkage techniques. Over the ﬁrst ﬁve waves, 79% of respondents agreed
to having their records matched (Antoni and Bethmann, 2014). Among those, 92%
of records could be matched resulting in an overall record linkage rate of 73.4%.8 An
analysis of the determinants of record linkage reveals that ﬁrst-generation immigrants
and individuals with missing socio-demographic information are more likely to refuse
the linkage of their information to the administrative data. Yet, when we regress log
wages on the survey information for the full sample of respondents and the sample of
6These numbers are quite similar for men and women. Men are about 2 percentage points more
likely to be a back-and-forth immigrant than women. Women in turn are 1.2 percentage points more
likely than men to have worked in a job outside the social security system prior to showing up in the
social security records.
7Table 4.B.2 reports the results for all three measures of years since migration to estimate wage
assimilation. Using the year of immigration from the household survey (YSM: PASS), using the year
of entry into the social security records (`YSM: IEB) or using the minimum of the two (YSM: Both),
we ﬁnd very diﬀerent results if we use the year of entry into a social security job only. The reason is
that the entry into the administrative data typically occurs later than the year of immigration. As a
result, we underestimate the initial earnings gap and overestimate the speed of assimilation (as shown
in columns (2) and (5) of Table 4.B.2).
8For part of the sample, households could be matched using a unique administrative id. Individuals
within the household were then matched based on names and dates of birth. For the remaining
individuals, a probabilistic record linkage approach based on name, date of birth, gender and the full
address was employed. The overall matching rate is slightly lower than the matching rate of 84-91%
reported in Lubotsky (2007) based on similar data, for two reasons: ﬁrst, record linkage in the U.S.
data could employ a unique social security number available in both data sources. Second, the social
security records in the U.S. cover around 95% of employees including a sizable share of self-employed.
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respondents with valid record linkage, this yields no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (see Beste,
2011, for details).
The administrative data comprise the complete employment and earnings histories
of all workers covered by the social security system; the administrative records do not
include the self-employed, civil servants and military personnel.9 We observe for each
individual whether she is employed within the social security system or whether she
collects unemployment beneﬁts as of June 30th each year. Our employment variable
is equal to one if a respondent is employed within the social security system or not;
the variable is zero if a person is unemployed, non-employed or working outside the
social security system. The unemployment variable is equal to one if a person collects
unemployment beneﬁts as of June 30th in a given year; the variable is zero if the person
is employed or not covered by social security records.
The wage variable records the average daily wage (in logs) for the employment spell
that contains the reference date of June 30.10 Like most social security data, our wage
variable is right-censored at the social security limit. We impute censored wages under
the assumption that the error term in the wage regression is normally distributed,
allowing for separate variances by district, year and gender (see also Dustmann et al.,
2009, for a similar approach). We deﬂate wages to 1995 prices using the consumer
price index.
Unlike the social security data used in Lubotsky (2007), our administrative records
also include detailed information on each worker's education or occupation. In the
analysis, we distinguish three skill groups. Low-skilled workers enter the labor mar-
ket without post-secondary education; medium-skilled workers completed an appren-
ticeship or graduated from high school (Abitur). Workers are high-skilled if they
graduated from a university or college. Furthermore, we also observe characteristics
of the employer like ﬁrm size, location, industry and ethnic composition. We use this
additional information below to explore some potential channels for immigrant assim-
ilation.
For the empirical analysis, we restrict our sample to individuals aged between 20
and 60 who are not working in irregular, marginal, seasonal or part-time employment.
Our ﬁnal sample contains information for 18,973 individuals and has about 303,500
observations. For the analysis of wages, we further restrict the sample to full-time
workers. This last restriction reduces the sample to around 132,000 observations. Sum-
mary statistics are reported in Table 4.B.3. Our matched dataset is an example of a
stock sampled data where we observe an immigrant (or native) conditional on having
survived and remained in the host country until the sampling years of the household
9In 1995, 79.4 percent of all workers in West Germany were covered by social security and are
hence recorded in the data (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 1996).
10Because employers are required to update records only at the end of each year, this variable may
capture wage changes that occurred from January to December of the same year.
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survey (2006-2011 in our case). Figure 4.A.3 illustrates the data structure (Lubotsky,
2007, uses very similar data). The main advantage of the stock-based sample is that, in
contrast to repeated cross-sectional data or small panels, we can follow a large number
of immigrants who still reside in the country.
4.2.2 How representative is the PASS-ADIAB data?
Given the sample structure of the PASS data, one might ask to what extent the data
and hence our results are representative of the experience of the average immigrant
living in Germany. We ﬁrst show that a comparison of immigrants and natives in the
PASS-ADIAB and a random sample of the social records reveals that our sample earns
lower wages than the average worker. We then demonstrate that the average immigrant
in the PASS-ADIAB data does not diﬀer much from the average immigrants in the
Microcensus, which covers a 1% random sample of the German population.11
We start out with comparing the wages of both immigrants and natives in the
PASS-ADIAB sample with immigrants and natives in the 2% random sample of social
security records. Figure 4.A.4 shows the distribution of daily wages adjusted to 1995
prices for natives and immigrants between 1975 and 2010. The distribution of wages
has a similar shape but is shifted to the left relative to the average worker in the social
security system.
Hence, the average worker in our data earns less than the average worker in the
social security records. Yet, immigrants in the PASS-ADIAB data might still be repre-
sentative of the German immigrant population. Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics
of characteristics of male and female immigrants in the Microcensus and the PASS-
ADIAB between 2007 and 2010. For better comparability, both datasets impose the
same sample restrictions. They include only foreign-born respondents aged between
20 and 60, and exclude those who came to Germany before 1975 or at an age below
20. Immigrants in the PASS data and immigrants in the Microcensus are of similar
age. Even more importantly, immigrants in the PASS-ADIAB do not diﬀer in their
educational distribution from immigrants in the Microcensus. 30% of all immigrant
men are low-skilled, i.e., do not have a high school or vocational degree. Around 50%
have a high school or vocational degree and close to 20% have a college or university
degree. The distribution among immigrant women is roughly similar as well.
We then compare labor income between the PASS-ADIAB and Microcensus. Figure
4.1 displays the distributions of immigrants' net monthly income (adjusted to 1995
prices) in the Microcensus (2007-2010) and the PASS-ADIAB (2007-2010). The vertical
lines in the graph indicate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile for each data source.
11As we cannot identify immigrants in the social security records without the PASS survey, we
cannot compare the characteristics of the immigrant population in the PASS-ADIAB data with the
immigrants in the social security records.
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Personal income per month in the Microcensus combines labor earnings, income from
self-employment, rental income, public and private pensions as well as public transfers
(like welfare or unemployment beneﬁts, child beneﬁts or housing subsidies) but is net
of taxes and other contributions. To use a comparable measure in the PASS-ADIAB,
we use a similar measure of net income from the household survey.12
Table 4.2: Comparison of Microcensus and PASS-ADIAB
Men Women
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Panel A: Microcensus (2007-2010)
Age 42.1154 9.9812 41.6177 10.1858
Low Education 0.3029 0.4595 0.3485 0.4765
Medium Education 0.5196 0.4996 0.4661 0.4989
High Education 0.1769 0.3816 0.1847 0.3881
Panel B: PASS-ADIAB (2007-2010)
Age 44.0195 9.3798 43.3808 9.7322
Low Education 0.3073 0.4615 0.2982 0.4576
Medium Education 0.4766 0.4996 0.4741 0.4994
High Education 0.2241 0.4171 0.2321 0.4223
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for male and female immigrants in the Microcensus and the
PASS-ADIAB between 2007 and 2010. The education variables are binary indicators equal to one if an
immigrant is low skilled (has no high school or vocational degree), medium-skilled (has a high school degree
or vocational degree), or high-skilled (has a university or college degree). The sample is restricted to foreign-
borns who immigrated to Germany after 1975 at age 20 or older, and who are between 20 and 60 years-old
during the surveys. These restrictions result in a sample of 49,111 male and 55,995 female immigrants in
the Microcensus, and 1,741 male and 2,235 female immigrants in the PASS-ADIAB data.
The ﬁgure illustrates that the distribution of incomes of immigrants from the PASS
does not diﬀer from the large cross-sectional Microcensus up to the 75th percentile: the
25th and 50th percentiles of both income distributions are the same. There are some
diﬀerences in the upper part of the income distribution, as the Microcensus includes
more high-income individuals than the PASS-ADIAB data. Hence, the 75th percentile
in the Microcensus is about 10% higher than in the PASS-ADIAB data.
12We do not use the wage measure from the administrative data for three reasons: ﬁrst, the wage
measure in the social security records is based on a deﬁnition that diﬀers considerably from that
of the net personal income measure in the Microcensus. Second, the wage measure in the social
security records is censored above, which is not the case in the Microcensus. Third, the PASS-ADIAB
data range from 1975-2010, while the Microcensus data cover the years 2007-2010. In order not to
confuse diﬀerences in wages from time eﬀects, we compare the household information on net income
to demonstrate that the immigrant population are comparable in terms of realized earnings.
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Figure 4.1: Earnings Distributions of Immigrants in the MZ and PASS-ADIAB
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the distributions of immigrants' net monthly income (adjusted to 1995 prices) in the Micro-
census (2007-2010) and the PASS-ADIAB (2007-2010). Furthermore, the vertical lines indicate the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentile for each data source. Personal income per month in the Microcensus combines labour earnings, income from
self-employment, rental income, public and private pensions as well as public transfers (like welfare or unemployment
beneﬁts, child beneﬁts or housing subsidies) but is net of taxes and other contributions. For comparison, the PASS
variable on income is not the earnings from social security record, but a similar variable on net income taken from the
PASS survey. The sample is restricted to foreign-borns aged between 20 and 60 with positive net income. Furthermore,
it includes only immigrants that immigrated after 1975 at age 20 or older.
Overall, immigrants in the PASS-ADIAB have similar educational qualiﬁcations and
a roughly similar earnings distribution compared to immigrants in the representative
Microcensus. While we have a below-average share of high-earnings immigrants in our
sample, most of the public debate and concerns about immigration and the perceived
lack of labor market progress centers around low-skilled and low-wage immigrants.
Therefore, the PASS-ADIAB seems a valuable data source to study the labor market
assimilation of immigrants in Germany. Our data has a number of advantages over the
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which has for many years been the only large survey
with reliable information to identify and track immigrants in Germany. First, the
administrative data start in 1975 and hence, almost a decade earlier than the SOEP
survey, which started in 1984. Second, the wage and job spell information is likely to
be more accurate as it is based on employer notiﬁcations to the social security system
instead of self-reported wages and employment status by the individual. Third, the
number of ﬁrst-generation immigrants in the SOEP is limited and does not trace the
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composition of the immigrant population in Germany.13
4.2.3 Empirical Strategy
To investigate assimilation patterns of immigrants in Germany, we estimate variants
of the following model:
Yiabt = β1Y SMat + β2Y SM
2
at +
7∑
a=1
µaπa + δ1Expibt + δ2Exp
2
ibt + θt + κi + εiabt (4.1)
where Yiabt is a labor market outcome like employment or wages of individual i belong-
ing to arrival cohort a (where natives form the reference category) and birth cohort b
observed in year t. The key independent variables are the linear and squared term of
years since migration (Y SMat and Y SM2at), which are set to zero for natives. We use
two alternative deﬁnitions of years since migration. The ﬁrst deﬁnition uses informa-
tion on year of arrival from the survey data (YSM: PASS). The second deﬁnition uses
the information on entry into the social security records if the year of entry is earlier
than the year of arrival reported in the survey (YSM: Both). The latter deﬁnition is
our preferred measure, as it utilizes all available information on the migration history.
We also control in equation (4.1) for potential experience (Expibt and Exp2ibt) to
capture any learning and accumulation of skills in the labor market that is common
for immigrants and natives. To control for observable and unobservable diﬀerences
between immigrants, we further include cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects (πa) as 5-year
groups (1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, etc). We further add ﬁxed eﬀects for nine
broad regions of origin (κi) to account for shifts in the immigration ﬂows over time.14
Finally, year ﬁxed eﬀects (θt) are included to account for aggregate economic shocks.
In the baseline model, we assume that aggregate shocks aﬀect the labor market per-
formance of immigrants and natives in the same way; in speciﬁcation checks, we relax
this assumption by allowing local economic conditions to aﬀect immigrants and na-
tives diﬀerentially (see Bratsberg et al., 2006; Dustmann et al., 2010)). All models are
estimated separately for men and women.
To illustrate the assimilation patterns graphically, we also estimate a variant of the
model in equation (4.1) where we replace the linear and quadratic term in years since
migration with separate 5-year dummies (5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29 years
13The sampling of immigrants in 1984 focused on the largest groups of guest workers (e.g., from
Turkey, Italy or Greece), which have then been followed over time. It took until 1994 to draw a new
immigrant sample, which contained immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe that began to arrive
in Germany since the late 1980s.
14The regions of origins are traditional EU countries (EU-15); EU accession countries, mostly from
Central and Eastern Europe (EU-12); ex-Yugoslavia; Turkey; Asia; Africa; North and South America;
Russia and other former Soviet Union republics; the last group are immigrants with other or no
information on country of origin.
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since migration). The reference group in this speciﬁcation are recent arrivals (0-4 years
since migration). As the speciﬁcation further includes separate dummy variables for
arrival cohorts with natives as the reference group, we allow for diﬀerent employment or
wage levels between immigrants and natives as well as between immigrants belonging
to diﬀerent arrival cohorts. The coeﬃcients on the 5-year dummies for years since
migration then represent the extent to which employment or wages of immigrants have
caught up relative to recent arrivals (0-4 years since arrival).
4.3 Labor Market Assimilation in Germany
4.3.1 Baseline Results
4.3.1.1 Employment Assimilation
Table 4.3 reports assimilation patterns in employment and unemployment relative to
natives based on equation (4.1). Employment assimilation is shown on the left-hand
side (columns (1)-(4)), while assimilation in unemployment is shown on the right-hand
side of the table (columns (5)-(8)).
As a point of reference, we report the initial gap in employment between immigrants
and natives in the last row. The initial gap is obtained by estimating equation (4.1)
with a quadratic in years since migration but replacing country of origin and cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects with a simple immigrant dummy. The number reported is the coeﬃcient
on the immigrant dummy, which reﬂects the diﬀerence in the outcome variable by an
immigrant with zero years since migration relative to a native. The last row of column
(2) shows that the initial immigrant-native gap in employment rates among men is
10.67 percentage points suggesting that immigrants have diﬃculties to ﬁnd their ﬁrst
job in Germany.
Starting from this initial disadvantage, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive, but concave
eﬀect of years since migration on the probability of being employed for both male and
female immigrants. Using our preferred speciﬁcation in even columns, assimilation
in employment rates occurs quite fast in Germany: after 10 years in the country,
immigrant men have closed 7.3 (0.0103∗10−0.0003∗100) percentage points or almost
70% (0.073/0.1067) of the initial immigrant-native gap in employment.
Immigrant women, in turn, start out with a much higher immigrant-native gap
in employment rates of 23.4 percentage points. As for men, the assimilation proﬁle
suggests a substantial catch-up in employment rates with time spent in Germany.
After 10 years in the labor market, women have closed the employment gap by 17.7
(0.0247 ∗ 10− 0.0007 ∗ 100) percentage points  or by 76% (0.176/0.2376) of the initial
employment gap.
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Table 4.3: Assimilation in Employment and Unemployment
Employed Unemployed
Men Women Men Women
YSM: PASS YSM: Both YSM: PASS YSM: Both YSM: PASS YSM: Both YSM: PASS YSM: Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years in Germany 0.0126*** 0.0103*** 0.0256*** 0.0247*** -0.0224*** -0.0209*** -0.0389*** -0.0377***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Years in Germany Squared -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0011*** 0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 158850 159043 144409 144554 158850 159043 144409 144554
R-Squared 0.1331 0.1328 0.0892 0.0890 0.1139 0.1138 0.1578 0.1576
Immigrant-Native Gap -0.1147 -0.1067 -0.2376 -0.2340 0.2152 0.2123 0.3781 0.3748
Notes: The table reports estimates of the eﬀect of immigrants' years since migration on the immigrant-native gap in employment and unemployment, separately for men (columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6)) and women
(columns (3)-(4), (7)-(8)). The dependent variables are indicator variables for being employed (columns (1)-(4)) and unemployed (columns (5)-(8)). The employment variable is equal to one if a respondent is
employed within the social security system or not; the variable is zero if a person is unemployed, non-employed or working outside the social security system. The unemployment variable is equal to one if a
person collects unemployment beneﬁts; the variable is zero if the person is employed or not covered by social security records. In odd columns, information from the PASS survey on immigrants' year of migration
and origin country is used, in order to construct the main explanatory variable years since migration, as well as to deﬁne immigrants and their origin countries. In even columns, survey information is replaced
by information from the IEB, if the ﬁrst social security records entry is found to be earlier than the reported year of immigration. All regressions control for a quadratic of potential labor market experience,
year ﬁxed eﬀects, cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects (1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009), as well as region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants
(EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, and other or no citizenship). The sample includes native and foreign-born respondents
aged 20 to 60, who are unemployed, non-employed, or full-time employed (not in part-time employment, non-regular employment, or in vocational training). Furthermore, foreign-borns in the sample immigrated
after 1975 at age 20 or older. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. The initial immigrant-native gaps are computed in identical regressions that include an immigrant dummy instead of origin and cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A comparison of odd and even columns reveals that assimilation patterns are very
similar independently of whether we use the year of immigration reported in the house-
hold survey (YSM: PASS) or the minimum year of immigration and the year of entry
into a social security job (YSM: Both). These results highlight that the problem of
back-and-forth migration is not only quantitatively small, but also does not aﬀect our
estimates of assimilation.
To relax the functional form assumption on years since migration, we next use a
variant of equation (4.1) where we replace the quadratic speciﬁcation with separate
dummies for 5-year periods. Figure 4.2a, which plots the coeﬃcients on the 5-year
dummies, illustrates the sizable catch-up in employment of immigrant men and women
relative to natives. Like the estimates in Table 4.3, the assimilation proﬁles are in-
creasing and concave for both men and women. Furthermore, the proﬁle of female
immigrants is steeper than that of male immigrants suggesting that women converge
faster: Women who have stayed in the country by more than two decades have closed
most (85% = 20/23.5) of the initial employment gap.
4.3.1.2 Assimilation in Unemployment
We next turn to the question whether we observe a similar assimilation in unemploy-
ment rates. An important concern in many European countries is that immigrants,
because they often have much lower education than natives, enter the country only to
collect government transfers. One indication of such behavior would be if immigrants
received unemployment beneﬁts at much higher rates than natives. We would expect
higher unemployment rates initially as immigrants often lack language skills, the social
network or other valuable information channels for job ﬁnding, compared to natives.
Over time, this initial disadvantage should diminish after immigrants have spent some
time in Germany.
The results for estimating equation (4.1) with unemployment as the dependent
variable, are shown in columns (5)-(8) of Table 4.3. Immigrant men face an initial
immigrant-native gap in unemployment of about 21 percentage points (see the last
row in column (6)). With time in the country, however, immigrant men are able to
reduce their unemployment rates relative to natives, but again at a decreasing rate.
The estimates in column (8) suggest that after 10 years in Germany, immigrant men
have closed 14.9 percentage points or about two-thirds of the average unemployment
gap with natives. Like for employment rates, immigrant women exhibit a much larger
initial gap to natives: on average, they are 37.5 percentage points more likely to be
unemployed than native women. Yet, mirroring the rising share of women employed in
a social security job, we ﬁnd a convex assimilation proﬁle: unemployment rates decline
even more sharply for women than for men, closing about 74% (0.277/0.375) of the
average immigrant-native unemployment gap after ten years.
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Figure 4.2: Assimilation Proﬁles in Employment and Unemployment
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of immigrants' time in Germany on the male and female immigrant-native gap in
employment and unemployment using the PASS-ADIAB (1975-2010). The coeﬃcients for years since migration (in
ﬁve-year groups) are estimated in OLS regressions. The dependent variable in the upper graph is an indicator for being
employed within the social security system; the variable is zero if a person is unemployed, non-employed or working
outside the social security system. In the bottom graph, the dependent variable is indicating whether if a respondent
collects unemployment beneﬁts; the variable is zero if the person is employed or not covered by social security records.
Sample restrictions and other control variables are the same as in the main speciﬁcation in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.2b illustrates the assimilation proﬁles based on estimating equation (4.1)
with separate dummies for 5-year groups in Y SMat. Three patterns are noteworthy:
ﬁrst, we see sizable progress for both immigrant men and women over time relative to
natives. Hence, both men and women are able to overcome their initial disadvantages
and ﬁnd jobs. Second, women reduce their unemployment rates at a faster rate than
men compared to natives. This result is to be expected, given that women also are on
average much more likely to be unemployed than native women. Finally, Figure 4.2b
also shows that most of the convergence happens within the ﬁrst decade of arrival;
after that, there seems to be little further progress. Note that these results cannot be
explained by changes in the quality of cohorts arriving in Germany as we control in all
speciﬁcations for arrival cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. They can also not be easily explained by
changes in the composition of immigrants with respect to their countries of origin as
we control for region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects.
Overall then, we document sizable assimilation in employment and unemployment
rates relative to natives, especially in the ﬁrst decade after arrival. Immigrant women,
while facing much larger gaps initially, also assimilate at a faster pace along both
dimensions; as a result, women are able to close an even larger share of the immigrant-
native gap in employment and unemployment rates than men.
4.3.1.3 Wage Assimilation
We next turn to the question whether we observe similar progress in terms of wages.
Table 4.4 reports estimates of equation (4.1) where the outcome is now log daily wages.
Following the literature, we estimate wage assimilation on the sample of full-time work-
ers in a given year. On average, immigrant men and women earn about 29% lower wages
compared to natives. For male immigrants, we do not see any evidence for assimilation
in wages as the coeﬃcients in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.4 are not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero. These results are similar to those of earlier studies on assimilation in
Germany using the Socio-Economic Panel, which also ﬁnd no wage assimilation among
male guest workers (e.g., Pischke, 1992; Schmidt, 1997).
For women, in contrast, we ﬁnd evidence of positive and sizable wage assimilation
as their wages converge to natives with time spent in Germany. Given that both the
linear and squared coeﬃcient on years since migration are positive, wage assimilation
has a convex shape for women. After ten years in Germany, women have closed between
4 and 7.8 percentage points of the gap depending on whether one includes the linear
coeﬃcient, which is not statistically signiﬁcant, in the calculation.15
15Ignoring the linear coeﬃcient, a woman who has lived in Germany for ten years has closed 0.004∗
100 = 0.04 or 4 percentage points of the immigrant-native gap. Taking the linear coeﬃcient into
account, an immigrant woman has closed 0.0038 ∗ 10 + 0.0004 ∗ 100 = 0.078 or 7.8 percentage points
of the gap  corresponding to 11.5% and 27% of the average gap of 28.8 percentage points (see last
row of Table 4.4 respectively).
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Table 4.4: Assimilation in Wages
Log Wage
Men Women
YSM: PASS YSM: Both YSM: PASS YSM: Both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years in Germany -0.0022 -0.0009 0.0037 0.0038
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0057) (0.0054)
Years in Germany Squared 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004** 0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82153 82258 49746 49789
R-Squared 0.0669 0.0670 0.0234 0.0233
Immigrant-Native Gap -0.2949 -0.2955 -0.2826 -0.2883
Notes: The table reports estimates of the eﬀect of immigrants' years since migration on the immigrant-native earnings
gap, separately for men (columns (1)-(2)) and women (columns (3)-(4)). The dependent variable is the log of daily wages
(adjusted to 1995 prices). In odd columns, information from the PASS survey on immigrants' year of migration and origin
country is used, in order to construct the main explanatory variable years since migration, as well as to deﬁne immigrants
and their origin countries. In even columns, survey information is replaced by information from the IEB, if the ﬁrst social
security records entry is found to be earlier than the reported year of immigration. All regressions control for a quadratic
of potential labor market experience, year ﬁxed eﬀects, cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects (1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989,
1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009), as well as region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU
entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union
republics, and other or no citizenship). The sample includes native and foreign-born respondents aged 20 to 60, who
are full-time employed (not in part-time employment, non-regular employment, or in vocational training). Furthermore,
foreign-borns in the sample immigrated after 1975 at age 20 or older. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. The
initial immigrant-native gaps are computed in identical regressions that include an immigrant dummy instead of origin
and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 4.3 conﬁrms the absence of wage assimilation among working men as the
proﬁle is essentially ﬂat with years since migration. The assimilation for women in
turn is positive and steep, suggesting sizable catch-up of working women relative to
their native counterparts. Over the ﬁrst 25 years, immigrant women are able to close
almost the entire initial immigrant-native wage gap, as immigrant wages increase by
about 25 percentage points more than wages of native women.
One potential concern of our estimation strategy is that immigrants who have ar-
rived earlier in the country might diﬀer systematically from later arrivals. The model
we estimate in equation (4.1) controls for arrival cohort ﬁxed eﬀects, which accounts for
any observable or unobservable diﬀerence in employment or wage levels across the ar-
rival groups. Yet, immigrants might still diﬀer along some dimensions within the 5-year
arrival cohorts, which would bias our estimates if those characteristics were correlated
with their labor market performance. In addition, immigrants from earlier cohorts
might not only diﬀer in employment or wage levels, which are picked up by the ﬁxed
eﬀects; but they may possibly diﬀer from later arrivals in their speed of convergence
to natives over time. If earlier arriving cohorts have worse unobservable characteristics
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Figure 4.3: Assimilation Proﬁles in Log Wages
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of immigrants' time in Germany on the male and female immigrant-native earnings
gap using the PASS-ADIAB (1975-2010). The coeﬃcients for years since migration (in ﬁve-year groups) are estimated
in OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the log of daily wages (adjusted to 1995 prices). Sample restrictions and
other control variables are the same as in the main speciﬁcation in Table 4.4.
than later arrivals and these unobservables reduce the speed of convergence in terms of
employment and wages, we would underestimate the true proﬁle of wage assimilation,
for instance.
To rule out this concern, we estimate a variant of the model in equation (4.1)
where we include individual ﬁxed eﬀects (γi). The coeﬃcients on years since migra-
tion, Y SMat and Y SM2at, are then identiﬁed from the within-individual changes in the
employment probability or wages among the group of immigrants. Interestingly, re-
sults for the ﬁxed eﬀects models in Table 4.B.4 are very similar to the baseline results,
which use variation both within and across immigrants. The estimates of assimilation
in employment in columns (1) and (2) are very similar to the main results in terms
of both signiﬁcance and magnitude. Including ﬁxed eﬀects into the wage regressions
yields non-signiﬁcant eﬀects of Y SMat and Y SM2at for men in column (3). Among
women, the linear term of years in Germany is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that
an additional year in Germany increases female immigrants' wages by 1.3 percent. This
magnitude is slightly larger than in the main speciﬁcation. Overall, the employment
probability and the wage gains of immigrants within the individual are similar to their
gains relative to comparable natives.
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4.3.2 Accounting for Selection along the Employment Margin
As we document sizable increases in employment rates for immigrant men and women
in the last section, our estimates of wage assimilation could be biased. When im-
migrants enter the labor market after they have spent some time in Germany, the
composition of the immigrant population in the workforce changes  overall and rela-
tive to native workers. If there is positive selection into the workforce along observable
and unobservable skills, for instance, immigrants who (re-)enter the labor market have
lower earnings capacity than the average immigrant worker. And given that changes
in employment are much more pronounced among immigrants than natives, positive
selection into work will systematically underestimate the assimilation of immigrant
wages in equation (4.1).
Table 4.5: Lee Bounds on Average Eﬀect of YSM
Baseline Lower Bound Upper Bound
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Men (7%)
D[Y SM ≥ 5] 0.0106 -0.0366*** 0.0925***
(0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0120)
Observations 82258 81974 81974
R-Squared 0.0670 0.0692 0.0607
Panel B: Women (12%)
D[Y SM ≥ 5] 0.0950*** 0.0035 0.2418***
(0.0254) (0.0243) (0.0233)
Observations 49789 49563 49563
R-Squared 0.0223 0.0239 0.0193
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports upper and lower bounds of estimates of the eﬀect of immigrants' years since migration
on the immigrant-native gap in log daily wages. The dependent variable is the log of daily wages (adjusted to
1995 prices). Following Lee (2009), we estimate upper and lower bounds for the eﬀect of the binary treatment
variable D[Y SM ≥ 5], taking the value 1 if an immigrant is 5 or more years in Germany. The trimming margin
refers to the eﬀect of D[Y SM ≥ 5] on the employment probability of treated respondents. In columns (2) and
(3), the lower (upper) bound is calculated by trimming the upper (lower) 7% and 12% of the wage distribution
of the treated individuals for men and women, respectively. Sample restrictions and other control variables are
the same than in the main speciﬁcation. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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To assess the potential importance of selection into employment, we ﬁrst employ
a bounding approach, which makes no assumptions on the type of selection (following
Lee, 2009). As the bounds approach was developed for the binary case, we split our
sample into a treatment and a control group: the new treatment variable is equal to
one if an immigrant has spent 5 or more years in Germany; the variable is equal to zero
if an immigrant has been in Germany less than 5 years (and for natives).16 To assess
the impact of selection into employment, we estimate in a ﬁrst step the diﬀerence in
employment for the treatment (5 or more years since migration) and control group (less
than 5 years since migration). Estimates indicate a signiﬁcant employment diﬀerence
of 7 percentage points for men, and 12 percentage points for women, mirroring the
results in Section 4.3.1.1. The basic idea of the Lee bounds is to trim the outcome
(log personal income) of the treated group assuming that the `excess' employment all
occurs either at the top or at the bottom of the earnings distribution. After trimming,
we re-estimate the model to obtain a lower and upper bound on the eﬀect of years since
migration in the binary setting. The results for men and women are shown in Table
4.5. We ﬁrst rerun the baseline model for the binary variable for Y SM , which again
shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect for men, but positive earnings eﬀects for women (column
(1)). We then report the lower and upper bounds for men and women in columns (2)
and (3) of Table 4.5. The bounds indicate that selection can change the estimates of
wage assimilation dramatically in both directions. For men, the eﬀect of being 5 or
more years in Germany lies between −3.66% and +9.25%, if those entering the labor
force through employment assimilation are selected from the top or the bottom of the
earnings distribution, respectively. The lower bound for women is zero, while the upper
bound shows a very large eﬀect of +24.18%.
Given the importance of the type of selection into employment, we compare in a next
step observable and unobservable labor market skills of the average immigrant worker
to those of immigrants entering the labor market. Entrants comprise all individuals
who have experienced an un- or non-employment spell, a job outside the social security
system or start their labor market career. We use two deﬁnitions of entry into the labor
market: the ﬁrst deﬁnition contains all individuals who are employed in period t but
were not employed in t − 1. The second deﬁnition includes those employed in t but
not employed in both t − 1 and t − 2, which focuses on individuals who have been
unemployed or out of the labor force for at least two years in a row.
Table 4.6 shows means (odd columns) and standard deviations (even columns) for
male immigrants in the top panel and for female immigrants in the bottom panel. While
16Given the result that the largest relative growth in employment among immigrants occurs during
the ﬁrst ten years in Germany (see Figure 4.2a), we split the sample at 5 years in Germany into
treatment and control group, and not at the mean of years since migration (around 10 years). Note
that this dummy formulation is similar to the the more ﬂexible model estimated above with 5-year
intervals in years since migration.
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labor market immigrants entering the labor market are not less educated, the results
conﬁrm that they are negatively selected in terms of earnings potential. Those (re-
)entering the labor market after at least one or two years without a social security job
(see columns (3) and (5)) earn signiﬁcantly lower wages than the average worker (shown
in column (1)). Furthermore, their unobservable worker productivity as measured by
worker ﬁxed eﬀects is lower than for the average worker.17 Table 4.6 further suggests
that the lower wages are largely because of individuals who re-enter the labor market
have lost their good ﬁrm matches. Entering individuals work in smaller ﬁrms that pay
lower wages and have lower ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Comparing the results for men (in Panel A) and women (in Panel B), we ﬁnd that
the negative selection is much more severe for immigrant men than for women. Hence,
entering women are more similar to the average female worker, while entering men
are much worse oﬀ than the average male worker. Furthermore, a comparison of the
results in Table 4.6 for immigrants with those of Table 4.B.5 for natives shows that the
negative selection along the employment margin is similar for immigrants and native
workers. Therefore, the fact that proportionally more negatively selected immigrants
than natives enter the labor market suggests that estimates of wage assimilation are
likely to be downward biased, especially among men.
One approach to correct for selection along the employment margin would be to
use a control function. Unfortunately, a quasi-experimental setting being absent, it is
diﬃcult to identify an exclusion restriction that would aﬀect job ﬁnding or employ-
ment but have no eﬀect on a person's earnings. An alternative strategy is to impute
the missing wages of individuals outside the social security system using alternative
assumptions (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2000, Chandra, 2003, and Neal, 2004, who study
the Black-White wage gap; or Hunt, 2001, and Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008, who
analyze gender wage gaps). We thus deﬁne a new wage variable, which is equal to the
observed wage wit for employed workers and equal to an imputed wage w˜it for obser-
vations with missing wages. We then estimate equation (4.1) with an Least Absolute
Deviations (LAD) estimator to analyze wage assimilation after accounting for selection
along the employment margin. Median regressions like LAD have the advantage that
they only require an assumption whether the missing wage is above or below the me-
dian wage among workers; we do not require any assumption where exactly a person
with missing wage is located in the wage distribution (Johnson et al., 2000; Neal, 2004;
Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008).
17Card et al. (2013) study the role of establishment-speciﬁc wage premiums in generating increases
in West German wage inequality. For four subintervals covering the period from 1985 to 2009, they
estimate models with additive ﬁxed eﬀects for workers and establishments. The individual worker
ﬁxed eﬀect represents a combination of individual skills and other unobservables that are rewarded
equally across employers. The establishment ﬁxed-eﬀect represents the proportional pay premium
that a speciﬁc establishment pays to employees. The worker ﬁxed eﬀects range between values of
about 1 and 5.5 in our sample (s.d. 0.4), and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects range from −1.6 to 3.5 (s.d. 0.7).
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Table 4.6: Characteristics of Labor Market Entrants
Employed in Previous Year
Not Working in Previous
Year
Not Working in two
Previous Years
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Male Immigrants
High Education 0.1824 0.3862 0.1689 0.3748 0.1891 0.3918
Medium Education 0.5275 0.4993 0.5450 0.4982 0.5266 0.4996
Low Education 0.3025 0.4594 0.2940 0.4558 0.2919 0.4549
Real Wage 56.1407 35.0520 38.0085 24.5583 36.6352 24.8192
Worker FE 3.6738 0.4360 3.4429 0.4272 3.4107 0.4373
Firm FE 0.6845 0.4286 0.5332 0.4301 0.5278 0.4238
Firm Size 943.88 4155.59 240.06 1049.01 201.39 528.42
Firm: Median Wage 67.2584 25.9815 55.9575 23.2393 55.1391 23.1685
Observations 4,970 1,175 737
Panel B: Female Immigrants
High Education 0.2251 0.4177 0.2249 0.4177 0.2254 0.4181
Medium Education 0.4795 0.4996 0.4996 0.5002 0.5141 0.5001
Low Education 0.3083 0.4618 0.2881 0.4531 0.2770 0.4478
Real Wage 33.3402 32.1357 25.3201 59.2597 25.4000 68.9494
Worker FE 3.9221 0.3962 3.8140 0.3741 3.7949 0.3842
Firm FE 0.6253 0.3797 0.6066 0.4147 0.6266 0.4052
Firm Size 351.78 847.46 271.70 735.19 263.46 649.24
Firm: Median Wage 64.9487 26.0550 59.6711 25.2776 60.1502 25.2253
Observations 4,272 1,092 777
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for diﬀerent subsamples of male and female immigrants the PASS-ADIAB between 1975 and 2010. In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes only those
individuals that were employed in the previous year. Columns (3) and (4) is restricted to individuals that are employed in a given year, and were non-employed in the previous year. Columns (5) and (6)
include employed individuals that were non-employed in the two previous years. The sample is further restricted to foreign-borns who immigrated to Germany after 1975 at age 20 or older, and who are
between 20 and 60 years-old. Summary statistics are reported for the following variables: indicators for high, medium, and low skilled; daily wage (adjusted to 1995 prices); worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects,
which have been estimated based on the universe of social security records (Card et al., 2013); the size of the ﬁrm (in employees); and the median wage of a ﬁrm.
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The ﬁrst imputation method uses the earnings history of each individual in our
panel data. Speciﬁcally, we impute the missing wage with the non-missing wage of
that same individual in the closest available year (either before or after the year with
missing information). Using the LAD estimator, this approach is valid as long as an
individual's wage relative to the median in a given year is correctly identiﬁed by the
closest available wage of that same individual.18 Note that we can only impute a
missing observation if the person has some earnings history; we will not be able to
impute wages for individuals who have never worked in a social security job over our
sample period.
A second imputation method uses information on an individual's observable char-
acteristics to infer their wage relative to the median. Speciﬁcally, we run a regression
of the log daily wages on an individual's education, age, age squared, an indicator for
being an immigrant, and year ﬁxed eﬀects for those employed. Based on the coeﬃcients
from this regression, we then impute wages for individuals with missing wages. The
underlying assumption is that the returns to observable characteristics estimated from
a sample of employed workers is a good proxy for the returns to those characteristics
for non-employed individuals in a given year. A potential advantage of this approach
is that we can impute wages for more individuals, even for those who have no valid
wage recorded in the social security records. As a result, the imputed sample is much
larger than the sample from our ﬁrst imputation method.
Our ﬁnal imputation method assumes that all individuals with missing wages would
earn below the median wage of those employed. Hence, we impute a wage of zero to
all missing wage observations, which is in a median regression equivalent to assuming
that all individuals with missing wages would be positioned in the bottom half of the
wage distribution. Given the low employment rates of women (25 and 39 percent
among female immigrants and natives, respectively), we are not able to implement this
imputation method for women as the imputed median wage would be zero.
Note that all of the imputation methods discussed make non-trivial assumptions
on the relative position of those with missing wages. Each of these identifying assump-
tions and approaches, which allow for observable as well as unobservable heterogeneity
between workers and non-workers, might be questioned individually. Yet, if all impu-
tation approaches yield similar results on wage assimilation, this collage of evidence
would suggest that the results are robust to the particular imputation method (and
hence, identifying assumption) used.
Table 4.7 reports assimilation patterns in wages using LAD regressions and the
imputed wages as dependent variables. As a point of reference, columns (1) and (5)
report the baseline results without imputation for men and women. The baseline
18For comparison, if we used OLS instead, we would require the stronger assumption that an
individual's wage level in the nearest available year is a valid proxy for the missing wage.
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Table 4.7: Wage Assimilation with Adjustments for Selection along Employment Margin
Men Women
Baseline Closest Wage Observables Zero Baseline Closest Wage Observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years in Germany 0.0032 0.0150*** 0.0024*** 0.0186*** 0.0075 0.0121*** 0.0005***
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0000)
Years in Germany Squared 0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003 -0.0002* -0.0000***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82258 145932 155827 155827 49789 116781 141355
Notes: The table reports LAD-estimates of immigrants' earnings growth with diﬀerent adjustments for selection along the employment margin. The dependent variable is the log of real daily
wages. The main independent variable is the preferred version of years since migration (combined from PASS and IEB data). In columns (1) and (5), results from the main speciﬁcation are
presented. In columns (2) and (6), wages of non-employed individuals are approximated with the closest available wage (before or after). In columns (3) and (7), wages of non-employed individuals
are imputed with a regression using education, age, age squared, an immigrant dummy, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In column (4), non-employed individuals are assigned a wage of zero. Due to the
high share of non-employed women, the Median Regression for this latter imputation method is only feasible in the male sample. Sample restrictions and other control variables are the same than
in the main speciﬁcation. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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estimates for LAD regressions are quite similar to the OLS regressions in Table 4.4:
there is no wage assimilation for men and positive assimilation for women, though the
LAD estimates of assimilation for women are statistically signiﬁcant just below the
10% level.
Across all three imputation methods, we see positive wage assimilation for both men
and women relative to their native counterparts. We observe a concave assimilation
proﬁle as wages increase with each year in Germany, but at a decreasing rate. Taking
the estimates in column (2), wages of immigrant men increase by 11% after 10 years
in the country relative to natives. For immigrant women, column (6) suggests wage
increases of 10% relative to native women over the ﬁrst decade in Germany. These
assimilation eﬀects are sizable. To put them into perspective, note that the return to
an additional year in Germany is about half the return of a year of experience (e.g., for
men the coeﬃcient of the linear term of experience is 2.16%, and the quadratic term is
-0.03%). Also note that the estimates using the ﬁrst and third imputation method, i.e.,
using nearby wages and assuming wages below the median, are very similar for men
indicating that most of the imputed wages of non-employed men based on previous or
following wages (column (2)) indeed lie below the median.
Figure 4.4: Assimilation Proﬁles in Imputed Wages
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of immigrants' time in Germany on the male and female immigrant-native earnings
gap using the PASS-ADIAB (1975-2010). The coeﬃcients for years since migration (in ﬁve-year groups) are estimated
in median regressions. The dependent variable is the log of imputed daily wages. Wages of non-employed individuals
are approximated with the closest available wage (before or after). Sample restrictions and other control variables are
the same as in the main speciﬁcation in Table 4.7.
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Figure 4.4 illustrates these assimilation proﬁles. The ﬁgure plots LAD-estimates
of equation (4.1) with separate dummies for 5-year groups of years since migration.
Similar to the estimates in Table 4.7, one can see that the wages of both male and
female immigrants increase relative to natives over time. Given that female (male)
immigrants in these speciﬁcations are estimated to earn initially about 22 (23) percent
less than comparable native-born individuals, the ﬁgure illustrates that men and women
are able to close a considerable share of their initial immigrant-native wage gaps over
the ﬁrst decades in Germany. Comparing these assimilation patterns with the previous
results in Figure 4.3 illustrates that the wage assimilation for men is underestimated
due to selection along the employment margin.
Overall, the diﬀerent imputation methods used in this section indicate that selection
along the employment margin biases our estimates of wage assimilation downward.
This eﬀect is much more pronounced for men as the earnings potential of those entering
social security jobs is worse than the earnings of the average worker (see Table 4.6).
In contrast, working and non-working women are quite similar in terms of observable
and unobservable determinants of earnings potential. Hence, imputed wages for non-
employed women are distributed more equally across the earnings distribution.
4.3.3 Speciﬁcation Checks
Our main results indicate that immigrants in Germany assimilate with respect to their
employment and unemployment probabilities. Furthermore, they exhibit positive wage
growth relative to natives, especially after accounting for selection along the employ-
ment margin. In Table 4.8, we investigate the robustness of these results to alternative
speciﬁcations by estimating variants of equation (4.1). Panel A displays the OLS-
estimates for the outcome of being employed, and Panel B refers to LAD-estimates
on the log of imputed daily wages. All speciﬁcations use the years since migration
measure that combines information from the administrative and survey data. Imputed
wages are based on earnings history of each individual, our ﬁrst imputation method
used to account for selection into employment. The corresponding baseline estimates
are columns (2) and (4) in Table 4.3, and columns (2) and (6) in Table 4.7.
First, our main speciﬁcation does not control for education, as investments in human
capital are a potential channel of assimilation, which we wanted to capture in our years
since migration measure. We add indicators for being medium-skilled (high school or
vocational degree) and high-skilled (university or college degree) to the regressions
where being low-skilled is the reference category in columns (1) and (5) of Table 4.8.
The coeﬃcients of the education controls have the expected positive eﬀect on both
the probability of being employed and wages (not reported). More importantly, the
inclusion of education controls does neither change the magnitude nor the signiﬁcance
145
Table 4.8: Assimilation Results with diﬀerent Speciﬁcations
Men Women
Education
Controls
Diﬀerent
Experience
Proﬁles
State Unemp.
∗ Immigrant
District
Unemp. ∗
Immigrant
Education
Controls
Diﬀerent
Experience
Proﬁles
State Unemp.
∗ Immigrant
District
Unemp. ∗
Immigrant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Employed
Years in Germany 0.0101*** 0.0174*** 0.0141*** 0.0138*** 0.0232*** 0.0224*** 0.0342*** 0.0411***
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0051)
Years in Germany Squared -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0010*** -0.0015***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Observations 159043 159043 115254 57272 144554 144554 83951 36484
R-Squared 0.1414 0.1334 0.2506 0.2162 0.1060 0.0892 0.3126 0.2596
Panel B: Log Wage (Imputed with closest available Wage)
Years in Germany 0.0093*** 0.0331*** 0.0114*** 0.0130*** 0.0107*** 0.0149*** 0.0212*** 0.0303***
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0049)
Years in Germany Squared -0.0002*** -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Observations 145932 145932 106613 56357 116781 116781 68728 34235
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates of the eﬀect of immigrants' years since migration on the immigrant-native gap in employment and log daily wages for diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The dependent variable in Panel A is an
indicator for being employed within the social security system; the variable is zero if a person is unemployed, non-employed or working outside the social security system. The coeﬃcients in Panel A refer to OLS-estimates.
In Panel B, the log of imputed daily wages (adjusted to 1995 prices) is the dependent variable; wages of non-employed individuals are imputed with the closest available wage (before or after). Estimates in Panel B refer
to LAD-regressions. The main independent variable is the preferred version of years since migration (combined from PASS and IEB data). In columns (1) and (5), indicators for medium-skilled (has a high school degree
or vocational degree) and high-skilled (has a university or college degree) are added to the main speciﬁcation. In columns (2) and (6), regressions allow for immigrant-speciﬁc experience proﬁles. Columns (3), (4), (7),
and (8) include the local unemployment rates as well as an interaction term of the local unemployment rate with an immigrant dummy (on the state and district level, respectively). Sample restrictions and other control
variables are the same as in the main speciﬁcation. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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of the estimated coeﬃcients of Y SMat and Y SM2at on the employment probability.
When including them in the wage regressions, coeﬃcients point in the same direction
and are still highly signiﬁcant. However, their size becomes smaller for both men and
women relative to the baseline.
Our model further imposes a common experience proﬁle for natives and immigrants
(Expibt and Exp2ibt). To allow for separate experience proﬁles, we add interaction eﬀects
of experience and experience squared with an indicator for being an immigrant. The
assimilation proﬁle for the probability to be employed does not change much as shown in
columns (2) and (6) of Table 4.8. Estimates of the eﬀects of time spent in Germany on
wages, however, are considerably larger when including immigrant-speciﬁc experience
proﬁles. Accordingly, the estimated experience proﬁle of immigrants is substantially
ﬂatter than that of natives (not reported). This pattern suggests that immigrants have
few returns to labor market experience per se (including years worked in the country
of origin); instead, immigrants experience large wage gains from working in Germany
after arrival.
A third simplifying assumption of our baseline speciﬁcation in equation (4.1) is that
we impose common time eﬀects for immigrants and natives. Yet, previous evidence sug-
gests that the employment opportunities and wages of immigrants are more negatively
aﬀected by economic downturns than those of natives. As a result, the immigrant-
native wage gap contracts during booms and widens during recessions. To relax the
assumption on common time eﬀects, we add measures of local unemployment rates and
their interaction terms with an indicator for immigrants to equation (4.1). Columns
(3) and (7) of Table 4.8 report estimates using state-level unemployment rates, while
columns (4) and (8) use district-level unemployment rates.
As expected, the local unemployment rates are negatively associated with both the
probability of being employed and wages. More interestingly, employment prospects
are indeed worse for immigrants when local unemployment is high, as the interaction
term between local unemployment and being an immigrant is also negative (both not
reported). However, the estimates of assimilation remain unchanged when allowing
diﬀerential time eﬀects for immigrants and natives. There is still a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on employment and wages for both immigrant men and women. The only notable
diﬀerence between the estimates reported in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), and the
baseline results is that the magnitude of the eﬀects for women is larger. The diﬀerent
magnitude could indicate that local economic shocks lead to an underestimation of
female immigrants' employment assimilation. However, the magnitude of the wage
assimilation proﬁles in Panel B is not aﬀected by allowing for diﬀerential time eﬀects
for immigrants and natives.
The results in this subsection indicate that our main results are robust to diﬀer-
ent speciﬁcations and extensions of equation (4.1). Both immigrant men and women
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assimilate in terms of employment and wages once we account for selection along the
employment margin. These results are good news for immigrants and the destination
alike: they suggest that the relative performance of immigrants, despite being less edu-
cated and lacking skills and networks initially, improves substantially with time in the
country.
4.3.4 Heterogeneity of Assimilation
The results of the previous subsections show that immigrant men and women assimilate
in terms of employment and wages once we account for selection along the employment
margin. In a next step, we investigate in Table 4.9 whether these assimilation proﬁles
diﬀer among immigrant groups. In order to asses heterogeneity, we include interaction
terms of our years in Germany variables with indicator variables for diﬀerent groups
of immigrants (Y SMat ∗D[Groupi] and Y SM2at ∗D[Groupi]) to our baseline model.
In columns (1) and (5), we investigate whether immigrants arriving after 1990
exhibit faster assimilation than immigrants who arrived in Germany prior to 1990. As
the composition of immigrants changed dramatically after the fall of the iron curtain in
1990, one might expect that cohorts arriving after 1990 assimilate at diﬀerent pace than
those before. Results in Panel A indicate that this group indeed assimilates much more
in employment than those immigrants who arrived before 1990. However, estimates of
the interaction terms in Panel B suggest that the speed of wage assimilation does not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between immigrants arriving in Germany before or after 1990.
Next, we test whether assimilation is faster for immigrants from the European Union
than for non-EU immigrants. Hence, we add interactions for a binary variable for being
an EU immigrant with our years since migration variables. The dummy variable `EU-
country' takes the value one if immigrants come from EU-15 countries, the new Eastern
European EU-member states, Norway or Switzerland. Given freedom of movement, EU
immigrants have the same access to the German labor market as natives in principle.19
The results in Panel A of Table 4.9 indicate that non-EU immigrants, both men and
women, start from a lower employment level initially, but also assimilate faster in
terms of employment relative to natives. However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the wage assimilation proﬁles of EU and non-EU immigrants (Panel B).
Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) investigate whether Turks and immigrants from
the Former Soviet Union, two of the most important immigrant groups in Germany,
assimilate faster or slower than the average immigrant. Many Turkish immigrants
arrived in Germany as guest workers and later under the family reuniﬁcation category.
Immigrants from the former Soviet republics, in turn, are often ethnic Germans who
19Some exceptions apply: in particular, immigrants from Eastern European countries that joined
the European Union in 2004 did not have full access to the German labor market during our sample
period.
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Table 4.9: Heterogeneity of Wage Assimilation
Men Women
Year of
Migration
≥ 1990
EU-Country Turkey
Former
Soviet Union
Year of
Migration
≥ 1990
EU-Country Turkey
Former
Soviet Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Employed
Years in Germany (Y SMat) -0.0050 0.0158*** 0.0146*** -0.0112*** 0.0154*** 0.0313*** 0.0252*** 0.0088***
(0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0028)
Years in Germany Squared (Y SM2at) 0.0002* -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 0.0004* -0.0004*** -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Y SMat ∗D[Groupi] 0.0432*** -0.0200*** -0.0354*** 0.0589*** 0.0223*** -0.0189*** -0.0230*** 0.0348***
(0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0040)
Y SM2at ∗D[Groupi] -0.0020*** 0.0008*** 0.0011*** -0.0020*** -0.0010*** 0.0008*** 0.0005*** -0.0012***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 159043 159043 159043 159043 144554 144554 144554 144554
R-Squared 0.1333 0.1330 0.1330 0.1339 0.0892 0.0891 0.0891 0.0894
Panel B: Log Wage (Imputed with closest available Wage)
Years in Germany (Y SMat) 0.0122*** 0.0151*** 0.0178*** 0.0078*** 0.0140*** 0.0110*** 0.0131*** 0.0110***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0024)
Years in Germany Squared (Y SM2at) -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Y SMat ∗D[Groupi] 0.0057 -0.0005 -0.0281*** 0.0159*** 0.0007 0.0023 -0.0079 0.0013
(0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0068) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0059) (0.0037)
Y SM2at ∗D[Groupi] -0.0002 0.0001 0.0010*** -0.0004* -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005*** -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 145932 145932 145932 145932 116781 116781 116781 116781
Notes: The table reports estimates of the eﬀect of immigrants' years since migration on the immigrant-native gap in employment and log daily wages for diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The dependent variable in Panel A is an indicator for being
employed within the social security system; the variable is zero if a person is unemployed, non-employed or working outside the social security system. The coeﬃcients in Panel A refer to OLS-estimates. In Panel B, the log of imputed daily
wages (adjusted to 1995 prices) is the dependent variable; wages of non-employed individuals are imputed with the closest available wage (before or after). Estimates in Panel B refer to LAD-regressions. The main independent variable is the
preferred version of years since migration (combined from PASS and IEB data). In columns (1) and (5), the linear and quadratic Y SM -variables are interacted with indicators for immigrants that came in 1990 or later. In columns (2)-(4)
and (6)-(8), the independent variables of interest are interacted with indicators for diﬀerent origin regions or countries: EU-countries (EU-15, East European EU, Norway, and Switzerland) in columns (2) and (6), Turkey in columns (3) and
(7), and Russia and other former Soviet Union republics in columns (4) and (8). Sample restrictions and other control variables are the same than in the main speciﬁcation. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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had fast access to German citizenship. The results indicate that Turkish men do not
experience any assimilation in neither employment nor wages with time in Germany.
For Turkish men, the interaction terms cancel out the positive main eﬀect of Y SMat.
We still see wage assimilation for Turkish women, however. We observe the opposite
pattern for immigrants from the former Soviet Union: they assimilate substantially
faster than the average immigrant both in terms of employment and wages.
4.4 Channels of Assimilation
Our results so far indicate that immigrants in Germany have initially much lower
employment rates and wages than natives. Sizable immigrant-native gaps are to be
expected if immigrants have less formal education or cannot transfer some of their
skills to the destination country. Further, they often lack certain skills (like command
of the language) as well as information or social networks to ﬁnd suitable jobs. Yet, the
ﬁndings in the last section have shown that the labor market outcomes of immigrants
improve relative to natives with time in the country: both immigrant men and women
are more likely to be employed and there is sizable wage assimilation once we account
for selection along the employment margin. How can we explain this catch-up process
of immigrants relative to natives? In this section, we provide some exploratory evidence
about the channels of wage assimilation in Germany.
The literature has stressed three main mechanisms how immigrants improve their
labor market position over time: the ﬁrst one is through job search and occupational
upgrading. Given that they might lack information or other credentials such as the
oﬃcial recognition of certiﬁcates or other barriers, immigrants tend to downgrade their
initial occupations after immigration (Eckstein and Weiss, 2004; Lessem and Sanders,
2014; Weiss et al., 2003). Hence, we would expect that they are more likely to change
jobs and possibly occupations to improve their job or occupational match. In addition,
immigrants might switch to higher-paying industries over time as well.
Some ﬁrst evidence for the importance of job mobility and upgrading is shown
in Table 4.10. Estimates are based on equation (4.1) and our measure of years in
Germany uses the minimum year of entry into Germany or the social security system
(YSM: Both). The dependent variables are whether a person changed the employer
(columns (1) and (4)), the occupation (columns (2) and (5)), or the industry (columns
(3) and (6)) in a given year. A change of employer is coded as one if an individual
who has worked in the current and last year is now observed in a diﬀerent plant;
the variable is zero if the individual is still employed in the same plant. A change
in occupation (industry) is coded as one if a person works in a diﬀerent occupation
(industry) than in the last job.20 The variable is not conditioned on the person being
20Occupations and industries in the PASS-ADIAB are measured at the 3-digit level. The variables
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Table 4.10: Mechanisms: Changing Jobs, Occupations, and Industries
Men Women
Change Job
Change
Occupation
Change
Industry
Change Job
Change
Occupation
Change
Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years in Germany -0.0101*** -0.0228*** -0.0222*** -0.0118*** -0.0137*** -0.0107***
(0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Years in Germany Squared 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80106 172078 172078 75027 186581 186581
R-Squared 0.0172 0.0558 0.0666 0.0140 0.0423 0.0530
Immigrant-Native Gap 0.0923 0.1727 0.1681 0.0883 0.0974 0.0790
Notes: The table reports estimates of the relationship between years since migration of immigrants and labor market mobility. Dependent variables are indicating
whether a respondent changed the employer/establishment (columns (1) and (4)), the occupation (columns (2) and (5)), and the industry (columns (3) and (6))
in a given year. The main independent variable is the preferred version of years since migration (combined from PASS and IEB data). All regressions control
for a quadratic of potential labor market experience, year ﬁxed eﬀects, cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects (1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999,
2000-2004, 2005-2009), as well as region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Asia, Africa, North
and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, and other or no citizenship). The sample includes natives and immigrants aged 20 to 60,
who are unemployed, non-employed, or employed (including part-time employment, non-regular employment, or in vocational training). Furthermore, immigrants
in the sample immigrated after 1975 at age 20 or older. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. The initial immigrant-native gaps are computed in identical
regressions that include an immigrant dummy instead of origin and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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employed continuously; hence, the individual could have worked in the same job or
experienced an un- or non-employment spell within the past year.
Table 4.10 indicates in the last row that, within the ﬁrst years in the country, im-
migrant men and women are much more likely to change occupations and industries,
and somewhat more likely to change jobs than natives. The estimates for years since
migration and its squared term show that immigrants of both genders are much less
likely to switch occupations and industries with time spent in the country. The job
changing rate also declines, but less than the rate of changing occupations and indus-
tries, especially for men. This evidence is consistent with the idea that individuals ﬁrst
search over occupations and industries, and then for a good ﬁrm match. Such search
behavior arises when occupation- or industry-speciﬁc human capital earns higher re-
turns than ﬁrm tenure; hence, it becomes increasingly costly to switch occupations or
industries later in one's career (see Neal, 1999; Pavan, 2011, for models and empirical
evidence). Immigrant adults, as they start out in the host country with fewer speciﬁc
skills, information and networks than their native counterparts of the same age, are
likely to start the process of searching for the right occupation and industry later than
natives. While the patterns are overall similar between immigrant men and women,
men are initially much more likely to change occupations and industries than women.
Not surprisingly then, immigrant men also experience over time a sharper decline in
the probability of occupational and industry changes.
Given that immigrants search for better job matches, we should also observe that
they work in diﬀerent ﬁrms than natives upon arrival. A recent literature has stressed
the role of the ﬁrm and sorting of workers into ﬁrms as an important determinant of
wages (see Card et al., 2013, 2018). If immigrants initially lack the necessary infor-
mation or networks, they might start out with jobs in less productive and possibly
lower-paying ﬁrms than the average native. Recent evidence indeed suggests that
ethnic networks, i.e., networks of immigrants from the same origin, facilitate fast em-
ployment, but often in low-paying jobs (see, e.g., Battisti et al., 2016; Dustmann et al.,
2016; Munshi, 2003).
Table 4.11 provides some evidence whether the ﬁrm indeed plays an important role
for the progress of immigrants. As before, the left-hand side shows results for men,
the right-hand side for women. The table reports estimates of equation (4.1) where
the outcomes are now ﬁrm characteristics. The dependent variables are the size of the
ﬁrm in columns (1) and (5), the composition of the ﬁrm's workforce in columns (2)-(3)
and (6)-(7) and the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect proxying for the ﬁrm match in columns (4) and
(8). Note that the number of observations in columns (4) and (8) is smaller than in
the rest of the table because the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are only available for West Germany
and for ﬁrms that existed during the period from 1985 to 2009.
diﬀerentiate between about 330 occupations and 200 industries.
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Table 4.11: Mechanisms: Firm Characteristics
Men Women
Firm Size
Share of
Germans
Share same
Origin
Firm FE Firm Size
Share of
Germans
Share same
Origin
Firm FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years in Germany 62.4907** 0.0039** -0.0052*** -0.0020 23.1063*** 0.0079*** -0.0040 0.0037
(26.3736) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) (7.3502) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0029)
Years in Germany Squared -1.0692 -0.0000 0.0001* 0.0001 -0.4262* -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000
(1.2013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2493) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83065 83065 80986 53336 51324 51324 50190 24777
R-Squared 0.0082 0.1446 0.7344 0.7283 0.0080 0.0972 0.6869 0.7237
Immigrant-Native Gap -600.9295 -0.1749 -0.8011 -0.1350 -191.8029 -0.1910 -0.0043 -0.1414
Notes: The table reports estimates of the eﬀects of years since migration on immigrant-native gaps in ﬁrm characteristics. Dependent variables are the ﬁrm size (columns (1) and (5)), the share of German
employees in the ﬁrm (columns (2) and (6)), the share of compatriots in the ﬁrm (columns (3) and (7)), and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (columns (4) and (8)). The main independent variable is the preferred version
of years since migration (combined from PASS and IEB data). All regressions control for a quadratic of potential labor market experience, year ﬁxed eﬀects, cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects (1975-1979,
1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009), as well as region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Asia, Africa, North
and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, and other or no citizenship). The sample includes natives and immigrants aged 20 to 60, who are full-time employed (not in part-time
employment, non-regular employment, or in vocational training). Furthermore, immigrants in the sample immigrated after 1975 at age 20 or older. Standard errors in parantheses are robust. The initial
immigrant-native gaps are computed in identical regressions that include an immigrant dummy instead of origin and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The last row shows that immigrants, even when they hold a social security job,
work initially in much smaller ﬁrms than natives. Immigrant men, for instance, work
in ﬁrms with on average 600 fewer employees compared to native men. For immigrant
women, the initial gap (as shown in the last row) is with just about 200 fewer employees
much smaller than for men.21 This initial gap closes after about 10 years in Germany.
As larger ﬁrms pay higher wages, the change in the size of employers is one source of
wage assimilation.
Furthermore, the composition of the workforce with respect to nationality also
changes for immigrants relative to natives with time in the country. Immigrants are
initially more likely to work in ﬁrms where a larger share of the workforce comes from
the same country of origin (see columns (2)-(3) and (6)-(7) of Table 4.11). Over time,
they are less likely to be employed in those ﬁrms, while immigrants are more likely
to work in ﬁrms with a larger share of native employees. This result supports earlier
evidence that ethnic networks seem to become less important for immigrants as a source
of job information and referrals over time (Dustmann et al., 2016).
Finally, immigrants might also assimilate because they are better able to identify
and sort into more productive and possibly better-paying ﬁrms over time. The last
row of columns (4) and (8) shows that immigrants are initially much more likely to
work in lower-quality ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients on years since migration in turn indicate
no progress along this dimension over time. Hence, immigrants are not able to close
the gap in ﬁrm quality relative to natives.
4.5 Conclusion
Most previous studies on immigrant assimilation in Germany ﬁnd little evidence of
assimilation using data from the Socio-Economic Panel (Basilio et al., 2017; Fertig and
Schurer, 2007; Pischke, 1992; Schmidt, 1997). We use a novel dataset, which combines
administrative social security records with a household survey providing information
on year of arrival and place of birth. Based on this stock-based sample, we reconsider
the question of immigrant assimilation in Germany. Our results provide a much more
optimistic picture of the progress of immigrants in Germany. For both immigrant
men and women, we document substantial progress in terms of employment relative to
natives. Furthermore, once we account for the sizable changes along the employment
margin, we also ﬁnd substantial wage assimilation for immigrant men and women.
Most of the convergence occurs within the ﬁrst decade after arrival; yet, the fast
growth within the ﬁrst ten years in Germany is not due to changes in the composition
21The main reason for this diﬀerence is that immigrant men are much more likely to be employed in
manufacturing and construction, while immigrant women are much more likely to work in the service
industry.
154
of immigrants. We further document that assimilation occurs for immigrants arriving
prior to 1990 and for those arriving after the fall of the Iron curtain though the speed of
convergence is somewhat larger for the later arrival cohorts. In addition, assimilation
is faster for immigrants from outside the European Union who also face much higher
barriers to transfer their skills like educational credentials, for instance. The only
exception are Turkish men, for which we do not observe any assimilation neither in
terms of employment nor wages. Yet, Turkish women still experience wage assimilation
 even at a faster rate than the average immigrant.
Finally, we explore potential mechanisms for the observed assimilation in employ-
ment and wages. The relative position of immigrants improves over time, as immigrants
search over occupations and industries. Our evidence also suggests that the ﬁrm plays
an important role in this convergence process, as immigrants are able to secure jobs in
more productive ﬁrms and to rely less on ethnic networks over time.
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4.A Additional Figures
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Figure 4.A.1: Inﬂows and Outﬂows of Immigrants to Germany (1975-2013)
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the in- and outﬂows of immigrants to Germany between 1975 and 2013. Furthermore, the
bars illustrate the net immigration, which is calculated as the diﬀerence between inﬂows and outﬂows. Immigrants are
deﬁned as foreigners. Thus, German citizens that emigrate and re-migrate are not included in the numbers. Source:
Statistisches Bundesamt (2018).
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Figure 4.A.2: Main Source Countries of Immigrants in Germany (1992-2014)
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the origin composition of immigrants that came to Germany between 1992 and 2014. The
graph reports the percentage shares of the main origin regions with respect to the total number of immigrants in a given
year. The main source regions of immigrants in Germany are grouped as follows: traditional EU countries (EU-15,
Norway, and Switzerland); new EU entrants (East EU); Russia and other former Soviet Union republics (i.e., Belarus,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan  not included are the EU-member states Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia); Former Yugoslavia
and Albania (including Croatia and Slovenia); Turkey; Middle East (including Afghanistan). Source: Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge (2016).
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Figure 4.A.3: Structure of the PASS-ADIAB
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Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the structure of the PASS-ADIAB data set.
Figure 4.A.4: Wage Distributions in IEB and PASS-ADIAB
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Notes: The ﬁgure displays the distributions real wages (adjusted to 1995 prices) in the IEB (1975-2010) and the
PASS-ADIAB (1975-2010). The sample includes natives and immigrants aged 20 to 60, who are employed.
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4.B Additional Tables
Table 4.B.1: Diﬀerence between Year of Arrival in IEB and PASS
Men Women
First Entry < PASS 7.73% 5.70%
First Entry = PASS 46.56% 47.37%
First Entry > PASS 45.72% 46.93%
Observations 13,229 14,020
Notes: The table reports the diﬀerences between the ﬁrst entry in the
social security records and the year of immigration according to the
PASS survey.
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Table 4.B.2: Wage Assimilation with Diﬀerent YSM-Deﬁnitions
Men Women
YSM: PASS YSM: IEB YSM: Both YSM: PASS YSM: IEB YSM: Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years in Germany -0.0022 0.0062* -0.0009 0.0037 0.0179** 0.0038
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0057) (0.0076) (0.0054)
Years in Germany Squared 0.0001 -0.0003* 0.0000 0.0004** -0.0002 0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82153 81743 82258 49746 49502 49789
R-Squared 0.0669 0.0596 0.0670 0.0234 0.0217 0.0233
Immigrant-Native Gap -0.2949 -0.2089 -0.2955 -0.2826 -0.1109 -0.2883
Notes: The table reports estimates of the relationship between years since migration and log real wages for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of years since migration and origin
countries. Deﬁnitions diﬀer in the source of information: In columns (1) and (4), information from the PASS survey on the year of migration and origin country
of immigrants is used to construct the main explanatory variable years since migration and the deﬁnitions of immigrants/origin countries. In columns (2) and (5),
information from social security records (IEB) on the ﬁrst social security record and the nationality of an observation is used to generate the same variables. In columns
(6) and (7), survey information is the preferred source of information, only if the ﬁrst social security records entry is found to be earlier than the reported year of
immigration, information from the IEB is preferred. Sample restrictions and other control variables are the same as in the main speciﬁcation. Standard errors in
parantheses are robust. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.B.3: Summary: PASS-ADIAB
Immigrants Natives
Men Women Men Women
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Real Wage 59.9630 31.0761 49.9339 51.4242 77.1507 64.9366 53.1478 33.3458
Employed 0.4687 0.4990 0.2539 0.4353 0.5530 0.4972 0.3898 0.4877
Unemployed 0.3649 0.4814 0.4592 0.4984 0.2376 0.4256 0.2571 0.4370
Change Employer 0.0622 0.2415 0.0496 0.2171 0.0449 0.2070 0.0438 0.2046
Occupation Change 0.1565 0.3634 0.0884 0.2839 0.1298 0.3361 0.0893 0.2852
Industry Change 0.1356 0.3423 0.0708 0.2566 0.1152 0.3193 0.0838 0.2771
Firm FE 0.6882 0.4187 0.6411 0.4128 0.7331 0.3829 0.6670 0.3836
Firm Size 818.33 3794.78 366.59 853.91 1166.91 5001.21 533.20 2374.92
Firm: Median Wage 66.1541 25.3469 61.1417 26.5764 68.8052 28.5702 58.8379 27.1118
Firm: German Share 0.7903 0.2286 0.8264 0.2126 0.9388 0.0961 0.9502 0.0914
Firm: Same Origin Share 0.0930 0.2007 0.0675 0.1797 0.9388 0.0961 0.9502 0.0914
Age 40.9967 9.2226 41.0876 9.4601 36.8783 10.3321 35.7882 10.3066
High Education 0.1796 0.3839 0.2396 0.4269 0.1099 0.3127 0.0821 0.2745
Medium Education 0.5302 0.4991 0.4671 0.4989 0.7212 0.4484 0.7112 0.4532
Low Education 0.3019 0.4591 0.3065 0.4611 0.1822 0.3860 0.2156 0.4112
Experience 22.9894 9.5456 22.7155 9.7718 19.2801 10.3860 18.3461 10.4850
Years Since Migration (Combined) 10.5041 6.8915 9.9660 6.7410
Year Arrived (Combined) 1992.51 7.25 1994.26 7.26
Age at Migration (Combined) 30.4926 8.3723 31.1216 8.7195
Observations 11,588 10,346 145,670 132,916
Notes: The table reports summary statistics immigrants and natives in PASS-ADIAB sample. The sample includes natives and immigrants aged 20 to 60, who are unemployed, non-employed, or
full-time employed (not in part-time employment, non-regular employment, or in vocational training). Furthermore, immigrants in the sample immigrated after 1975 at age 20 or older. The sample
comprises multiple observations of individuals between 1975 and 2010.
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Table 4.B.4: Within Individual Assimilation in Employment and Wages
Employed Log Wage
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years in Germany 0.0111*** 0.0219*** -0.0014 0.0133**
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0059)
Years in Germany Squared -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Experience, Experience Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival Cohort Fixed Eﬀects No No No No
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects No No No No
Observations 159106 144571 82273 49789
R-Squared 0.1442 0.1029 0.1668 0.0595
Notes: The table reports estimates of individual ﬁxed eﬀects regressions. The dependent variable in columns (1) and
(2) is an indicator for being employed within the social security system; the variable is zero if a person is unemployed,
non-employed or working outside the social security system. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the log of
real daily wages. The main independent variable is the preferred version of years since migration (combined from PASS
and IEB data). Sample restrictions and other control variables are the same as in the main speciﬁcation. Standard errors
in parantheses are robust. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.B.5: Characteristics of Native Labor Market Entrants
Employed in Previous Year
Non-Employed in Previous
Year
Non-Employed in two
Previous Years
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Native Men
High Education 0.1134 0.3171 0.0879 0.2831 0.0987 0.2983
Medium Education 0.7193 0.4493 0.6991 0.4587 0.6739 0.4688
Low Education 0.1804 0.3845 0.2297 0.4206 0.2436 0.4293
Real Wage 74.2857 67.0198 42.4795 27.8407 39.0990 27.6056
Worker FE 3.6738 0.4360 3.4429 0.4272 3.4107 0.4373
Firm FE 0.7378 0.3796 0.6139 0.4038 0.6045 0.4053
Firm Size 1188.41 4985.49 511.31 3155.32 400.93 2244.67
Firm: Median Wage 70.3301 28.9294 57.7912 23.5544 57.4037 23.4796
Observations 67,183 9,355 5,309
Panel B: Native Women
High Education 0.0808 0.2725 0.0794 0.2704 0.0797 0.2709
Medium Education 0.7172 0.4503 0.7170 0.4505 0.7035 0.4567
Low Education 0.2101 0.4074 0.2116 0.4085 0.2249 0.4176
Real Wage 43.9595 32.4677 26.7846 22.7178 24.8703 20.9503
Worker FE 3.9221 0.3962 3.8140 0.3741 3.7949 0.3842
Firm FE 0.6755 0.3732 0.6436 0.4036 0.6594 0.4137
Firm Size 496.24 2209.33 303.16 1274.39 279.17 1041.53
Firm: Median Wage 63.5873 27.7833 56.9706 25.1377 57.3049 25.3504
Observations 53,007 8,885 5,391
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for diﬀerent subsamples of male and female natives the PASS-ADIAB between 1975 and 2010. In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes only those individuals
that were employed in the previous year. Columns (3) and (4) is restricted to individuals that are employed in a given year, and were non-employed in the previous year. Columns (5) and (6) include
employed individuals that were non-employed in the two previous years. The sample is further restricted to foreign-borns who immigrated to Germany after 1975 at age 20 or older, and who are between 20
and 60 years-old. Summary statistics are reported for the following variables: indicators for high, medium, and low skilled; daily wage (adjusted to 1995 prices); worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, which have been
estimated based on the universe of social security records (Card et al., 2013); the size of the ﬁrm (in employees); and the median wage of a ﬁrm.
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